In the words of one Afghan lawmaker:
“The Musa Qala project has sent two messages: one, recognition for the enemy, and two, military defeat,” said Mustafa Qazemi, a member of Afghanistan’s Parliament and a former resistance fighter with the Northern Alliance, which fought the Taliban for seven years.
. . .
Some compare the deal to agreements that Pakistan has struck with leaders in its tribal areas along the Afghan border, which have given those territories more autonomy and, critics say, empowered the Taliban who have taken sanctuary there and allowed them to regroup.
What’s so interesting about this is that this is essentially what the British did in southern Iraq. They gave up. No one really likes to talk about it, and they are extremely difficult to embed with, but more and more people are starting to recognize that the one place coalition forces really suffered a defeat was in the south.
The Brits don’t patrol in Basra anymore, they largely just stay in their compound and get shelled every night. US bases get shelled too, but then they do something about it and the shelling stops.
Their most famous move was their abrupt withdrawal from Amara, capital of Maysan province, where they were rocketed every night by Mahdi militia. So with no warning to Iraqi authorities, they declared their mission in Amara complete, pulled out and “redeployed� to the Iranian border to conduct “World War II-style� desert patrol tactics. Somehow trying to turn a retreat into a evocation of the glories of the North Africa campaign.
The base in Amara, meanwhile was sacked by the Mahdi militia because Iraqi authorities hadn’t been given enough time to take control of it.
Since their departure, there have been pitched battles in Amara between Mahdi militia and police (who are controlled by the rival Badr Brigade Shiite militia).
Now don’t get me wrong, Iraq’s a tough place and each army has to make its decision about how to deal with it, but the British enjoy so much describing how they do everything better than the Americans.
In the beginning of their Basra occupation, they described how their years of experience occupying Northern Ireland made them expert at a light touch and winning the inhabitants’ trust.
Now, as they are talking about pulling out, the city is dangerous place awash in battles between rival militias and gangs making millions off the oil smuggling. The Brits just let them take over, and when it got too dangerous, they stopped leaving their base. And now they are leaving entirely.
In Afghanistan, when the fighting suddenly became hot. They appear to be doing the same thing.
So my question is, who are the real surrender monkeys?
Interesting. Thanks for this, Paul (and nice to see you with a proper account on Arabist).
The British just sit tight and take it when their Basra base gets shelled every night? Bi-gad?
British ‘Surrender Monkeys’…
Paul has a worthwhile post about the British in southern Iraq over at Arabist. Sure to raise some eyebrows. Certainly raised mine.
Seems a little cruel given England’s humiliation at the Ashes. But I’ve never known Paul to pussyfoot around….
I’m actually not quite clear what their counter-measures are but the point is — according to their military spokesman — it happens practically every day. (“oh, that, just a little spot of bother, happens all the time, you know.”)
Interesting. Did the Northern Ireland/previous colonial experience end up helping in any way, do you think?
“US bases get shelled too, but then they do something about it and the shelling stops.”
Could the case be made that the Americans are keeping the cycle of violence going and that the shelling may stop in one particular place only to surface in another? And the Brits are essentially dealing with the results of a largely American operation?
“..And the Brits are essentially dealing with the results of a largely American operation?”
The Brits and Americans are in widely separated areas. The Americans are concentrated around Baghdad, Anbar, Diyala, and the north. The Brits are just in Basra and Maysan provinces after having turned over Dhi Qar and Muthana. Also, in general, the southern provinces were much quieter places than the insurgence-prone center and north of the country — until the militia rivarly thing kicked off about a year or two ago.
Do you think that the violence that stemmed from militia rivalries was something the Brits could have prevented with more robust military action? Were the Americans able to do this more effectively?
Also, to what extent is this really about differences in military cultures vs political will. Seems like there are multiple political processes intersecting here – the Brits have very little support for this operation back home so little incentive to make the sacrifices necessary to be sure they do it right, the Americans have much more at stake but wanted to limit their own casualties and show progress by getting an elected Iraqi government in at the earliest, and bingo, law enforcement gets sectarianised and all hell breaks loose.
hmmmm… this has the feelings of a lengthy debate.
I can’t say I’m an expert on the matter, but what I would say is that Britain took a very hands off approach to the south — allowing the flourishing of a illegal armed groups and criminal networks. It was fine when everyone left each other alone, but then eventually they began rubbing up against each other. Rather than confronting them however. British forces, to a large part, withdrew.
Would a more hands on approach to the development of armed non-governmental groups in the south have made a difference? Probably.
The Brits developed a sectarianized law enforcement apparatus in the south as well.
