While some argue the economic reform before political reform discourse never left, the outcomes of last week’s Moroccan Summit firmly resituated and re-centered this notion.
It is within this context that states concerned about the Arab world’s governance condition converged to discuss the US diplomatic plan to democratize the world (since Iraq has not proven a successful democratizing kick-starter). Yet, what really was on display is another expression of a US policy failure.
Last February Al-Hyatt newspaper leaked the US’s Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI). Immediately, Arab leaders balked. Most prominently Hosni Mubarak called the plan “delusional” and an invitation to open “the gates of hell” without controlled reform (translation no reform, only adding cosmetic national councils). Yes….when one wants to bring a sudden stop to a idea’s circulation – employ the chaos argument. Other defensive, and not necessarily wrong, arguments Mubarak proffered were the “Islamists will hijack the Democratization process,” reform cannot come from outside, and reforms were already in progress.
By mid-March 2004, the US had not realized that while it could unilaterally launch a war, it was unable to push diplomatic reform plans. Mind you, many warned that the US’s measures had no teeth. Brian Whitaker of the Guardian sniffed the GMEI out for what it was nearly as quickly as it was launched.
This did not stop the US State department undersecretary Marc Grossman from touring the Arab world with his “we don’t want to impose this on anyone but it will be done” message in March 2004. I remember his encounter with then Egyptian FM Ahmad Mahir being more or less hostile. According to the view then democracy, one way or the other, would stop the scourge of terrorism. Terrorism is treated so simplisticly that if you eliminate authoritarianism it will magically disappear (without changing the US’s biased regional policies).
Arab leaders responded launching diplomatic missions to Europe to try and unite Old and New Europe against the US’s imperialistic designs. In large part, they succeeded.
The “initiative” battle was more or less over when Bush convened the G-8 summit in Georgia last June. The GMEI (then changed to Broader ME plan because in German “Greater” implied, ironically, imperialism when it was translated) was blocked by which countries did not show up rather than those in attendance. As al-Jazera.net pointed out then “Egypt and Saudi Arabia, two countries covered by the initiative but alarmed by its potential implications, declined invitations to the summit. Tunisia, which holds the rotating presidency of the Arab League, followed suit. Leaders of Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Jordan, Turkey and Yemen accepted Bush’s invitation.” So four out of 22-Arab league countries attended.
The idea of democratizing the Arab world fades as Iraq unravels. Yet, a summit scheduled to further discuss the outdated plan in Morocco took place on 11 December. The NYT ran a story on 5 December, entitled “US Slows bid to advance Democracy in Arab world,” which forecasted the get-together’s expected agenda and limited outcomes. The NYT also followed up with a piece that correctly argued that Arab leaders used the “excuse” of the Arab-Israeli conflict as the reason not to reform. The story did not, however, choose to focus on how the US plan had changed over the year and became a fairly large diplomatic failure. I am not sure the US could have ever pushed through, morally or practically, such an ambitious reform program. However, the Moroccan summit’s limited outcomes are further evidence that the US is losing influence with its regional allies.
Essentially, democratization efforts are being sidelined in favor of developing the social and economic aspects of the Arab world. Afterall, the Washington Consensus (WC) has been wrongly telling us for years that when the economic reform is done then political reform (read democracy which, in turn, is understood as peace) can commence. The Arab governments, knowing this convention to be wrong, simply have called for the WC to be followed. Indeed, this WC approach is a tremendously popular refrain in a certain party secretariat’s reform plans in Egypt. In the absence of any real desire or ability to oppose the Arab states, US policy shifted towards accommodate the possible.
Anyone who has thought more than a minute about this insanely wrong and simplistic “economic reform leads to democratization” concept (derived from Modernization theory) knows that what took place last week was not a sincere attempt to create a dialogue or space for development. Morocco’s summit was “politics as usual” as the US continues to sure up support for its contradictory regional role as a destabilizing hegemon.
I often argued last spring that when the GMEI successfully ran out of steam, we would see the proliferation of “We tried but Arab Culture resists modern democracy” arguments by US officials and more right-leaning analytical servants of political power. Nevertheless, I was outwitted again.
Instead of blaming the culture….it looks like they instead will simply blame the rulers, who are marketed as pining to stay in power at any cost. But then again, I should of realized….the culture argument is being saved for when the US military leaves Iraq in the midst of its ongoing civil war.
