Dear Arabist readers, I now promise you that even though the New York Times no longer has a paywall I will not link any of its Thomas Friedman, Maureen Dowd or other moronic commentators and will restrict linking to only the most essential stories or the ones by those NYT writers that actually do a good job (is it to spite me?) like Michael Slackmann.
More than one million dead in Iraq?
A new poll suggests over one million dead in Iraq since the invasion:
In the week in which General Patraeus reports back to US Congress on the impact the recent ‘surge’ is having in Iraq, a new poll reveals that more than 1,000,000 Iraqi citizens have been murdered since the invasion took place in 2003.
Previous estimates, most noticeably the one published in the Lancet in October 2006, suggested almost half this number (654,965 deaths).These findings come from a poll released today by O.R.B., the British polling agency that have been tracking public opinion in Iraq since 2005. In conjunction with their Iraqi fieldwork agency a representative sample of 1,461 adults aged 18+ answered the following question:-
Q How many members of your household, if any, have died as a result of the conflict in Iraq since 2003 (ie as a result of violence rather than a natural death such as old age)? Please note that I mean those who were actually living under your roof.
None 78%
One 16%
Two 5%
Three 1%
Four or more 0.002%Given that from the 2005 census there are a total of 4,050,597 households this data suggests a total of 1,220,580 deaths since the invasion in 2003.
I am skeptical because, while I’m no statistician, I find the sample rather small and the extrapolation a bit too easy. But then again, this is not my field. The controversial Lancet study, which many think also overstates the number of dead, was at least seen by specialists (although not all of them) as methodologically valid.
Hillary Clinton against dividing Jerusalem
Clinton vs. Clinton on Israel:
To coincide with the Jewish New Year, fresh statements are coming out of some presidential campaigns reaffirming the candidates’ ‘pro-Israel’ credentials. It’s the kind of thing that stretches the thread between domestic political posturing and smart policy prescriptions to a snapping point. It is almost redundant to note that the content of these declarations have precious little to do with advancing what is good for Israel, or, for that matter, US interests.
But one sentence from the Hillary Clinton press release of September 10 stands out. (Curiously, the the statement is not up on Clinton’s campaign website.) In staking out her position on “Standing with Israel against terrorism,” Hillary Clinton defends Israel’s right to exist with “… an undivided Jerusalem as its capital.” Oddly enough, this places her in direct contradiction with the plan put forward by a certain President Bill Clinton in December 2000.
I doubt she has a one-state solution in mind, either.
The sociology and economics of vote-buying in Morocco
Yesterday Le Monde published a fascinating analysis of the recent Moroccan parliamentary elections. I am pasting the full article after the jump since I don’t think it’s available to non-subscribers, and will focus on a choice excerpt here:
En fait, c’est l’abstention sociologique – celle de la masse des marginalisés sociaux – qui s’est le plus amplifiée entre 2002 et 2007, en relation étroite avec le relâchement du maillage social et politique, en ville bien davantage qu’à la campagne (respectivement 30 % et 43 % de participation). D’une part, ces populations craignent beaucoup moins les représailles administratives si elles ne se rendent pas aux urnes. D’autre part, l’introduction du bulletin unique rend le contrôle de l’échange marchand des voix beaucoup plus coûteux : il faut aussi avoir les moyens d’acheter suffisamment de téléphones portables avec appareil photo intégré pour permettre à l’électeur d’attester dans l’isoloir qu’il a rempli sa part du marché ! Il est donc plus difficile de monnayer la voix des ” pauvres ” contre de l’argent. Dorénavant, ils ont peu à gagner ou à perdre dans une telle transaction.
My translation: In fact, it is sociological absentionism — that of the masses of social marginals — that has been most amplified between 2002 and 2007, in close correlation with the withdrawal of the social and political lockdown [of former security practices], in cities much more than in the countryside (respectively 30% and 43% participation rates). On the one hand, these populations have much less to fear from security forces if they do not vote. On the other, the introduction of the single ballot makes controlling vote-buying much more expensive [for vote-buyers]: one must have the means of buying enough camera-phones to enable the voter to prove that he has fulfilled his part of the bargain! It is therefore more difficult to exchange the votes of the “poor” for money. From now on, they have little to gain or win in such a transaction.
In other words, even though it is said there was a high amount of vote-buying in the election, vote-buying overall has become more expensive and therefore is necessarily limited. In turn, there is less motivation for vote-sellers to go vote, especially as the relative security/political liberalization of the past decade mean that the state intimidation factor (go vote or else!) once enforced through the ground-level representatives of the Ministry of Interior (moqaddems etc.) is no longer such a compelling reason to vote.