And they didn’t even have to deal with a Sunni insurgency, the prime motivator of extreme violence in Iraq for the first few years.
No one has a monopoly of screwing up on Iraq, it’s just that the British are so almighty proud of their military and love taking the piss out of the Americans that it’s worth commenting on their recent record.
Thanks, Paul, for this post. Having fought in Iraq in 2003, I can attest that the U.S. Army made a lot of mistakes in the opening year of the war. Many of these mistakes were highlighted by British general Nigel Aylwin-Foster in this article in Military Review (the U.S. military’s scholarly journal): http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/download/English/NovDec05/aylwin.pdf
The tone of Nigel Aylwin-Foster’s article rankled a lot of American officers, who found it loaded with typical British condescension toward their American peers. (It is also, in my opinion, loaded with lessons to be learned.)
But it’s perfectly natural for a military to make tactical mistakes in the opening year of a counterinsurgency campaign. Just look at the British in the ultimately successful Malaya campaign — they floundered about for a full two years before getting things right. (And even then killed upward of 8,000 innocent civilians in their pacification efforts.) Indeed, America’s failure in Iraq is due to strategic failures (i.e., not enough troops, no broad international coalition, etc.) rather than tactics, which have improved greatly since 2003.
But the truth is, the Brits lost their stomach for this war long before the U.S. military. And one of the things that no American has said — for fear of insulting our closest ally — is that the reason things look easier in the south are two-fold:
1. The British effort in Iraq is distinguished not by the battles they have fought but by the battles they have left unfought. In other words, the British — for better or for worse — made a conscious effort to ignore the growing militia problem in southern Iraq starting in 2003.
2. Southern Iraq, it seems obvious, ain’t exactly the Anbar province. The reason southern Iraq looks easy is because, compared to ar-Ramadi or Fallujah, it is.
“US bases get shelled too, but then they do something about it and the shelling stops.”
Like what? Kill more innocent Iraqis? Storm into peoples’ houses at dawn? Offer more money to death squads to rid them of “uncooperative” leaders?
Thank you very much! Now i can feel free to generalize when talking about the “perspective” of embeded reporters!
“No one has a monopoly of screwing up on Iraq, it’s just that the British are so almighty proud of their military and love taking the piss out of the Americans that it’s worth commenting on their recent record.”
I think it is worth commenting on in and of itself But I do understand your sentiment. I lived in the UK during the first year of the occupation and the British press stressed all the time how different their boys was opposed to the Americans. Americans were portrayed as incencitive trigger happy cowboys.
But did I detect some gloating in your post? 😉
One more thing: it should be said that the Brits were not the only ones who struck a seperate peace with terrorists/militias/militants in Iraq. I just had a conversation with a fellow military officer and Iraq vet, and he mentioned the deal the Italians had in the south: Don’t hit our convoys on the road, and we won’t *leave* the road. There was a degree of “hear no evil, see no evil” to the Italian method. But should this surprise us?
In Iraq, the US genuinely felt — rightly or wrongly — that they had an interest in the fight there. The Europeans, meanwhile, felt they had a genuine interest in being a good ally to the US … but not that their national security was tied up in what happened in Iraq. There were varying degrees of motivation among the “coalition of the willing.”
Eman,
Thank you for your refreshing perspective, such insight is always welcome to any debate.
I would only point out that if you draw all your conclusions about “embedded reporters” from my comments, you still would be making a gross generalization, since there are a lot of people here writing different things.
I’d also add that I’m not embedded.
Your constructive comments are the heart and soul of any online discussion.
Andrew – would you say the Brits and the Americans varied in their choice of tactics in any significant way that could have affected their success in their particular corners of Iraq? You suggest the American tactics didn’t make a difference either way, while the Brits seem to think they did; and Paul is arguing that the Brit “light touch” tactics may have done more harm than good.
Also, am curious about what the Brits did to “develop” a sectarianized law enforcement apparatus in the south, was under the impression that this was just a by-product of sectarianization of law enforcement throughout Iraq esp after their elections. Did the Brits decide to back the Shia and let them run things first, or intervene less than the Americans did to counteract the same process?
And, any examples of areas in which the Americans managed to check the rise of sectarian militias?
aaargh, SP, all I wanted to do was poke fun at the British and now you are making me defend and explain my arguments? Is that allowed?
I don’t mean to endorse US tactics in Iraq, my feelings about that have been pretty plain. All I was doing was highlightning British difficulties, which tend to get a little less attention. (and an apparent repetition of such tactics in Afghanistan).
