Rami Khouri has written a series of thoughtful articles about the restructuration of state power in the Arab world — both the power shift away from the military towards the security services as well as wider issues of the failure of public institutions. His his latest piece he explores the subject further:
What is significant is that the centralized power of Arab states is slowly fraying or dissipating, even in strong states with emphatic central governments and efficient, self-assertive security organizations, such as Jordan, Egypt and Morocco.
Power is decentralizing in many cases because governments simply do not have sufficient money to maintain the welfare, employment, subsidy and state-building services they provided very efficiently for half a century after the surprise of their own statehood in the 1930s, 40s and 50s.
The decentralization and dissipation of state power into the hands of Islamicized urban quarters, armed militias, ethnic-based parties, neighborhood thugs, autonomous regional authorities, multinational corporations, and private sector commercial real estate firms is an important sign of several simultaneous phenomena: the fraying credibility of state authority, the determination of concerned citizens to take charge of their own life needs and well-being, and the enormous power of the globalized commercial marketplace.
As Arab power configurations evolve, it is critically important that we do not repeat the mistakes of the past 75 years on authoritarian governance; instead, we must prod sensible statehood by consulting rather than ignoring the Arab citizen. Coming to grips with the evolving realities of power and authority requires much more honest, integrated and sophisticated analysis than has broadly pertained in recent years in the public discussions of what is wrong with our societies and how can we make things better. Much of this debate has been driven by ideological zealots, and a few naïve rascals in the Anglo-American-Israeli-dominated West, who tend mainly to focus on Islam and Arab violence — or by elite Arab autocrats who are equally blind to the powerful currents of their own fellow citizens’ discontent and fear.
The reconfiguration of power and authority is the big, new, historic and pervasive macro-development now taking place in Arab society, as the prevailing power structure of the past 75 years reaches the limits of its abilities. Not surprisingly, concerned citizens, agile gangs and efficient businessmen alike are moving in to grab their share of power in those spaces where the state is retreating, or franchising its own legitimacy and authority. Handled wisely, this could be a heartening and positive development that allows Arab society to define itself according to the consensus views of its pluralistic citizens — unless American, British, Israeli or other Western armies invade again and try to re-configure us to their liking, rather than to our rights and wishes.
It’s been argued (esp. by Diane Singerman in Avenues of Participation) that the Egyptian state’s ties or relevance to the shaabi population started to thin out a long time ago, though this population’s dependence on state subsidised food has created an incentive for them to continue to bother with the government. It looks like what Rami Khouri is talking about is an extension of this phenomenon further up the class ladder. But there will still be limits to how much the state can disengage even from the lives of the comfortably-off, given that rent control and government jobs are still important for the security of all but the most well-off. Private sector growth seems mainly confined to elite segments. Not sure the ‘retreat of the state/rise of civil society’ is really taking place wholesale if the state still needs to swoop down to do crisis management every now and again, or if even doctors still need to rally for state benefits. The ‘patronage’ relationship seems much too important still to allow a shift to ‘consulting the citizen.’
“Not surprisingly, concerned citizens, agile gangs and efficient businessmen alike are moving in to grab their share of power in those spaces where the state is retreating, or franchising its own legitimacy and authority”
Well, this is actually a very adverse phenomenon. Since top down rerorms wrapped in an ideological pan arab framework imposed by a strong state, is sole viable way out of the trajedy Arab world has been stuck in since the transfer of political power from Arabs to foreign elements(Turks) centuries ago.
Ramy commited two mistkes in his analysis; first he lumped up all Arab states, in the last 75 years, together. Thus equating the revolutionary and progressive like Nasser’s Egypt or the Briliant ( really democratic) reactionary and inefficient like Saudi Arabia, for instance.
Secondly,he parroted the neo- orientalist propaganda regarding reforms in the Arab world which totally overlook the fact that Arabs are distinct civilisation where the dynamics of of the internal mechanism governing its paths are structurally and radically different from western, Iranian and oriental ones. Simply, we are in a mode of production and a historico-ciltural context where the wetsrn recipes simply can’t work.
Whether leftist or rightist ,western dicourses on Arab world regarding democratisation , people empowrement, monority rights all converge along lines that suit the integration of “Arabia” into the global regime. That in turn should deepen further the class antagonism between the rich north and th south as well as between the minority alliance of the ruling business political monority and the deprived majorities inside the Aerab world.
Finally, when he refered t Zionist and imperial powers, he sould have aded the spear head of retardement in the middle east- Iran. It was this facist retrdd Iran that worked its best to contain Saddams progressive reforms and devlopment of Iraq wich had been unprecedented in the ntire history of the Arab world. At the present, without Iran the invasion of Iraq could have never worked 8 according to Aptahy- the deputy of Khatwemy.