The economics of Egyptian media

There is a storm brewing among the biggest editorialists of Egypt’s press scene. It has been reported that a few days ago, Salama Ahmed Salama, the doyen of reasonable, non-partisan commentators at al-Ahram, had a violent clash with the chairman of the board of the august newspaper, Mursi Atallah. Atallah wanted Salama to stop his involvement in Shorouq al-Gedid, the new independent daily that, by going for a highbrow audience and staid style, is trying to place itself in competition to the flagship state-owned daily. Salama is said to have resigned immediately and walked out, depriving al-Ahram of one of its most respected icons whom for a long time ran the central desk (correct me if I’m wrong) that is so central to the way Egyptian newspapers tend to be run. (Although lately, due to illness, Salama had been a lot less present.)

Now Atallah has apparently issued a directive to some other frequent op-ed writers who are part of the al-Ahram stable asking them to stop freelance contributions to other papers. But these – for instance the good people at the al-Ahram Center for Strategic and Political Studies like Abdel Moneim Said Ali, Amr Chobaki and Dia Rachwan (who each come from quite different political trends, respectively NDP-liberal, left-liberal and Nasserist) – are rather pissed off about this. It would be rather odd, say for a British or American editor, to see the names of his employees appear in other papers. For instance Abdel Moneim Said writes for al-Ahram, Masri al-Youm and Nahdet Misr. But this practice is widespread in Egypt, offering these public intellectuals a platform across different media and of course diversified income. Considering al-Ahram still clings to a salary model that is highly reliant on bonuses (which themselves vary according to the chairman’s whim), I can’t say I blame them. This particular trio appeared on TV last night (on ‘ashira masa’an, Dream 2) to protest the new directive from Atallah, which comes in the context of a long-running feud between the chairman and al-Ahram editor Osama Saraya.

More generally, this kerfuffle involving some “big names” in Egyptian political commentary points to a wider problem in the industry: bizarre salary scales, and for ordinary journalists the fact that it is a poorly paid profession that offers for the most part little prospects of career and social advancement, which in tuns contributes to a tolerance of low-quality journalism and (especially in al-Ahram and state papers) pages filled with repetitive commentary by people just filling in their weekly allocation of column inches.

Several years ago, when Mubarak sacked most of the chairmen and editors (often they were the same person) of the big government publishing houses, it was noted that these would need serious reform to survive in a more market-centered industry. Salama was one of the most important advocates of this reform. That reform still has to come – no one wants to let go of some of al-Ahram 1400 journalists, a major voting bloc for the politically hyperactive Journalists’ Syndicate – but the distortions and wide-ranging freelancing of many of its writers suggests that many are simply taking matters into their own hands. The question will inevitably come: does Egypt really need al-Ahram, al-Akhbar or al-Gomhouriya? Or are these dinosaurs of Nasserism mostly serve today the function of keeping a large staff employed, providing the government with an outlet for its point of view, and perhaps slowing down the expansion of independent media by mopping up a lot of premium advertising income? The problem is, are we even sure that independent media can do better in terms of editorial quality and political independence? Not necessarily, and certainly not unless the everyday reporters are paid a living wage.


Web 2.0 silliness

Unlike Hossam, I am slightly skeptical about Web 2.0 social software technology. It’s true activists in Egypt and elsewhere have made good use of Twitter and Jaiku to update each other about demonstrations and such, but I can’t quite shake off the feeling that over time using these things too much reduces your brain to mush. I’ve already given up on Facebook, never found Doppler very useful, haven’t used LinkedIn in months, and only keep up to date with Jaiku because Hossam forced it upon me, although I don’t really post myself (in any case it would be along the lines of “having sardine and toasted cheese sandwich LOL!” I’d rather spare people.)

But yesterday someone registered a State Security account on Twitter, and this morning I received this:

Hi, arabist (arabist).

Habib El-Adly (ElAdly) is now following your updates on Twitter.