The truth of the matter is….the US never cared if there was democracy or reform. They only care about making sure that the dictators that exist in the region are friendly to the status quo minded establishment in Washington. By treating the Arab states as their vassals rather than actors (with interests and attributes) that can contribute to international political development, the US repeatedly, and likely uncaringly, continues to frame its policies erroneously. Its dialogues between equals (even when the equals aren’t equals) not orders from above that translate into every language and produce more promising, balanced policies.
Is there a cohesive US policy? The more I think about it, the more it seems there is one thing driving American policy in the region: securing markets and oil reserves. The democracy rap is empty rhetoric: if democracy was to take over the Arab world today, it would be extremely hostile towards the US. It would come packaged as Islamic fundamentalism, Nasserism, pure communism or pure socialism. There is no real democractic alternative.
I mean seriously: extrapolate the policies of any of these alternatives and it becomes apparent that a) they have no vested interest in sustaining free speech after taking power and b) they would probably severe ties with Israel and the US as soon as they’re in power.
Whose agenda does that serve?
This did not stop Colin Powell from says that the Summit was “A historic meeting, crowned with success!”.
Forgot to say two things:
1) Very good post, as they all are around here.
2) The King of Morrocco left his country with 300 members of his court for Santo Domingo on December 8, saying he would not indicate a date for his return. The king wasn’t even there for the “historic” forum.
Your comments seem fair to me and I usually harbor cynical intentions about the US’s democratic, Human rights, and other “moral” arguments.
Generally, I think thouse of us that study the region find the US’s key interests are 1) Israeli security, 2) Oil, 3) Stability and order over freedom (read encouraging authoritarianism), & 4) arms dealings. This is not an inflamatory remark as it is well documented.
A nice general article written on this was Lisa Anderson, “Arab Democracy: Dismal Prospects,” World Policy Journal, vol. 18, issue 3, fall 2001: 53-61.
My favorite passage reads:
“We also know that the United States, which is on record as supporting democratic government as the best mechanism for guaranteeing accountability, has been a complicating factor in the democratization of the region for decades. As patron of the oil producers and ally of Israel, the United States has routinely honored its commitment to liberal values largely in the breach. Too often, scholars and government analysts alike approach the question of the U.S. role in the region the same way Huntington did, by relegating it to “the external environment.” The United States and its international allies now find themselves supporting autocratic but compliant friends, willing to do the West regional and international favors at the price of the West’s blind eye to domestic tyranny. How can the common long-term interests of both international actors and local citizens in the extension of democratic politics be fostered in the short run?
The answer is not simple, for although democracies may be stable and peace loving, democratizing states rarely are. If this very sketchy analysis is correct, the next generation of leaders in the Arab world will be drawn from one of two groups: those within the state and its ruling circles, and those living at its margins. Neither are great proponents of liberal democracy. The elites appear to be modern but not democractic–often a dangerous combination, as the communist experiment showed–and the masses are angry. Were the United States to insist seriously on democratic reform, we would find that the democratizing process would unleash opinions and allow associations–from new nationalisms and new ethnic conflicts to anti-American and anti-Western political ideologies–we would find abhorrent.
Yet squelching unpopular or unpleasant ideas and movements only postpones the day of reckoning. The elites and the masses alike are witnessing the state they hoped to put to their purposes increasingly challenged by both internal decay and the negative effects of the globalization of finance and communication that are the watchwords of the new century.
Democratization would force wide-ranging, raucous, and possibly violent debates about the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the role of the United States in the region, and the pervasive view of inequity in the world, which the current rulers now suppress with America’s perhaps reluctant but very real blessing.
Thus far, the United States has evinced no appetite for the inevitably awkward and painful discussion of its past and present role in the region that genuine democratization would entail. It continues to collude with the regimes in power, permitting fixed elections and human rights fakery to provide a fig leaf that allow it and its client regimes to continue in the game. This will serve the interests of neither peace nor democracy in the region (nor regional development and prosperity for that matter), and it is not too early to confront the significant role that American policy will play in either facilitating or impeding democratization in the Arab world.”
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Its a long quote and nicely written chapter about a difficult subject. We can see when they don’t promote democracy. We cannot always see direct consistent and definable ways in which they empower authoritarian rule.
The irony of Anderson’s piece is that it is appears at the time 9/11 is happening. Hence, written before, not after. Now Anderson is not the first to say this and there has always been contradictions between lofty US policy aims and the decisions they make practically.
So does this make for a cohesive policy? I don’t think so – I find policy decisions anywhere to be rather short-term driven and taken in an ad-hoc fashion.