Did the British tilt towards the Shia? I would imagine so since their area of operation, the south, is 90% Shia. Who else would they tilt to?
What I meant was they did nothing to stop the militias growth in strength and taking over security.
Did the Americans do differently? In some cases. In some cases they worked against it. They had a whole brigade of the National Police pulled out of Baghdad and confined to base for retraining a few months ago, about 800 people because they were facilitating militia incursions into west Baghdad.
In other cases they turned a blind eye. In 2004, shortly before elections, they told Iraqi leaders that more brigades of national police were needed, and suddenly two brigades appeared — apparently entirely Badr Brigade guys freshly outfitted in NP uniforms — perhaps these were the same guys taken off line two years later.
Malesh ya Paul, my inner geek just wanted details. Arguably the Brits did screw up Iraq from the very beginning/Mandate period so you are absolutely allowed to poke fun at them.
Yes, just please dont poke fun at Iraqis, because they are doing everything so properly and responibly. As I see, your major role here is to patrol that everyone gets the criticism he deserves..istnt it so?? I would like to see your nice idealist theories being implemented in practice… whois going to laugh than?
Paul,
Thanks for the compliment and thank you for correcting me. I didn’t know you were no longer embeded, Mabrouk, when were you released? I’m so happy for you -though this means we’re no longer gonna get lovely posts from you about sweet American soldiers in Iraq who are all married and have families back home they wanna return to.
Don’t get me wrong, I do love your style and wish I can write like you one day. I read your articles regularly when you were based in Cairo and always admired not just the style but also the logic behind them. However, eversince you went to Iraq, I must say, I was disappointed. You started writing like any other typical American reporter, especially during the time you were embedded.
Though I read the Arabist regularly I never tried to comment before on any of your few posts because what I had to say was nothing more than a difference in opinion. You see one thing I see another. And since on the one hand, I’ve never been to Iraq and on the other -as you yourself stated a few times- there is a language and hence cultural barrier between you and the Iraqis we are not exactly the right people to discuss or argue about what is going on in Iraq.
However, this time, this post is just too much! This time it’s not about an opinion it’s about an attitude that is prevalent among American and British writers, the whole “We killed less people than you did and that makes us better”, “We know how to deal with those hajjis better than you do, we don’t chicken out and run after it all turns into one big mess.” !!!
What’s going on in Iraq is not a competition to show who can mess things up then strighten them out again quicker than the others with the winner getting a prize in the end!! This is about a nation that has been destroyed for God only knows what! It’s about thousands of people whose lives have been brought to an abrupt end for nothing.
So please stop romanticizing your country’s occupation forces. They, and all of their allies, are nothing but war criminals and it disgusts me to see respectable reporters gloating over the fact that others are messing up even worse with a group of people.
Eman, one of the biggest problems the U.S. military has faced in Iraq has been that the soldiers serving there often “dehumanize” the Iraqis. That is, they forget that Iraqis have jobs, families, dreams, fears, and hopes — just like them. Don’t make the same mistake by dehumanizing Ameircan soldiers. And certainly don’t criticize Paul for writing about those soldiers’ families and lives. The point of that kind of reporting is to remind all sides of the debate that in the end, the Iraq tragedy is about the sacrifice (often pointless) of men and women — humans all — who died too soon.
Eman, I’m afraid I have to disagree with you. Andrew (who has served in the US forces) is right: these soldiers deserve to have their stories told. In the first Gulf War many American soldiers came back with what is now known as Gulf War syndrome and were subsequently treated like shit by the Dept. of Veterans Affairs. Now many soldiers are coming back with major psychological problems, if not amputations (or indeed in a bodybag.) They are now fighting a pointless war because their president lied and manipulated the American public. Many of them are recent recruits who wanted to do their bit for their country because of 9/11. Some were lured with promises of “not having to do any real fighting” and were told that they would be put through college when they got back to the US — in fact most are getting just enough money to cover may half a year at a typical US college, certainly nothing like what they would need for a standard four-year degree. Sure, the Iraqis have it worse — much, much worse. But the soldiers are not to blame, their government is. And incidentally Paul also reports on the plight of Iraqis, not just US soldiers — and has done so at the risk of his own life. It’s not fair to say that all American soldiers and journalists are monsters. After all, we don’t judge Egyptians on their government’s policy.
Hi Eman,
Thanks for being a little more specific this time in your criticism, and I’m sorry I’ve disappointed you. I would make few quick comments – 1) the occasional posts that have appeared here do not represent the full breadth of my writings, personal or professional on Iraq, there’ s a lot of stuff you’ve missed that you would probably find a little less ‘disappointing’. So, once again, I would caution against a generalization.
