The major challenge facing the United States in this region is how to help democratize Arab polities and in so doing giving peace, stability, and moderation a chance in the struggle against dictatorship and violence. So it is downright mysterious why American aid to Egypt should continue to flow with no political strings attached.
America could make the linkage very explicit, by putting forward clear benchmarks and timelines on political reform. At a minimum, if Bush were serious about his liberty doctrine, U.S. aid could be restructured to give less to the Egyptian military and more to domestic civil society and to American nongovernmental organizations involved in democracy promotion. Yet, ironically, these organizations are now under siege in Egypt.
Bush’s retreat on democracy promotion has implications well beyond Cairo. Autocrats throughout the Middle East are watching. To date, the lesson is obvious: Do a few minor reforms to appease the Americans when they are paying most attention during elections, then roll these reforms back after the vote.
In retrospect, it may have been a better strategy for Bush to not have delivered his second inaugural speech about liberty, but instead quietly pushed for incremental reforms. At this stage, however, the words have already been spoken. Bush must now back them up with real policies that show his commitment to freedom. If he fails in Egypt, he fails throughout the Middle East.
Too bad Hamzawy wasn’t making the expert testimonies (almost all against cutting or changing aid) at the recent congressional hearing on the matter. His conclusions are definitely spot on. Whether you care about democracy in the Arab world or not, as an American foreign policy maker you can’t afford to just abandon a “doctrine” like that. It’ll discredit you in the region and elsewhere. I mean, the Monroe Doctrine (originally America’s refusal to let Europeans colonize Latin America, later the perpetuation of America’s dominance over Latin America that Chavez is now prying apart) lasted about 180 years before it started falling apart under Bush’s guard. His own doctrine — at least the part about democratizing the Middle East, since the part about unilateralism seems to have already died — never even got off the ground.
Thanks for sharing this editorial with us Issandr. Hamzawy rocks! Where was this editorial published by the way?
Michael McFaul was Yeltsin’s cheerleader in the 1990s – all over the Washington Post announcing that mafia types like Anatoly Chubais were delivering Russia into a democratic future.
When Putin got in using the same election tactics as Yeltsin, but soon showed himself to be a lot more independently minded, McFaul took the lead in denouncing the Kremlin’s ‘backsliding’ and democratic ‘reversals’.
One of those typical second guesser type US academics who are always looking at which way the wind’s blowing in Washington before launching their latest perscription in Foreign Policy.
Forgot the link, have changed the post, but here it is also:
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/07/03/opinion/edmcfaul.php
I suppose that Hamzawy and McFaul are right that the US, if it was really serious, would have blocked aid etc. (though they have it exactly wrong when they say that congress passed the aid to Egypt against White House opposition; in fact, the congress wanted to cut aid, but the White House insisted it continue at the same level). But for me, expecting the US to be a force for democratic change in Egypt and the region is naive to the point of folly.
The US seems more and more like a weary serial adulturer, who keeps telling his wife that he’ll never cheat again, that things are different now (I heard these very words from a State department democratiser this time last year), and then goes and sleeps with another woman. It’s very unlikely that the US is going to change it’s ways. In a way, why should it? US interests are served by supporting autocrats in what it regards as an essential but unstable region.
So let’s face reality; the US isn’t going to cut military aid to Egypt, not when that aid is tied to the Camp David agreement and the Muslim Brotherhood are rising. Instead we should be asking how democratic change, wrought from within, is possible in the face of US indifference and opposition.
Simon, I totally agree — but the point they make about how the US should have never pledged to help democrats, in its own interest, is still very valid. For the standpoint of US interests, this policy is turning out to be a disastrous loss of face.
I’m pretty sure Hamzawy has testified in the past. At the end of the day, the administration and the elected reps have to be willing to listen. And they tend to pick “experts” who will tell them what they want to hear anyway (cf. Alterman at this year’s briefings)
I think that it is entirely possible that we will see Congress cut economic aid to Egypt in the not-so-distant future. Such policy sea changes don’t happen overnight; it takes time for the pressure to build and entrenched policies to shift. And the appropriations process is not even over for this year. Lots can happen in the coming months…n.b. the debate last month was heated, there was a lot of criticism of Egypt’s reform and human rights record, and the vote was surprisingly close. For whatever it’s worth, Egypt is losing ground on the Hill, big time. It’s not just the White House etc. backing the status quo, of course. The defense companies that do oh-so-much business with Egypt are powerful obstacles to any reform, of course, and will fight hard because they see cutting economic aid as a slippery slope to messing with military aid.
Now, whether aid should be conditioned on reform is a valid question. Jon Alterman was absolutely right to point out to a pretty clueless Washington audience that such a move is not a silver bullet solution. It’s a very blunt tool that could backfire (although it’s one of the few tools the US has –and we know now that the Egyptian regime *definitely* reacts to moves from Washington. It’s just that the US rarely reacts strategically to the reactions. Cairo still plays the game far more skillfully than Washington does). A better approach would be just to cut part of the economic aid –not condition it on any changes, because that would be a mess to “measure” and certify each year, especially with Cairo churning out new, but bad, “reform” legislation quickly now (how in the world do we “set benchmarks”? XX dollars for a new press law by March 07- XX dollars for “judicial reform” by May 08 — huh?? you can imagine how badly this would go). Instead, Congress should simply cut part of it because we’re not happy with how things are going, and redirect those funds to another cause. This won’t change much on the ground, once you understand how the aid really works and who actually benefits from it anyway. But it’s better than the current nothing (which is terribly embarrassing), and sometimes mostly symbolic gestures are the only first step available. Finally, contrary to the op-ed, there are *huge* political strings attached to our current aid to Egypt, have been since the beginning. It’s just that these have absolutely nothing to do with political reform. But, as the I-P conflict morphs into a newly awful stage and Washington cares less and less about resolving it (and sees much bigger problems in the region to which it believes Egypt has little to contribute), some here will start to question whether the ‘string” of Egyptian help on this issue is still so essential, and the “logic” of the aid package may start to unravel.
Amy, could you explain how the aid cut as a symbolic gesture might get the Egyptian regime to react (presumably in ways that the US would like it to) even though, as you mention, an aid cut wouldn’t mean very much on the ground? this is something that’s a bit of a puzzle to me, because people always say US aid is a drop in the bucket and wouldn’t get the regime to give up its core interests and yet recognize that the US has been able to get the regime to change in some significant ways.
What do you think of the arguments for reprogramming aid, as some have suggested, as a way of sending a message without messing with sensitivities about Camp David?
Would more precise conditionalities, such as the release of political prisoners, be at all effective?