Lebanese brain drain

LEBANON: One in three Lebanese wants to leave:

BEIRUT, 10 June 2007 (IRIN) – Researchers warn that economic instability and persistent security threats are driving ever more young, educated Lebanese abroad, creating a brain drain that threatens the country’s economic and social future.

“We’re suffering a huge brain drain,” Kamal Hamdan, head of the Lebanese Centre of Research and Studies, told IRIN.

“Those who have the brains take their diplomas and leave. They are the young people who would go on to be middle executives and entrepreneurs. In the long term, their absence means we may face a serious shortage of policy developers and managers.”

Perhaps one of the worst consequences of last summer’s war — it repeated the brain drain caused by the civil war.

Let’s not forget Lebanon

Two essential pieces on Lebanon appeared in the last few weeks. The first, a review piece by Max Rodenbeck in the NYRB, looks at the last two-three years and draws a convincing portrait of what happened. Considering how confusing Lebanon’s politics are, that’s quite a feat. Plus Max gets the way I react to Lebanese food (esp. when consumed with copious amounts of arak, as it must be) exactly right:

Yet it is true that while Lebanon whets appetites with its gorgeous landscapes, clement weather, energetic people, and wonderful food, trying to consume too much of it tends to bring on heartburn. Just ask the Ottoman Turks, the imperialist French, the US Marine Corps, the Palestinians, the Israelis, the Syrians, or any number of Lebanese would-be overlords. The country’s infernally complex ingredients seem chemically incapable of melding into a digestible dish.

The second piece, by Jim Quilty for MERIP, focuses on the recent confrontation between the Lebanese army and an Islamist group operating out of the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp near Tripoli:

If Lebanese politicians on both sides of the government-opposition divide have emphasized support for the army over empathy for human suffering in the camps, their rhetoric betrays the marginality of the refugee community. It also reflects the centrality of the Lebanese army in the ongoing contest over the future direction of state policy. At the end of the day, it is entirely likely that the Palestinians in Lebanon will be three-time losers in this bloody episode: enduring the humanitarian crisis that grows out of it, shouldering the burden of containing it and suffering a backlash in Lebanese political opinion for being seen as somehow responsible for it. The anti-Palestinian feeling in Lebanon is all the more bitterly ironic since so few of the radical Sunni Islamists battling the Lebanese army in Nahr al-Barid are themselves Palestinian.

Another key paragraph, on whether March 14 is financing Salafist-Jihadists groups (as famously but unconvincingly alleged by Seymour Hersh), is this one:

Whether or not the Hariris and their Saudi supporters have a soft spot for salafis is not the point. Rather, it is the culture of cooptation that has marked the Lebanese government’s approach to the challenges confronting the country since the Syrian withdrawal. Rafiq al-Hariri deployed his financial resources to great effect during his political career, but his purchase of loyalties was embedded in the Syrian occupation’s security regime. With the Syrians gone, and with Sunnis set against their Shi‘i countrymen — and with them the specter of Hizballah, the militants who stopped the Israeli army, Lebanese find the line between purchased loyalties and militant outsourcing a fuzzy one.

Although Quilty, like Rodenbeck, highlights the fact that some Syrian support for Fatah al-Islam operatives was probably necessary, he does not satisfactorily answer the various conspiracy theories about its origin — except to say that whatever help they may have secured, the members of the group appear to be genuinely nasty Jihadists, not just hired guns.

Read it all for the nitty-gritty detail of Palestinian camp politics.

Landis contra Young

Something of a nasty fight has emerged between two of the most prominent commentators on Syria and Lebanon, Joshua Landis and Michael Young. The two seemed to be on cordial terms before, with Landis frequently referring to Young’s writings on Lebanon, even though it’s always been clear that they had opposite attitudes. Young has long been critical of Syrian meddling in Lebanon and supportive of the March 14 movement, as well as generally critical of Hizbullah. Landis, who writes more from a Syrian perspective, has defended Syria from some of the more spurious attacks against it while still providing critical coverage of its domestic politics.

