Links from my del.icio.us account for September 18th through September 19th:
- Desmond Tutu: Israeli shelling in Gaza may be war crime |
World news |
The Guardian – "Tutu said the Israeli attack, which hit the Athamna family house, showed "a disproportionate and reckless disregard for Palestinian civilian life".The archbishop presented his comments in a final report to the UN Human Rights Council, which had sent him to Gaza to investigate the killings in Beit Hanoun in November 2006. For 18 months Israel did not grant the archbishop or his team a visa. They entered Gaza in May this year on a rare crossing from Egypt.
On the three-day visit, Tutu and his team visited the house, interviewed the survivors and met others in Gaza, including the senior Hamas figure and former prime minister, Ismail Haniyeh. At the time, Tutu said he wanted to travel to Israel to hear the Israeli account of events, but he was not permitted."
- Almasry Alyoum | Suspicious Tour By US Ambassador In Cairo University – Al Masri Al Youm's reporting has really gone down the drain, this story is ridiculous.
- The Witness | Egypt: Thieving donkey sent to jail – "CAIRO — An Egyptian donkey has been jailed for stealing corn on the cob from a field belonging to an agricultural research institute in the Nile Delta, local media reported yesterday.
The ass and its owner were apprehended at a police checkpoint that had been set up after the institute’s director complained that someone was stealing his crops, the state-owned Al-Ahram daily said.
The unnamed ungulate was found in possession of the institute’s corn and a local judge sentenced him to 24 hours in prison. The man who had his ass thrown in jail got off with a fine of 50 Egyptian pounds (about R70)." - The political state of Egypt | Will the dam burst? | The Economist – I missed this long briefing on Egypt's sorry current situation and uncertain future.
- Saudi Arabia’s puritanical clerics | Death to the media moguls! | The Economist – On crazy Saudi fatwa against depraved satellite channels.
Interesting Economist story. Starts very dramatic and then ends on milder tones. Does 2008 Egypt really feel like pre1952?
It seems to me that Egypt is at the mercy of global commodity prices and the slowdown in Europe. So far the government has maneuvered to put down protest while giving some lifeline in terms of wages and subsidies. But this policy can work for only so long. if commodity prices stay high or even go up, and the global economy continues to slow down (the two are of course related), things are bound to get rougher. Neo-liberalism “works” only in times of rapid growth.
I haven’t read almasry alyoum for a long time. Is it so bad now? What happened?
It’s really surprising how often the comparison is made, in Egypt, between the 1951-52 period (or even 48-52) and the current state of affairs. Whether it really feels the same, though, I can’t say. My guess is that the two situations are really quite different: in 1952 there is a real multi-party system in place, foreign occupation of Egypt by Britain, the recent defeat in Palestine (and the scandal over faulty arms having been sent to the front by a monarchy with only a lukewarm interest in preventing the formation of Israel, which it knew was militarily impossible at that point), the presence of many foreigners in Egypt targeted as scapegoats, a very militant political culture, the rise of Arab nationalism as a towering idea across the region, and a sharp global ideological delineation in the context of then-emergent Cold War. When people compare the two, it’s also forgotten that Egypt is largely coup-proof (since the army is already in power). At best we can talk about a corrective measure taken by the military establishment, and even that seems unlikely. Which is why in a way the situation is worse: back then social discontent was heavily manufactured by political parties (through the use of militias and agitators) and given direction, today discontent is perhaps much more genuinely felt but rudderless, leading to a feeling of helplessness. There is no easy way out of the Egyptian predicament, at least not until the issue of succession had been handled. In the meantime the erosion of any sense of national civic values, i.e. a shared positive vision of political culture, continues. The situation in Egypt is in some respects not as bad as you would think from reading al-Destour and the other opposition press (you’d think you’re in Somalia) but there is very little positive to hang on, basically very little leadership looking to the future, elaborating a vision of what Egypt might be.