Check out Habib El-Adly’s profile here:
http://twitter.com/ElAdly

Habib al-Adly, of course, is Egypt’s interior minister.

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Gamal in DC: are think tanks complicit?

While Gamal Mubarak did not “quietly slip” into Washington as the FP blog The Cable suggests (the visit was widely reported in the Egyptian press) he is keeping a low profile. Odd that this leader of the National Democratic Party who holds no executive position (officially!) should be hosted in several closed-session meetings with major think tanks, including some close to the Obama administration, with an apparent black-out on what’s being discussed.

A rhetorical question – I am torn about this myself: should the same think tanks that regularly call out for democratization in Egypt host a man who appears to want to undemocratically replace his father and tailored Egypt’s constitution for that purpose? Should they collaborate in furthering the opacity that has characterized Egyptian-US relations for decades? I understand their desire to be seen as “players” and the usefulness of “Chatham House rules” meetings, but in this case I find it rather galling. The future of Gamal Mubarak and his role as a representative of Egypt is a pretty important issue, and one where lack of clear information has contributed to the general malaise about the post-Hosni Mubarak future.

As mentioned before, if anyone would care to leak, we’ll happily publish.

Update II: A reader who attended one of the meetings says:

There was a 90-minute discussion that covered economics, politics, civil-military relations and the bilateral relationship. For the most part, the questions were what one would expect people to ask the head of the policy secretariat of the party (rather than a president-in-waiting). He was comfortable (and relatively bullish) on the economic front, arguing that Egypt was less exposed to the global slowdown than many countries and would benefit from having cleaned up the banking sector several years ago. He also suggested that the aid relationship cannot be the centerpiece of the bilateral relationship. On Civ-Mil issues, he said that the military and intelligence services are subordinate to the president regardless of whether the president comes from a civilian or military background.

Glad some of this came out!

On reform of the banking sector protecting Egypt’s economy, this is generally understood to be the case and was recently highlighted by the World Bank. Egypt has already had its liquidity crisis and does benefit from a very competent Central Banker in Farouq al-Ogda, and has mostly cleaned up the bad banks. That being said, the financial crisis is bound to have a socio-economic component that, combined with the sour public mood, could generate some kind of unrest or political difficulties. Especially that the Nazif government has driven little political benefit from the real economic improvements of the last few years, unfairly I think, and faced pretty hostile media coverage.

Interesting quote on aid not being the central part of the relationship. Unfortunately, for Congress, it is. It’s all about how much money the US spends on Egypt (without much thought about how, in many ways, Washington gets its money’s worth). So this sounds like presenting Egypt’s point of view, which is that aid should not even be up for discussion.

On civilian-military relations, again the classic constitutionalist view. One would think he’s hoping this will be the way things unfold. But, let’s imagine Gamal Mubarak is the next president: he will have to deal with several massively powerful institutions (some might call them states within the state): the military, the intelligence services and the interior ministry. Will he be able to address one of the key issues that makes cleaner, and eventually more democratic, politics possible – namely the separation of the state from the NDP – especially when he will have been brought in by that very collaboration?

If anyone has any more thoughts on this, let us know in the comments.

Update: In the meantime, American-Egyptian associations have released a statement to President Mubarak and raising the issue of whether he should be welcomed in the US again when civic, religious and political rights have stagnated or degraded in recent years. Full text after the jump.

Continue reading Gamal in DC: are think tanks complicit?

Gamal in DC again

This report in Masri al-Youm says Gamal Mubarak is planning to speak at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and at the Council of Foreign Relations this week. Some of the meetings are closed-door, apparently, so if any DC-based Arabist reader is attending, we’d love to hear of anything interesting Gamal has to say (anonymity guaranteed if desired!)

