The recent arrests and attacks in Casablanca are very much worth investigating. In Morocco itself there is a debate between those who believe the group was linked to al-Qaeda or merely inspired by them. The government is pushing the line, credibly from what I’ve gathered from Cairo, that they were an amateur group that was much less sophisticated than, say, the group behind the 16 May 2003 bombings or the recent bombings in Algeria. There is also a debate in the Moroccan media about whether prisons are in effect becoming indoctrination centers for Islamists. Some of the men involved in this latest group were minor Islamist fellow travelers who were apparently radicalized in prison. They were pardoned and released a few years ago, as part of a royal amnesty on Islamist prisoners since so many had been rounded up after 16 May 2003. Burke’s piece largely points to poverty as the key radicalizing factor — a dominant analysis of the success of Islamist groups in Morocco (both non-violent and violent). Although there’s no denying that Morocco is a country of much poverty and many injustices, I have problems with this way of looking at things. It dismisses the very real, pragmatic manner in which a terrorist cell is formed: someone not only has to provide the guiding radical ideology (not mainstream Islamism, but rather its violent radical form) as well as the knowledge and resources to acquire and build weapons, stay secret, escape police surveillance, and more.
The group that was recently dismantled obviously did not have any great training. But to say it was merely the result of poverty is obscuring the threat of individuals, or networks of individuals, that are propagating this type of radical Islamism. Terrorists can be rich or poor, we have seen. Last year, the Moroccan security services dismantled another cell that included of former military officers — not the poorest of the poor. To keep on pointing to the poor allows to escape accountability on the really important sources of terrorism: radical Islamist websites, funding networks from the Gulf and elsewhere, information networks such as the ones led by “former” radical Islamists in London, and the experience of veterans from the Afghan civil war and now the Iraqi civil war. And, of course, the regional and global symbolic context of a “clash of civilizations” or “war on Islam” backed by very real occupations, daily scenes of injustice and selective disregard of national sovereignty does not help. Some types of poor people — notably young men — may be easy to recruit from, but focusing on poverty brings the risk of considering the poor inherently suspect.
I’ve been following this a bit, partially from tthe perspective of what I saw when the FIS and GIA were forming. I tend to agree with the Moroccan government that this is not connected to Algeria, in part because former FIS and GIA have not successfully taken refuge in Morocco. Also, given Morocco’s pattern of coups coming from inside the military does not match that of Algeria. Also, there is not a significant history of Moroccans joining the the mujahaddin in Afghanistan in the 80’s as there is Algeria, I think the Algerian group is an opportunist off-shoot rather than a clear client Al Queda structure. Coming on the eve of the Algerian elections as it does, I sense it is more an internal thing. As for Morocco, as long as Morocco clamps down on certain types of speech, provides 3rd party rendition services and does not address certain inequities (although I think MVI has started to address a few things), attacks like this are going spring up from time to time. But let’s not forget, also that they were primarily directed towards American institutions. Morocco is in a peculiar position- that of one of the US’ only Arab friends watching its long time friend turn into an international criminal, and yet still stands in need of its assistance.If MVI took a greater stand, he might be able to take the occupation fo Iraq out of the equation, or at least lessen it.
Worth a read only because there is so little written on Morocco. Other than that, it is quite lazy and lacks focus. For how long will M6 be considered a “new king”?
I tend to agree with the Moroccan government that this is not connected to Algeria, in part because former FIS and GIA have not successfully taken refuge in Morocco.
Actually, there seems to be surprisingly few contacts between Algerian and Moroccan jihadist groups, given how much they could benefit from it. And what coordination actually exists appears to have been relayed via Iraq or the diasporas in France and Spain. Perhaps that’s the only positive thing to come out of the Western Sahara conflict so far: closed borders mean less cross-border terrorism…
Also, given Morocco’s pattern of coups coming from inside the military does not match that of Algeria.
Huh? 1962, 1965, 1967, 1992…
Also, there is not a significant history of Moroccans joining the the mujahaddin in Afghanistan in the 80’s as there is Algeria
This is my impression too, and it is probably still pretty significant for the movements today. But why is that? Why did lots of Algerians go to Afghanistan, and not Moroccans?
I think the Algerian group is an opportunist off-shoot rather than a clear client Al Queda structure.
Well, they’ve been trying to attract al-Qaida support for a long time, for ideological and PR reasons, and now they’ve got it. But as an organization, I agree they’re hardly a “client”, more like a willing accomplice. Whether their (re)turn to urban attacks is purely opportunistic, or somehow connected to the allegiance to bin Ladin, I don’t know, but it’s a fact that both happened at about the same time.
Algeria’s coups are set up differently- the Moroccan coups comem from deep within the military, and is sometimes a Cherifi thing.
I am not sure why the Algerians went more than the Moroccans. It may have something to do with the utter disgust at the system which held out so much promise in the late 60’s and earl;y 70’s. All I know is that they “afghanized” quite quickly. The FIS sympathisers I knew were primarily disgusted with the government and were slightly conservative- but not rabidly so. Also, and I may be wrong, but the interpretation of Islam the FIS and the GIA tended to espouse are very incompatible with malakite views, let alone the residual belief systems prevalent in the smaller cities and the countyside about 10 years ago.
The only area in Algeria I can think of that comes even close to conservative Islam is Ghardia.