Do read the article through the end for a solid analysis of why the Istiqlal party came first — basically its well-established party machine and network of notables and municipal level supporters across the country. Hence why I have kept hearing that municipal elections (the next ones being in 2009) are more important than parliamentary ones, because they represent a real local-level form of political representation compared to the more abstract parliamentary representation (and everyone complains that they only see their MPs during elections anyway.)
Continue reading The sociology and economics of vote-buying in Morocco
Investor confidence and the succession issue in Egypt
One of the interesting things that has come out of the recent rumors that Mubarak was on death’s door is that, for the first time publicly at least, a link is being made between presidential succession in Egypt and investor confidence. Quite aside from ordinary Egyptians on Facebook or newspaper editors, this is now an open subject of discuss for the financial press and analysts. This Reuters story from earlier this month quotes a Standard & Poors ratings director as saying this has kept Egypt’s rating down:
But Egypt has not made clear what would happen to the reform process if Mubarak, 79, who has ruled for a quarter century, leaves office, Farouk Soussa said in an interview.
“The main constraint at the moment is the question of succession,” Soussa said. “Trying to determine what will happen on key policy issues is like gazing into a crystal ball, and it shouldn’t be that way.”
Standard & Poor’s rates Egypt BB+ for foreign currency and BBB- for local currency with a stable outlook.
Likewise, a Forbes story today predicts investor worry about the post-Mubarak period, considering that Egypt’s own Central Bank (foolishly?) has said that the recent rumors cost a loss of $350 million:
“Foreign investment really has to do with the stability of the country,” said Arsene Aka, analyst with Global Insight. Although he found the central bank’s readiness to put a figure on the cost of freedom of speech “a bit disturbing,” he admitted that from an economic standpoint, it did make sense.
According to Aka, the $350 million figure was probably a rough calculation of what a few days’ rumors could cost Egypt’s already impressive achievement of $9 billion in foreign direct investment so far this year. “If Mubarak dies, investment will halve,” he warned.
My own experience in talking to Egyptian businessmen is that they are relatively confident a transition will take place without any serious disturbance to the country’s economic policy. But, arguably, the way Egypt is currently run (with an increasingly obvious delegation of economic decisions from the presidency to Gamal Mubarak and the Nazif cabinet) is not exactly optimal, especially since getting a presidential go-ahead is sometimes necessary for major investment projects. Investors have complained of inexplicable delays in decision-making, and I’ve even heard of cases where an investor with cash in hand simply left because he was tired on waiting for clearance from the presidency.
The question is, at what point does it become necessary for the country’s economic stability that a clear succession plan (if not a specific successor) be outlined? Or will financial analysts and investors will continue to make educated guesses (but in the end still quite uninformed guesses since there is little solid information) about Gamal Mubarak or Omar Suleiman scenarios? Sure, Egypt’s not badly at all in terms of attracting investment despite the current uncertainty, with some long-term projects (e.g. petrochemicals, LNG, etc.) seeing the light of the day, but I’ve often wondered why the succession issue was not a major concern of investors, or rather why most were pretty confident succession would mostly provide continuity with current economic reform policies. Perhaps that is now changing.
Tribes, marriage and terrorists in Iraq
I can’t claim anything as to its veracity, but below is an interesting anthropological-military analysis of what might have motivated the recent switch of key Sunni tribes from fighting with foreign jihadist elements to fighting against them. Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt (SWJ Blog):
The uprising began last year, far out in western Anbar province, but is now affecting about 40% of the country. It has spread to Ninewa, Diyala, Babil, Salah-ad-Din, Baghdad and – intriguingly – is filtering into Shi’a communities in the South. The Iraqi government was in on it from the start; our Iraqi intelligence colleagues predicted, well before we realized it, that Anbar was going to “flip”, with tribal leaders turning toward the government and away from extremists.
Some tribal leaders told me that the split started over women. This is not as odd as it sounds. One of AQ’s standard techniques, which I have seen them apply in places as diverse as Somalia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Indonesia, is to marry leaders and key operatives to women from prominent tribal families. The strategy works by creating a bond with the community, exploiting kinship-based alliances, and so “embedding” the AQ network into the society. Over time, this makes AQ part of the social landscape, allows them to manipulate local people and makes it harder for outsiders to pry the network apart from the population. (Last year, while working in the tribal agencies along Pakistan’s North-West Frontier, a Khyber Rifles officer told me “we Punjabis are the foreigners here: al Qa’ida have been here 25 years and have married into the Pashtun hill-tribes to the point where it’s hard to tell the terrorists from everyone else.”) Well, indeed.
More after the jump.