I don’t really agree with your economic analysis as far as commodity prices are concerned. Egypt has large reserves, is willing to spend them, and has been a major benefactor of the oil boom in the Gulf, since the Gulfies are investing so much of their cash here. Although there is a lot of cash coming into Egypt right now, a there’s been a lot of money in that country for a long time, the problem is how it’s spent. That is not a new problem — the problems we see today is because of investment in public services that wasn’t made 10 or 20 years ago, not money that’s not being spent now. In some cases the current government is playing catch-up and is just starting to correct the situation (for instance transport). But it waited until it was already too late to avoid a huge social crisis that is coinciding with a political crisis at the core of the system (i.e. succession and decision-making at the presidency). Arguably in the 1980s Egypt did not have the money, but in the mid-1990s it did (or had access to credit) and could have at least tried to overhaul the system. Instead sweetheart loans were given to regime cronies, causing a liquidity crisis between 1999 and 2004. Sure neo-liberal economic policies, notably privatization for the sake of privatization (rather than with a clear plan of what to do with the money raised), are to blame. But the bulk of the blame for today’s problems go back to the mid-1990s and earlier. Fluctuations in commodity prices and export potential happen all the time, but you can plan for them. Egypt squandered about two decades when it could have done that planning.
Masri al-Youm, in my opinion, has gone significantly down the drain since 2007 in terms of professionalism and quality of reporting, mainly for internal reasons — although they still get some nice stories and scoops. There are a bunch of new newspapers appearing soon, notably al-Chorouk, and I have some hope that they be more like what Masri al-Youm was in 2005. The story I linked to seemed completely silly because it attributed sinister motives to the US ambassador’s visit to Cairo University without any real reason.
Thanks for a very informative response. As usual with such historical comparisons, the differences are no less interesting than the similarities (another one we hear a lot these days is “the return of the 1930s depression”, and again I think the differences are important). Admittedly, my view is decided by a pessimistic outlook on the global energy outlook, with oil depletion squeezing everybody. So while it is true that natural gas revenues are guarantied for the next two decades, I believe this year Egypt has become a net oil-importer, while biofuels have driven global cereal prices up – a process that was has subsided lately but i expect to pick up in the next couple of years. Tourism is similarly heading for troubles as air travel will become more costly. All this assumes oil prices continue to climb upwards. This would make it an unusual and unprecedented time, and policies that could work otherwise would make little sense – such as growing cash crops vegetables to be flown to European markets. (I often find Egyptian green beans and Guavas in London, and I assume they are flown in).
The 30%-wage-increase-trick can not be played too many times before losing its effect. Inflation (22% in July?) is a real problem for a country with such levels of poverty. Eventfully the bread crisis will return. Even if the government can afford the subsidies, this will come at the expense of infrastructure projects etc.
But your point about Gulf involvement is well taken. Gulf investments, tourists, markets, and perhaps subsidised petroleum could make a difference.
The question of whether how much oil and gas Egypt has is pretty complicated, and actually recent announcements suggests oil reserves have increased to new finds or the enhanced ability to exploit old wells. But even if Egypt produces enough crude oil for its own use, it still imports some of that lower-grade crude and imports high-grade refined products such as kerosene. Furthermore, there have been rumors of unreliability in the gas supply, with LNG exporters being given priotity over domestic consumers — resulting in for instance dual-use power plants returning to fuel oil rather than natural gas, which diverts oil away from other types of consumption and is more expensive. There’s a real need for transparency in this sector, and better long-term planning.
I agree overall with your views on inflation — Boutros-Ghali recent announcement that the worse has already happened is optimistic (and he made it six months ago and was wrong). Salary increases, further (necessary) cuts in subsidies, the global environment all suggest inflationary pressures and reduced competitivity. Worst case scenario: within two years Egypt might find it hard to avoid the stagflation that is coming to the US. But the bread crisis is preventable — in terms of subsidies it’s a small part of the overall bill to subsidize wheat imports, whose prices are now going down or at least levelling. I remain convinced that the problem earlier this year was one of poor management / enforcement, not lack of funds.