The background for this trip to the US is that adds to the long-term trend of Gamal taking a more active role in representing Egypt in DC, especially ahead of this month’s door-knock mission of the American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt (an occasion for influential businessmen to lobby Congress on economic and political relations with Egypt) and the expectation that Hosni Mubarak could be making his first trip to Washington in five years as Egypt mends its political relationship with the new Obama administration. Of course, presidential succession is as ever the hot topic, but it’ll be interesting to see whether Gamal stakes out positions on regional and security issues as well as his more traditional economic turf.

Leave a comment or contact me via email. Thanks!

Ayman Nour released

 

Ayman Nour on the campaign trail in Menouf, 2005. Ayman Nour on the campaign trail in Menouf, 2005.

 

 

The public prosecutor’s office declared a couple of hours ago that Ayman Nour would be released on medical grounds. I have heard he is now home. There is no further information as to why now, or why previous appeals to release him on medical ground were denied, but this appears to be a political decision. Rather strange timing that this happens a couple of days after the Washington Post urges the Obama administration not to deal with Hosni Mubarak unless Nour is freed.

Let’s assume – with all due respect to the integrity of the Egyptian legal system – that this is a political decision. What’s the rationale? I think the most plausible explanation is that it is not just an overture to Obama that Mubarak wants to change the negative dynamic in the US-Egypt relationship. It is a clear message that says, “look: Bush tried for four years to pressure me. But I do things on my own timing and any pressure is counterproductive.” The message is, before Obama and his administration settle into a clear approach on Egypt (I don’t think the NSC staffer on Egypt has even been appointed yet), that if the same US approach to Egypt continues, it will only generate headaches. It was necessary to release Nour to improve the bilateral relationship, since after the 2006 Democratic takeover of Congress the Ayman Nour case became a congressional issue beyond the control of the administration (in fact Dick Cheney tried to intervene to calm down Congress, and was pushed back.) Over the last two years Congress has put unprecedented (even if still relatively mild) pressure on Egypt by withholding $100 million in military aid (but giving Condoleeza Rice the right to waiver the withholding, which she did twice). Now Congress will not have Ayman Nour to rally support around this, and the cautious State and DoD approach to the Egyptian relationship (which is very strong in military, intelligence, and a few issues aside diplomatic terms) could very well prevail – especially as we’re seeing a new Egyptian crackdown on the tunnels to Gaza, the other big issue for Congress.

So what happens now? Well, Obama staffers have a token sign of progress they can point to, and a lesson that the Bush approach failed. Congress has what it wants. Ayman Nour, under Egyptian law, is now no longer able to run for public office as he has a criminal record. The Ghad party has been torn in half and will take time to rebuild. The legislative and political environment is much worse than it was when Nour first emerged as a national figure in 2004-2005, and repression is taking place much more brutally and systematically. So, most probably, we will see US pressure on democratic reform die down, since policymakers will find it difficult to get support for another direct confrontation with the Egyptian regime. They will wait and see what happens after succession. And for Mubarak, patience and sheer stubbornness won in the end. Which goes to prove that “democracy promotion” is a policy that’s in need of a serious rethink: “pressure” doesn’t really work, and autocracies have time on their side – unless those doing the pressuring are willing to make a serious break with past practices.

For now, I wish Ayman the best and am tremendously happy for his family, especially his brave wife Gameela who fought against all odds for so many years.

The No. 1 Sun Engine

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The 11th Cairo International Biennale kicks off in a few days, and while I’ll unfortunately miss the opening I will be back in a few weeks to check out this intriguing project I was emailed about. The No. 1 Sun Engine was operational in Maadi, a posh southern suburb of Cairo, in 1913 and was among the first serious experiments in solar power. Its American inventor, Frank Shuman, raised funds to deploy the bizarre contraption (which works by powering a low-pressure steam turbine) in London before visiting sun-drenched Cairo to build it. Its first use in to power a water-pump for irrigation with water from the Nile.