I think the alignment is purely strategic- soort of liek the Armenian Secret Army for teh Liberation of Armenia aligning themselves wih Hizbollah in the Bekaa Valley training camps. Makes litlle sense on the surface unless you look at it from a tactical standpoint.
And then, in the Maghreb, you always have those who see anyone as being able to sweep the present governent away as a necessary eveil that they will deal with later. The problem is you ask them how they will deal with it and they have’nt a clue. Get rid of X seems to be as far as it goes.
on coups: okay, i sort of see what you mean.
The only area in Algeria I can think of that comes even close to conservative Islam is Ghardia.
Well, Ghardaia is certainly conservative, superconservative, but they’re ibadi. Hardly the GIA’s or FIS’s cup of tea. (Interesting thought though. I’ll check how Ghardaia voted in the 1991 elections.)
I think the alignment is purely strategic . . .
No, I think it is deeper than that. There was some sort of congruence between the al-Qaida worldview and GSPC already at the first GIA-GSPC split. The GIA had gone too far into its own nightmarish little psycho world (and was also packed with military informers).
Al-Qaida, or rather the theologists-ideologues they relied on, were appalled at both their increasingly un-Islamic, even un-Islamist, behaviour (mass killings, mut’a “weddings” as a cover for rape, etc), and at the total loss of support this caused within the population. The GSPC was partly the child of an internal power struggle, but even more so the result of committed militants to correct the path of the struggle and get back to fighting the government instead of butchering villages and assassinating FIS leaders. This had the open blessing of al-Qaida, and there were contacts at some level from day 1.
okay, now i’ve done my homework. it seems ghardaia voted in FLN and independent candidates (no FIS or other parties) in the 1990 APC local elections, and FLN in the wilaya elections. also, according to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algerian_National_Assembly_elections,_1991“ rel=”nofollow”>wikipedia, FIS had one of four seats in the parliamentary elections the year after.
…but now where’s my first post? must have been caught in the spam filters.
Alle,
interesting about Ghardia, isn’t it? I’m not suggesting Ghardia is FIS terriitory, it’s just Ghardia practices a much more austere brand of Islam than most other places in Algeria, like say Ain Touta and the Chaoui. It would be interesting to see if there is any correlation between the numbers of MB teachers sent out to the Maghreb by Nasser and the rise of fundamentalism. I know that Lageria received quite a number, I don’t think Morocco got as many since the French did n’t have as much time to dismantle the education system (such as it was).
BTW, very interesting blog on the Saharaoui, Would like to ask you some q’s off list.
I had the impression that the number of Moroccan “Afghan Arabs” was not negligible at the lower ranks, since Morocco has been supplying muscle for a long time to various covert and open initiatives (such as sub-Saharan counter-insurgency in the 1970s as well as Afghanistan in the 1980s) backed by the US and Saudi notably. A lot of these people come from the North — Tetouan and such, which is also historically the first area of the country from which modern Salafist ideas spread in the 1920s and perhaps the area most oriented towards the Arab East.
It does not seem however that the current batch of semi-competent terrorists are Afghan veterans though.
When I was looking at the FIS, recruitment in US mosques and the mujahedin, I didn’t come across that many Moroccans, but maybe I missed something. I kept coming up with Algerians, and in the US, interestingly enough, in the early 90’s a bunch of Afghanized Algerians went to Utah for school and other things.
I agree that the current crop doesn’t see very Afghanized (sounds liked Africanized bees, doesn’t it). They seem a bit young and they also don’t sound like educated boys from poor families, like moany of the student protesters in the 80’s were. I think this lends some support to the idea potentially violent unrest among the socially and economically frustrated.
zazou & issandr — this is interesting. someone must have made a study on this at some point, which arab countries supplied the arab mujahidin to afghanistan? there are a number of conflicting http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369842“ rel=”nofollow”>studies on who goes to iraq, but algerians seem to make up an important fraction (even if i don’t believe http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0927/p01s03-woiq.html“ rel=”nofollow”>this one, since it seems primarily intended to downplay the saudi element, using saudi security sources).
in algeria now, the GSPC leadership still has original afghans — i think both abdelmoussaâb abdelouadoud, the overall leader, and mokhtar belmokhtar who heads the southern branch, were there in the last throes of the war. but i have no idea about morocco, i don’t know anything about moroccan islamism.
BTW, very interesting blog on the Saharaoui, Would like to ask you some q’s off list.
you can e-mail me on arrevs[at]gmail.com, if you want.
Frankly, I don’t know why the Algerians went in this direction, either. I am wondering if it has somethnig to do with the nature of the Algerian Revolution. I’ll try to ask my friend Zyhgim and see wht he says – as a Kabyle, I am sure he has some theories. I knew some of the Afghanized Algerians in the US , as well as some FIS and Annahada sympathisers and we had some really difficult discussions around the killing sprees the FIS were going on- they kept telling me in 1990, that none of this was true. Unfortunately for Lounes Mektoub and the friends of his I know, as well as journalist friends who were on the lists- it was true, And I willnever,. ever forget the day I watched Boudiaf get assassinated.
So, I agree- it would be very interesting to look into this.
And alle, thanks for the e-mail address.
Interesting article in the Daily Star that suggests that slums with minimal state presence are partly to blame for the growth of terrorist groups in Morocco:
http://www.dailystaregypt.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=6807