In a March 10 post discussing efforts at obstructing a deal between the US, France and Syria over Lebanon, Landis counts Young as one of the intellectual obstructionists of such a deal (political obstructionists include Druze warlord Walid Jumblatt and US Ambassador to Beirut Jeffrey Feltman). Landis goes on to attack the obstructionist line as one that is dangerous for Lebanon and the region as a whole as well as one that puffs up a “Shia crescent” threat and gives Lebanese Shias “slave” status in a Christian and Sunni-dominated polity:

The only problem with this analysis is that it is has led to a long list of failures and the needless death of thousands of Iraqis and Americans. Michael Young recommended the invasion of Iraq in 2003, claiming that the “consociational” Lebanese model of government that has served his country so well would bring peace and happiness to Iraq and quickly be replicated throughout the Middle East. It has taken the West four long years of watching Iraq descend into ferocious civil war to come to grips with the short comings of this analysis. In 2006, Young advocated keeping the incompetent Lahoud as president of Lebanon rather than giving Michel Aoun a chance at elections. (Aoun was the most popular candidate in Lebanon at the time.) This obstructionism led directly to the summer war between Lebanon and Israel. With no prospects of a non-violent adjustment to Lebanon’s lopsided power-sharing formula, Hizbullah and its opposition allies fell back on the old formula of “resistance” and demonstrations. When war broke out, Young began excitedly prognosticating that Israel could break Hizbullah and international forces disarm it. He insisted the Shiite party did not represent authentic Lebanese demands, being merely a creature of Iran and Syria. Again, Young’s dreams didn’t materialize. Instead, the inconclusive war led to paralysis in Lebanon as Hizbullah and the Siniora government stand face to face, each unwilling to bow to the demands of the other. Rather that admit that he has misjudged the opposition or the ability of American and Israeli power to reshape the hearts and minds of Middle Easterners, Young continues to insist that Syria and Hizbullah will buckle if only the US will inflict a bit more pain on them.

Rather than come to grips with the real flaws of Lebanon’s democracy, Michael Young, like many other Lebanese, believes that the use of force by foreign powers can preserve the skewed status quo in Lebanon. He wants international forces to disarm the Shiites in the South, and the US to inflict more pain on Syria. The Lebanese obstructionist solution is to import violence into Lebanon and the region. They refuse to allow a “typically muddled but non-violent solution to the impasse.” Importing foreign armies to keep the Shiites in their place will only lead to further war and extremism on both sides.

What is wrong with the “consociational” system that is held up as the epitome of Lebanese democracy and power-sharing? Quite simply, it treats Shiites like slaves. In pre-civil war America, black slaves were counted as half a white person. In Lebanon they are accorded the same political weight. Although Shiites are estimated to make up some 40% of the population, the Taif Accords, Lebanon’s constitutional arrangement, permit the Shiites only 22% of the seats in parliament.

The defenders of Taif will scoff at this analogy between Lebanese Shiites and American slaves. They will say, “But we don’t treat Shiites as slaves. They can vote and they are allocated the third most powerful political office in the land: the President of the Parliament. All true, I admit, but this doesn’t obscure the simple fact that Shiites are accorded only half the political worth of other human beings in Lebanon.

That post (which is longer than what’s excerpted above) was obviously provocative and generated a lot of comments on Landis’ blog. He eventually posted a follow-up with some reader responses and said he wanted to let passions cool. He did mention that Young had responded but did not put up his response.

Young decided not to wait and wrote up his response in the Daily Star’s opinion pages, of which he is the editor. The response was much more aggressive in tone than anything Landis wrote against him, although arguably Young was the injured party thus far. The column was titled “the blogosphere’s foreign informant” and in it Young accuses Landis of being soft on the Syrian regime (he compares him to Patrick Seale, Hafez al-Asad’s biographer, whose book does rather soft-pedal criticism of the late Asad, although it remains a very good read.) He defends himself from some of the charges Landis made, notably denying that he ever said that he would leave Lebanon if Muslims were given more power in the confessional system. More seriously, Young accuses Landis of willfully putting Syrian dissident Michael Kilo in danger by revealing that he met with Syrian Muslim Brotherhood members in Morocco to strike a deal against the regime. Again, you should read the whole thing, but here is the most vitriolic part of Young’s article:

My theory, and take it for what it’s worth, is that Landis’ ambition is to be the premier mediator with and interpreter of Syria in American academic and policy-making circles – a latter-day Patrick Seale. In this context, and again this is just a coagulating hypothesis, Landis has frequently used his blog to prove his worth to the Syrians – perhaps to enjoy better access. He has also maligned those offering perspectives different than his own. In the post where he went after me, Landis harshly attacked the An-Nahar Washington correspondent, Hisham Melhem, as well. My conviction is that Landis felt he had to discredit us both, mainly because we fear that Lebanon will pay if the US engages Syria. As he once, revealingly, put it to me: “Your anti-Syrian line is the most coherent and best packaged.” I would dispute the term “anti-Syrian” and find his use of the word “packaged” peculiar. Perhaps I’m just not partial to Syria’s leadership.