2) The post was not about who killed more people, it was about British forces abdicating their responsibility as an occupying authority to ensure stability in their area. It’s a responsibility that the Americans were, for a large part, unable to fuilfil in their areas either, as repeatedly pointed out by the Sunni Muslim Scholars Association.
3) I am very aware of what is going on every day in Iraq, thank you.
Oh well, everyone else is jumping into the fray… My British soldier friend, of whom I’m inordinately fond, just got back from that part of the world. While he was there, I sent him e-blueys and he sent me the actual paper ones. I tried to always sound upbeat and cheerful, and he tried to always put the best possible light on what was going on. Of course, when he got back it was a different matter.
Some of the stories were not surprising, just sad, and mostly due to a clash of culture and language. But the most telling story was the presentation to the local Iraqi police from the British of a brand-new police SUV, with all the lights and whistles, to get them started in doing the job themselves. The very next night, the Brits get a frantic call from the Iraqi police to come help them out. When the Brits get there, they look around and ask, ‘Where’s the new gear?’ Ummm. Silence. Nobody knows anything. Later it comes out that the SUV was stripped down and sold as a civilian car to a local warlord and all the techie-type paraphenalia carted off to the local boot sales, so to speak. Why? Because they needed the money and, after all, the Brits are still there to do the job for them anyway, right?
Right. It’s an anecdotal story, second-hand, from a rather biased source, you betcha. But it left me with the strong impression that the only way the Iraqis were going to stand up is if the Brits (and the rest of us) stand down first. To me, I think the Brits are reacting quite sensible. Tally-ho, boys. Get yer arses out of there and come home.
Oh, and just as a postscript, my British soldier mate is being treated for PTS, has had a great deal of trouble getting back into civilian life, and has signed up to do another tour in Afghanistan, because he still (silly sod) sincerely believes in trying to make a difference. I’m just worried that he’s going to get his arse blown up and come home in a box to be written off by various armchair warrior politicians as just another comma in the history of the world, having achieved absolutely nada. Just as you don’t throw good money after bad, I don’t see the sense in throwing live bodies after dead ones. We’ve created a hell of a mess in Iraq and Afghanistan, that’s true, we are guilty as sin. But we’ve lost. Face it. We’ve lost the war, it’s over. Time to bring our bangers and mash surrender monkeys home.
‘but more and more people are starting to recognize that the one place coalition forces really suffered a defeat was in the south.’
Jesus. It really is always someone else’s fault, isn’t it. I must be dreaming all these endless reports about the US endlessly waging war to retake Fallujia.
We arrived in Basra and maintained a difficult peace for as long as we could, from what I can see of domestic and international news. Things were going fairly well, there was co-operation, it remained fairly secure. The general principle seems to be, don’t beat the shit out of civilian militias backed by foreign powers when you’re likely to end up across the negotiating table from them anyway; we learned this the hard way. Corruption in the total absence of a police force is inevitable; bloodshed need not be.
Slowly and surely, the war in the north in particular got worse and worse, and co-operation between the British and the people of Basra was fatally damaged by this, while we were overstretched keeping half of Afghanistan together while US military spending almost completely abandoned it. I’m sure there have been mistakes, but ultimately it seems to have become impossible to maintain any distance from the US approach of distrust for anyone with an arab name, and we’ve lost control of Basra, for sure. It sucks as much as most of the population of the UK thought it probably would by now.
But hey, it’s all going so _fabulously_ elsewhere, there had to be a fly in the ointment somewhere, eh?
You’ll pardon our troops for not wanting to violently crush legitimate popular discontent just to make the US look better, I hope.
And don’t go too far out on the ’tilting towards the Shia’ angle; you’ll end up looking very stupid.
Paul – Thank you for an insightful post – you have generated quite a debate here.
Today in the US, the Iraq Study group issued its report containing 78 recommendations. YOu can find a link to the report on Just Dahlia.
In summary, this august group is calling on Bush to basically follow the British example you so ably outlined and call US troups back into bases, slowly withdraw combat troups out of Iraq into neighboring areas, and change the US military task in Iraq to training. At the same time, the report calls on the US to engage with Iran (I have often said that the US went to war in Iraq and Iran won-here is more proof) and Syria, as well as the rest of the Middle East including Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. In short, the group is calling on Bush to go back to good old diplomacy now that it is finally clear that Bush failed in his cowboy go-it-alone approach to international affairs (despite the British lackeys).
Well, now that the US has let hell lose on the region, maybe following the example of the British is the only option left for them to mess up as well.
Dahlia