But this still does not delegitimize the initial posting. After 9/11 and in the leadup to the unjust war against Iraq, all we heard was the democracy domino theory. State department and USAID officials were told “authoritarianism leads to terrorism” which they simplistically repeated ad nausium. The fact is there has been a clear retraction and retreat from this position back to the “ec -> pol reform” argument signifies a policy failure regardless of how its packaged or where blame is laid.
The only other thing I will mention…..after 9/11 but before the intense democacy promotion campaign, the current but soon outgoing US Amb in Cairo, David Welsh, gave an English Public Lecture Series at the American University in Cairo on 28 January 2002. After taken a written question asking about the relationship of economic and political reform and Egypt with references to the February 02 Sharm al-Shaykh donor conference and the Saad al-Din Ibrahim folder, Welsh replied, “We have concerns over events in Egypt. We convey those concerns to the proper Egyptian officials. However, we consider Egypt a friend. We don’t push pressure on our friends.”
Less than a month later I think the US lobbied for around $10 Billion in loans, aid, and grants among the IFIs for Egypt. Saad had to wait another 14 months until he was finally acquitted (which included Bush threatening to link Egypt’s aid to political reform in August 2002 – read Saad’s case).
I think there is a haphazard approach to US Democracy promotion in the region. Nevertheless, I think last week’s Moroccan-held “Forum for the Future” expresses a failed policy that Bush 43 admin #1 invested a lot of rhetoric capital in.
Re Nur al-Cubicle’s comments:
This is just the sort of double-speak we are hearing all to frequently from Washington. Failure is success, War is peace, & Inequality is Justice.
When they claim victory, we know there is still a long way to go.
As for MVI, good on him, I won’t have stayed either.
And Colon Powell – I don’t even want to get started……
While I agree that US policy is not exactly a raging success, what’s stopping Hosni Mubarak, for instance, from stepping down at the end of his term? Not the United States, I would think, and if it did want to stop such an event, how would it go about doing so?
Would you step down? Do you really think that after 23 years of rule, buttressed by the US and a pack of yes-men who never said ‘no’, Mubarak or his family want to step down? I am not certain if Mubarak really does care about the country, but he knows just as much as anyone that there is a huge political void in Egypt right now, and if he were to step down, the people most likely to fill it would not be in anyone’s favor – not even the democractically-hungry Egyptians.
The US has continously shown a certain degree of leniency towards Mubarak and his minister kabal. The US wouldn’t necessarily be able to influence Mubarak’s decision to step down, but enough money will buy whoever steps up afterwards. If the US wants, it can turn whoever takes power to its favour, especially when those who could stand for candidacy are not shining examples of honour and patriotism.
Good summary of GMEI/BMEI. Didn’t the Rabat meeting achieve one small success, though? At least, major regime figures had to listen directly to their own critics — activists and NGO types from the region itself who were also at the Forum. This is not something that happens everyday in the Middle East and North Africa, after all, and http://blogs.tol.cz/trends/archives/2004/12/rabat_roundup.html“>reason enough to be slightly upbeat, I would think. The Washington Post noted this in an editorial today too.
… and we have some special christmas-greetings from Mr. Chriac to keen Mr Bush, too …
Jean-Paul Perrier from Thales said Wednesday that “Miksa” [8.7US$Billion Saudi Border Guard Development Program] is still on the table and the Saudis are “keen” to go on with it.
And don’t forget “French President affirmed that he would pay a visit to Egypt at an invitation from President Mubarak during the first quarter of next year.”
But Sorry. I really don’t know that. Is the scheduled visit pre-election help, or already the post-election-visit?
re praktike:
Your question is fair enough. Indeed, involved in all this talk of US democratization plans and successes and failures, I feel there is an inherent tendency that sounds like colonalizing hubris.
What right does the US have in telling people what type of government to have? It certainly does not have the right (although it uses it) to overthrow governments it does not like. Naturally, because of its status, it should encourage inclusive governance. But inclusive in the sense the will of the people are represented, not the will of their people or person being expressed. It is when they misrepresent promoting democracy for pursuing other political objectives that they run into problem. Yet, you don’t need a Machivellian political strategist to tell you that bad regional policies means that should democracy surface, people may be elected who oppose your policies. Its the US policies, not the people.
As per Mubarak steping down. Mary Anne Weaver wrote in the Atlantic Monthly – “Pharoahs in Waiting,” (Fall 2003/Spring04? that a journalist asked HM about the prospects of Saddam stepping down. His response was “Arab Leaders don’t step down”. Is this a true reason or an excuse pegged with cultural underpinnings for us to abuse and orientalize? I don’t know…..but it implies intent.
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