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You can read more about the history of the sun engine at project page, where there’s a timeline that tracks Shuman’s movements alongside with prominent historical events, such as Lord Kitchener’s arrival in Cairo and the start of World War I. The juxtaposition of this early venture into solar power and major geopolitical developments is fascinating, if only because WWI ushered in the era of oil (and the systematic sabotage of alternative energy projects), while Shuman developed his machine because he (as a Pennsylvanian) was worried about reaching the exhaustion of then-recoveroble coal, the Victorian age’s equivalent of peak oil. Of course, coal (control of which was a key objective of WWI and which is now undergoing a revival in China and the US among others) powered the war effort and shaped European societies, notably by making industrialization possible, much as after WWI control of oil (and specifically Middle Eastern oil) would help make possible massive social change and an unprecedented age of plenty in America.

I’ve always found this interconnection of social organization, imperialism and technology fascinating – such as in some of the recent work of Tim Mitchell, who has looked at the differences in social organization of coal and oil-based societies (because of the distribution model for each resource) and their role in making Western democracy possible (and therefore also perhaps impossible in other conditions). In this respect I highly recommend his short article n the subject (to my knowledge the only one available), which is in Word format here: Tim Mitchell’s article on carbon democracy

But I’ll go see this exhibition for the sheer cool steampunk aspect of it.

Abou Trika overooked for Ballon d’Or?

The latest international conspiracy against Egypt:

Scandalously, the France Football editorial team who selected the 30 players for whom their worldwide panel of journalists are allowed to vote overlooked the Al Ahly and Egypt playmaker Mohamed Aboutrika.

Fifa won’t compensate for this offensive anomaly. Their shortlist doesn’t include Aboutrika either. Nor anyone else from Egypt’s recent vintage. Hardly surprising given that Fifa doesn’t even rank Egypt, winners of the last two African Cups of Nations, as the best team in Africa. Not enough Europe-based players, perhaps.

[From Football: Paul Doyle on the nonsense of the Ballon d’Or]

(Thanks, X.)

Showdown in Gurna

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This morning I received an alarming email from my friend Golo, a great French cartoonist who has been living in Egypt since the 1970s. Golo lives in Gurna (Qurna – in Upper Egypt the letter “qaf” is pronounced “gaf”), the small village on the other bank of the Nile from Luxor, where he runs a NGO for local children. Gurna is a famous village because it sits atop a major archeological site, including several tombs. Golo writes that the longstanding government efforts to vacate and demolish Gurna village are coming to a showdown, with electricity to the area being cut off this week:

Mardi 25 novembre à 11 h, les autorités ont coupé, sans préavis, l’alimentation électrique aux habitants des collines de Gurnah et ont fait enlever les cables d’alimentation.
Les familles, hommes, femmes, ENFANTS, qui n’avaient pu arriver à un accord pour leur relogement, sont donc brutalement condamnés à la bougie (on ne trouve pas de pétrole pour alimenter les lampes). Ces villageois payaient pourtant leurs notes d’électricité.
Ne restent fournis en électricité que les archéologues et les sites touristiques.
Les habitants ont le sentiment d’habiter à Gaza et non en Egypte. Ils s’étaient dirigés vers l’hôpital pour entamer une grève de la faim mais les portes du bâtiment leur ont été fermées.

My translation: On Tuesday 25 November at 11am, the authorities, without warning, cut off electricity to the inhabitants of the hills of Gurna and removed supply cables. The families – men, women, CHILDREN – who were unable to come to an agreement for their relocation are therefore forced to use candles for lighting (as petrol for lamps is unavailable), even though these villagers had been paying their electricity bills.
Only archeologists and tourism sites continue to receive electricity.
The inhabitants have the feeling of living in Gaza rather than Egypt. They went to the hospital to begin a hunger strike but were refused entry.

For decades, the Egyptian government has tried to evict Gurna’s long-standing residents to turn the area into a tourism and archeology site, claiming that the village deprives Luxor of potential tourism revenue and that sewage from its houses is seeping into the tombs [note: I find this NYT story rather too reliant on government sources]. Efforts began in the 1940s with famed architect Hassan Fathy‘s neo-traditional housing project. But, more recently, it has become part of a larger project to redesign the West Bank of the Nile near Luxor into a luxury residential area, where wealthy Egyptians and foreigners can have holiday homes on prime Nile-side property – with obvious benefits to the high-end tourism industry and property developers.

