Audio: Eissa at Journalists’ Syndicate

I’ve been wanting to put up for a while this audio file of Ibrahim Eissa’s speech at the massive press conference at the Journalists’ Syndicate on September 14th. Here is one (poorly) translated excerpt.

“We succeeded in saving the soul of this umma, which seemed about to die in the hospital of President Mubarak, and which has spent 25 years in the Emergency Room. Here she is [the umma], waking up from her coma, thanks to reforming judges, thanks to the Kifaya movement, thanks to Ayman Nour, thanks to the Muslim Brothehood, thanks to the opposition parties, thanks to liberal and socialist forces—and thanks to the independent press. The independent press, which has raised its voice as the conscience of Egypt, and has presented a model in the last few years of how to lower the president from the throne of a god-like pharaoh, and make him a human, elected president to whom we are capable of saying: no, no and again no.�

 Eissa ends the speech by saying what an distinction it is to be considered the regime’s “number one opponent� and “the journalist that the president of the republic wants to jail,� and gives a warm personal thanks to the President for this honour.

Recent funny YouTube videos

Below are some anti-Mubarak activist videos, some quite funny.

The very last one is the best, to the tune of the theme song from a movie (I forget its name) about a young man who saves to be able to marry only to have his money taken and the girl he wanted married off to someone else. He sings this song as he arrives at her wedding, describing what was done to him by her family and asking for his money back. Altogether, it packs quite an emotional punch and has hilarious adaptations of cinema posters lampooning regime figures.

Of course this site in no way endorses their content!

Reflections on Egypt’s press

Two pieces about Egypt’s current press clampdown are worth reading in light of yesterday’s press strike. Egypt: September of discontent by Amira Howeidy puts the pressure on the press in the current political context:

The problem now is that the authorities seem convinced that the private press, especially al Dostour, has more power than the state media machine in influencing public opinion. Otherwise, why would it drag its editor to court every few months in cases that always relate to the president? And why did the official news agency report plans to try him before an emergency court? The authorities later reversed that decision and referred him to a criminal court on 1 October under tight security measures, which adjourned the case to 24 October. Officially, Eissa’s crime is reporting on nation-wide rumours on the president’s health, or even death, in August. And in many ways what we’re witnessing is a crackdown on the independent press and an attempt to muzzle freedom of expression. This is why 18 independent newspapers have agreed not to publish on 7 October in protest.

But this isn’t solely about curbing freedom of expression. A quick glance at the bigger picture shows an insecure and aged regime battling for survival through a series of procedures that include silencing the press. If Eissa and his colleagues who face prison sentences end up in jail, they shouldn’t be viewed as only victims of a press massacre, but of a police state consolidating its position.

Meanwhile, I’d missed this long post over at Baheyya on The Death of Deference, which analyzes the press from a lot of angles. She recognizes that two personalities, more than anyone else, were responsible for the new oppositional tone of the independent press;

The two editors who more than any of their peers have created and promoted the contemporary adversarial model of Egyptian journalism are Abdel Halim Qandil and Ibrahim Eissa (though I must also recall the pioneering role of Magdi and Adil Hussein in the early 1990s). Both are consciously engaged in a systematic project of accusing, belittling, and criticising public officials, from the most hapless minister to the most powerful public official, the normally untouchable president. In light of the weakness of parliament and the fragmentation of citizen watchdog groups, both see journalism as a useful tool to extract a modicum of responsiveness from an unaccountable, unchecked imperial presidency. And both aspire to make a profound impact on the wider political culture, replacing existing norms of deference and decorum when addressing the powerful with a style marked by irreverence, profound scepticism, and a blunt, salty style. But though they’re fellow travellers in many ways, Eissa and Qandil come from very different backgrounds and are motivated by different impulses.

I would add to that (Baheyya briefly mentions it too) the remarkable supplanting of al-Ahram, the traditional newspaper of record, by al-Masri al-Youm. Now, however, we need another al-Masri al-Youm style newspaper to give it some competition lest it rests on its laurels. That may come soon, because from a professional standpoint things are starting to move in the Egyptian press. A few nights ago I had dinner with a publisher whose newspaper will see light sometime next year; he spoke of creating a “convergence newsroom” with the print edition of the newspaper more organically linked to its web presence. There is yet an Egyptian newspaper who website acts as a forum in the way the al-Arabiya comments section do. The web may still have limited reach, but it can add another layer to the dialogue between readers and newspapermen that has taken place in recent years — at least while emerging media moguls wait for the day when they can unleash their ferocious journalists onto the terrestrial TV and radio waves.

Fifi Abou for president?

Funny quote in this otherwise bog-standard succession story — With tough moves, Egypt moves to ensure stability whenever post-Mubarak era dawns:

Some, even in the opposition, believe it should, because a military-backed candidate would have wider acceptance.

