It’s been a hectic week, so I am putting various bits and pieces I’ve noted over the past week here with little commentary:
Visit Daoud Kuttab’s homepage and his blog, which contains an archive of his writings and other material. Kuttab, whom I had the opportunity to meet in Cairo in late 2002, is the Arab pioneer of internet radio. Here is an article he wrote on the need for more alternative Arab media, and here’s an article on his pet project, Ammannet — a website and radio station. Radio could be a powerful medium in the Arab world, but in most countries it is restricted to state-owned stations and perhaps a couple of commercial ones that avoid anything controversial. A Malian journalist told me a while back that in his impoverished West African mostly Muslim country of Mali has dozens of independent radio stations. Embarrassing.
Amr Hamzawi had an article in the Daily Star on why Egypt’s ruling party’s reform image is a sham. Hellme didn’t like it though.
The Likudnik Middle East Quarterly remembers Hume Horan, noted State Department Arabist, although I noticed they chose not to call him an Arabist but rather an “Arabic linguist” so as to not confuse him with those nasty, er, State Department Arabists. In Robert Kaplan’s The Arabists, that subtle smear job on American diplomats who specialized in the Middle East and weren’t pro-Israel ideologues, Horan comes out as something as a hero for his role in the airlift of the Falasha Jews in Sudan — which is probably why he’s so well liked over at the MEQ. I’m not sure what Horan’s politics were, especially as he published in the MEQ, but he was certainly an important American diplomat working in the region.
Kareem Fahim, Egyptian-American globetrotting journalist for the Village Voice, keeps a blog on their site.
Mahmoud Abbas calls yet again for the end of armed struggle in Palestine, but has nothing to offer in exchange. In the meantime, military operations like the one carried out a few days ago offer a much better model of resistance than the suicide bombings, so why do they occur so little?
Sami Awad offers three strategies for non-violent Palestinian resistance: strong leadership, continuous protests and strong international campaigning. Easier said than done.
The NYT profiles Seif Al Islam Qadhafi. Like in another profile by the Financial Times a few months ago, he sounds deranged. Not as much as his father, though.
Europe’s counter-terrorism chief says that European and Arab radicals are being trained in insurgent-run camps in Iraq.
Egypt’s National Council for Human Rights has asked the government to cancel the Emergency Law that has restrained political life for over a quarter of a century. I won’t say more about this now because some more in-depth analysis will come soon.
Adam Morrow looks at the Wafaa Konstantin affair amidst larger sectarian tensions in Egypt.
Rami Khouri talks about the recent Dubai conference on Arab reform.
France has banned Al Manar, Hizbullah’s satellite TV station, for being anti-Semitic. (Update: CNN reports the US government about to declare Al Manar a “terrorist organization.” Not sure why they need to differentiate from Hizbullah which they already consider a terrorist organization.
The West critisizes the Arab world for being protective, unresponsive to criticism and unnecessarily proud (which, to be honest, are all prefectly valid remarks; it’s just a shame they have to be said from ‘up there’ when they should all be ‘down here’, with us). If the Saudi government banned Fox news on satellite for being ‘Islamophobic’, the world would be in arms at how backward and degenerate the Saudis were.
I’ve often wondered myself why the Palestinians don’t attack more military targets. None of the factions can defeat Israel on the battlefield, but that isn’t the point; the idea would be to practice asymmetric warfare, make the occupation too costly to sustain and frame the battle in terms of armies rather than peoples. One of the Palestinians’ most monumental mistakes, IMO, was the spring 2002 wave of suicide bombings that radicalized the Israeli public and convinced them that the intifada was an existential war. A campaign focused exclusively against military targets within the occupied territories would be perceived differently and would accentuate Israel war-weariness rather than right-wing radicalism. My guess is that the Palestinians weren’t thinking strategically and simply went for the easy hits; now that Israel proper is better secured, they’re reconsidering their options.
BTW, the Beta Israel (“Falasha” is an ethnic slur) are from Ethiopia.
The Israeli military is too good?
Jonathan,
I agree on the catastrophic strategic mistake that the suicide bombings were (beyond their inherent immorality, both in that they kill innocents and that they encourage desperate people to commit suicide.) That was largely Hamas’ mistake (and a few Fatah offshoots) though, not necessarily the Palestinians’. But in any case they will collectively bear the brunt of it. There has long been among supporters of the Palestinian an argument that they should restrict armed struggle to attacks against military targets in the OTs and the settlers (the latter is more controversial since they include women and children, I personally think there is a good point to be made that they are a valid target, even under international humanitarian law.) Such a form of resistance would not mean the defeat of the Israelis — as Praktike points out they are simply too strong — but perhaps a weariness that could have led to a (limited) pullout as in South Lebanon. On the other hand, I think that the Israeli political forces that are attached to keeping control of “Judea and Samaria” are simply too strong — this is different than South Lebanon. There is also the question of keeping control of strategic assets like underground water tables, certain hills, etc… In my opinion these are the same reasons the Israeli powers-that-be do not want a peace deal that would not include these. (I’m not 100% sure about the sources, but apparently the Barak “historic offer” for instance did not include control of subterranean water)
Sorry about the Falasha slur, I wasn’t aware of that. It’s what Kaplan called them in “The Arabists.” I know they are from Ethiopia, not Sudan, but I think most of the initial operation took place in Sudan with refugees from Ethiopia.
I suppose the legality of attacking settlements depends on their purpose. If they are defensive (as they were originally conceived to be), then it may be possible to make a case that they are legitimate targets, much as military bases are legitimate targets even if some of their personnel are civilian. If they are merely illegal civilian outposts, though, then attacking them is a much more dubious proposition under Geneva-4.
In this particular conflict, though, legality is less important than perception. One of the reasons the “Judea and Samaria” political forces are so strong in Israel is that many Israelis perceive the war as an existential one and will thus tolerate measures they would not tolerate merely to perpetuate an occupation. Any attacks on people that Israelis view as civilians – including women and children in the settlements – will perpetuate this perception.
Given that Israeli public opinion will be important in ending the conflict, I’d argue that from a strategic point of view, Palestinians should direct their attacks solely at the military instruments of the occupation. I think we all agree that the Palestinian factions can’t defeat the IDF on the battlefield, but a shift from terrorist to guerrilla tactics will make it a different war from the Israeli standpoint, and one which the Israeli public will be more inclined to end on terms the Palestinians can accept.