Repressive treatment of Gurna’s inhabitants is nothing new. As Tim Mitchell wrote in his book Rule of Experts:

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The villagers are being moved to New Gurna, about 15km away on the edge of the desert. Although there are reports that the new settlement is not awful, it is far from the main source of livelihood of the Gurnawis: tourism. But the point is not whether or not the evacuation of Gurna to New Gurna is a good idea, but rather whether the government could have found alternatives (as have been suggested) to this kind of rough-shod treatment of people who have a historic link to the place.

Although there are far fewer people left in Gurna today, there is still potential for unrest (especially in the current anti-regime environment), even if it will be the last throes the Gurnawis’ long fight to retain their land and homes.

Developments in Mahalla

Hossam has been following the latest repressive measures being taken against labor activists in Mahalla, one of the center of labor protests in Egypt. He says:

There is a ongoing crackdown on labor activists in Mahalla, since they staged a demonstration last October against the management’s corruption:

http://www.flickr.com/photos/sarahcarr/sets/72157608515197459/

/arabawy/2008/11/26/renewed-crackdown-on-ghazl-el-mahalla-workers/

http://delicious.com/elhamalawy/MahallaOctoberProtest

Following the demo, the management decreed the transfer of four activists from their positions:

1- Blogger Kareem el-Beheiri was moved to the Cairo office

2-Mohamed el-Attar was moved to the Alexandria office

3-Amal Said was moved to the company’s nursery

4-Wedad el-Demerdash was also transferred to the nursery

/arabawy/2008/11/09/crackdown-on-mahalla-labor-activists-continue/

More alarmingly, the two women (Amal and Wedad) were sexually assaulted by thugs at the behest of the management, when they tried to enter the company compound.

/arabawy/2008/11/04/mahalla_sex_asaults/

The victimized workers’ colleagues are planning a demo on Saturday in solidarity. However yesterday another activist was victimized (named Wael Habib) as he was distributing leaflets in the company calling for the demo:

/arabawy/2008/11/26/renewed-crackdown-on-ghazl-el-mahalla-workers/

Wael has been one of the central figures in the December 2006 and September 2007 strikes…

It appears security is trying to block some of the labor activists who’ve done the most to get information out in the last few years from having access to the main factory.

Egypt: Piracy and history

Jonathan Wright of Reuters has a great story on Egypt’s attitude towards the Somali crisis, which is having an impact on Suez Canal income as ships begin to re-route around the Cape of Good Hope to avoid the area off Yemen and Somalia where most of ships are being attacked. It covers the parallels between the fall of Mamluk Egypt to the Ottoman, when the Sultan al-Ghouriwas unable to face piracy on the Red Sea as he fought Ottoman advances in Syria, and today:

Egypt shows no signs of military response to piracy
Tue 25 Nov 2008, 10:57 GMT

By Jonathan Wright

CAIRO, Nov 25 (Reuters) – Marauding seamen infest the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea, extracting tolls from shipping and disrupting an ancient trade route between Asia and Europe.

Egypt, one of the main direct beneficiaries of the transit trade, takes time to react. The government is in the hands of an aging leader, who looks to outside powers for help.

That was the challenge that Mamluk ruler Qansuh al-Ghouri faced in the early 16th century, when Portuguese ships appeared unexpectedly east of Suez and started to harass Egypt-bound shipping in the Red Sea and its approaches.

After centuries of peaceful trading, Egypt had no Red Sea fleet capable of countering the Portuguese menace. It may have underestimated the danger, despite diplomatic overtures from Venice, Yemen and the princes who ruled the west coast of India.

Continue reading Egypt: Piracy and history