But the army — led by Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, a Mubarak loyalist — has been largely segregated from Egypt’s politics since the assassination of former President Anwar Sadat by Islamist army officers. That has left the stage open for Egypt’s first civilian president.

“We have distanced ourselves from politics long ago,” said former Staff Maj. Gen. Hossam Sewilam, who once headed the Armed Forces Strategic Research Center. “If they elect Fifi Abdou” — a famed Egyptian belly-dancer — “or (Gamal) Mubarak, they are free. It’s not our business.”

With the military on the sidelines, the government has to show strength to keep succession smooth, said Gihad Auda, a senior member of the ruling National Democratic Party.

The story should have discussed the role of the security services, as opposed to the army, in the succession question.

Eissa trial begins

Ibrahim Eissa’s latest trial started today, and while he decided not to attend he may have an interesting defense strategy based on his allegations that President Mubarak is in poor health:

Eissa pointed out that the president’s health would be raised at each court hearing, “meaning that those who brought the case want his health to be discussed.”

As with other trials of journalists, the case against Eissa has been brought by a private individual since Egyptian law allows citizens to lodge complaints which can then lead to criminal convictions.

Eissa is now the target of eight such private cases, something he called “proof of the judicial farce” being played out against him.

“I hope the case will be decided in accordance with the law and that jailing journalists will be a red line — even if I have no faith in this regime,” said the editor.

In that case, why not get an expert witness to conduct a medical examination of Mubarak to ascertain that he is, in fact, in good health and thus that the rumors are baseless? Brilliant, even if I doubt the judge will go for it.

Hodeiby: Your best friend hates you

Your best friend hates you: prolific Muslim Brother Ibrahim Houdeiby’s latest article, perhaps his best one yet, on Egypt’s promotion of anti-Americanism and how it relates to the “engage the MB” debate. He concludes with an interesting argument:

In the era of “neo-terrorism,” or micro-terrorist groups, this increasing hostility only means a threat to American national security. With the rapid boom in technology and communication, it takes no more than a connection to the Internet and a few dollars to develop a bomb and threaten the security and lives of innocents anywhere. Therefore, relying on the strong relations with Egypt’s dictator as a substitute for building bridges of understanding with the Egyptian people is a strategic mistake.

The current and next American administrations have one of two possible alternatives. The first is to continue supporting a regime that complies with all their demands yet spreads embedded anti-Americanism on the domestic level, and suffer the possible consequences of that, which will be devastating to everyone. The second alternative is to support real democracy in Egypt, and realize that the outcome would be a government that would not necessarily serve America’s short term interests in the region. The outcome will be a government that pursues Egypt’s interests, and manifests the people’s will, yet does not fuel widespread inherent hostility towards the United States.

On the other hand, the MB is not exactly known for its pro-US rhetoric either, is it? So the message is, if you encourage democracy in Egypt, even if it will inevitably strengthen the MB (at least initially), Egypt will continue to play more or less within the limits imposed by American regional hegemony. And presumably refrain from doing things like sending soldiers to defend Lebanon from Israel. Or am I reading it wrong?

WaPo on MB Crackdown

Cairo Moving More Aggressively To Cripple Muslim Brotherhood:

CAIRO — After imprisoning or prodding into exile Egypt’s leading secular opposition activists, the government is using detentions and legal changes to neutralize the country’s last surviving major political movement, the Muslim Brotherhood.

Brotherhood leaders and rights groups contend the government is clearing the stage of opponents in politics, civil society and the news media ahead of the end of the 26-year rule of President Hosni Mubarak, who is 79. Egyptians widely expect the transition to be tense and that Mubarak’s son Gamal will be a top contender.

“Tyranny has reached unprecedented limits from any previous regime,” said Mohammed Mahdi Akef, the supreme guide, or highest leader, of the Brotherhood, which the government has outlawed for decades but allowed to operate within narrow limits. “This is insane tyranny.”

Egyptian officials point to the group’s high level of organization and violent past, and insist it remains the most dangerous force in Egypt. “The Muslim Brotherhood represents the framework for future violence,” said Mohamed Abdel-Fattah Omar, a lawmaker from the ruling party and a former head of the state security apparatus.

The article continues to link the crackdown on the MB with a general wave of repression (the press, civil society, etc.) linked to succession. This theory, frequently aired in the local press, is that the regime is moving to ensure that all vehicles of dissent are unable to organize when the time for succession comes, presumably in the next 24 months. But that would mean that there is a plan in motion for succession, and nothing could be less certain (even if some candidates may be maneuvering). Maybe it’s not that the crackdown is in preparation for succession, but rather that the uncertainty over succession has become such an existential problem (in the philosophical sense, not life-or-death sense) that it pushing various political actors (opposition parties, the MB, the press, civil society, etc.) to assert themselves and make a push on long-held beliefs and positions.

Or maybe things are so opaque it’s hard to make heads of tails of regime strategy, if strategy there is.