Continue reading Tribes, marriage and terrorists in Iraq
IPS on role of clerics in Iraq
Clerics Begin to Take Over:
“Our country has turned from a secular into a purely religious country,” Munthir Sulayman, social reform activist in Baghdad told IPS. “We were dreaming of a huge development in social affairs to become more modern and free, where individuals can play their natural role in developing the country through participation in politics, economy and all aspects of life. What has happened is the opposite, and the country has become completely under control of clerics.”
Who will rid us of these turbulent priests? (No, not you General David “The Second Coming” Petraeus.)
The siege of Mecca
I want this book. (You can get it from Amazon.)
Update: Looking through the book’s site linked above, there are PDF versions of declassified Western intelligence documents on the siege. Some interesting examples are this US embassy in Cairo report of how Mubarak, vice-president at the time, ordered al-Ahram to downplay news of the siege that was going to be on the top banner headline or how Hassan II sent his most vital aide at the time, Moulay Hafid Alaoui, to Jeddah with commandos from the Gendarmerie Royale to be put at King Khalid’s disposal. H2 was ready send several hundred more commandos, in the grand tradition of Moroccan brawn working for Saudi Arabia.
Carnegie: “U.S. Democracy Promotion During and After Bush”
From the summary of a new Carnegie report, U.S. Democracy Promotion During and After Bush:
Despite sweeping rhetoric about the global spread of democracy, the Bush Administration has significantly damaged U.S. democracy promotion efforts and increased the number of close ties with “friendly tyrants,” concludes a new report from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Security interests, such as the war on terrorism, and U.S. energy needs have led the Bush Administration to maintain friendly, unchallenged relations with more than half of the forty-five “non-free” countries in the world.
Carnegie Vice President for Studies Thomas Carothers argues in his new report, U.S. Democracy Promotion During and After Bush, that the main U.S. presidential candidates have voiced support for democracy promotion, but not yet outlined plans to put it back on track. Carothers analyzes the Bush Administration’s record on democracy promotion and its effect on democracy worldwide, and then presents fresh ideas about the role democracy promotion can and should play in future U.S. policies.
Key recommendations after the jump — the report argues for new pressure on Egypt and Pakistan. Here’s the bit on Egypt in the report:
At the same time, the next administration should do more to push America’s many autocratic friends on democracy and human rights issues. Dramatic or decisive measures are almost never available in such situations, and finding a productive balance between the con- tending interests at stake is always difficult. The temptation to follow the path of least resistance—uncritically embracing the friendly tyrant—is inevitably strong. Yet, in some cases a better approach is possible, one that does not overlook democracy yet is still compatible with other interests.
Egypt is one example. The Bush administration has made a mistake in giving up its push for Egyptian political reform. The Mubarak government is indeed a useful regional security partner for the United States. But as some noted Egypt experts have pointed out, the United States maintained good security relations with Cairo even at the height of the short-lived U.S. push on democracy. Mubarak’s current political crackdown is stifling what was a genuine possibility for badly needed inclusive, pluralistic political change in his country. Washington has only limited influence on Egyptian politics, but it does have some. Focusing diplomatic attention on key issues—such as establishing an independent electoral commission, opening up the legalization process of political parties, and reducing human rights violations—would help increase the chance of a more open, democratic leadership succession in Egypt. Such a transition would be good for Egypt’s long-term political health, which in turn would be good for the U.S. government’s long-term security interests in the country.
There are no indications on how to pursue this, however. As a Bush administration official who worked on this subject once told me, there is no one to talk to in Egypt (within the regime) who is willing to go down the path of even limited genuine reform. It’s being blocked at the highest level, and the uncertainty over succession does not encourage bold steps.
Update: Here is a WaPo op-ed by the author of the report, Thomas Carothers.
Continue reading Carnegie: “U.S. Democracy Promotion During and After Bush”
Egyptian torture NGO under threat
Speaking of crackdowns in Egypt, it seems that NGOs working on torture are also being targeted:
CAIRO, Sept 13 (Reuters) – Egypt has told a rights group that aids torture victims it will be shut down for financial misdeeds, the group said on Thursday, in what activists called a government effort to quash criticism.
The Association for Human Rights Legal Aid (AHRLA) said it had received notice it was being dissolved and its assets seized over accusations it had accepted foreign funding without government approval. AHRLA denied any wrongdoing.
Egyptian and international human rights groups dismissed the accusations as political cover for an attempt to silence a group that has raised embarrassing torture cases in court. Government officials had no immediate comment.
More info in Arabic after the jump on planned demo in support on AHRLA.
Continue reading Egyptian torture NGO under threat