Is court scribe really a role an academic should aspire to? And what does it say about Landis that he has consistently promoted the idea that the United States should sign off on renewed Syrian control over Lebanon in exchange for a deal with Damascus in Iraq? What kind of esteem does a scholar invite by wanting to return a recently emancipated, fairly democratic country to its former subjugation by a foreign dictatorship?

Now, some of the attacks on both sides seem a bit petty (but then again petty attacks and score-keeping appear to be a mainstay of Lebanese punditry) and some of the allegations are rather serious. It’s too bad to see two of the more influential opinion-makers on Syria and Lebanon (in the West, of course, they are non-entities in the Arabic-language media) get into a personal catfight like this.

I’m not going to take sides — not that either would car
e. I’ve long had concerns about bias in the writing of both, but still read both regularly and have learnt much from them. Being biased doesn’t mean you’re not interesting. I do think Landis, whose blog is an excellent resource, sometimes comes across as an apologist for the Syrian regime, although I don’t think he actually is and also airs negative opinions about it. Similarly, Young occasionally comes across as an apologist for the 14 March movement (or the Siniora government).

I actually do like the overall intent of Landis’ argument about Shias still being viewed by many Lebanese Sunnis and Christians as an underclass. Young appears to be saying that he agrees the Taif accords need to be scrapped, but he hasn’t exactly taken warmly to the way Shias (or at least those represented by Hizbullah) have pushed for that change, i.e. the street protests and occupation of Downtown Beirut. He’s also been an advocate of sectarianism of sorts. I remember this column (Daily Star subscribers can find it here) he wrote last December that surprised me:

Every few years the Lebanese must cope with an individual, party or community that ignores, disastrously, sectarian conventions. When the Maronites, the Sunnis and the Druze couldn’t get it right during the 1970s, the country descended into a 15-year war. Today, it is Hizbullah, as prime spokesman for the Shiite community, that is making a similar miscalculation. If conflict can be averted, then the party’s learning a lesson will have been worthwhile: better a weak Lebanese state where communal alignments can counterbalance the hegemonic tendencies of one side to a strong, purportedly non-sectarian state that will consistently drift toward a disputed, therefore unstable, authoritarianism.
That said, permanent, rigid sectarianism is not ideal. For any truly democratic order to emerge, the Lebanese must ultimately think as citizens, not as members of religious tribes. But wishing that away will not work. The only solution is to modify sectarianism from within, to provisionally accept its institutions while making it more flexible and opening up space for non-sectarian practices. The Taif agreement outlines the means to reach this end, and just as soon as Lebanon can break free of Syrian and Iranian manipulation, just as soon as Hizbullah agrees to a process leading to its disarmament, no matter how lengthy, sectarian negotiations will become possible and the road to reform can be taken.

That column was criticized here, but the point I would like to make about it is that it is hard to understand how Shias (who are, for better or for worse, mostly represented by Hizbullah nowadays) can make a push for a greater role within a sectarian system without going after some entrenched interests. Power is taken, not given freely.

Update: Landis has published a response to Young’s column.

Lebanon re-arming

This Le Monde article focuses on an arms race in Lebanon that is driving up prices as militias re-arm themselves:

Le fait est, néanmoins, que d’après les connaisseurs, la demande ne cesse de croître sur le marché noir, où le prix des armes individuelles aurait augmenté. Une kalachnikov se vend désormais entre 500 et 600 dollars au lieu de 100 à 150 dollars avant la crise. Les autorités syriennes ont annoncé de leur côté avoir intercepté, dans un camion se rendant au Liban, un colis comprenant 96 pistolets de 9 mm, un fusil-mitrailleur et leurs munitions.

Plus grave : le patriarche de la communauté maronite (catholique), le cardinal Nasrallah Boutros Sfeïr, a fait état d’une véritable ” course à l’armement de tous les partis et protagonistes libanais “. ” Comme si, a-t-il ajouté dans un prêche prononcé le dimanche 25 février, nous étions revenus plus de vingt ans en arrière ; comme si nous n’avions tiré aucune leçon des drames et des tragédies que nous avons vécus. “

Officiellement, les milices de toutes appartenances politico-communautaires qui ont participé à la guerre civile de quinze ans ont été dissoutes et ont remis leurs arsenaux à l’armée. Le Hezbollah (chiite, opposition) fait exception. Il continue d’être équipé d’armes de tous calibres, fournies principalement par l’Iran pour lui permettre de lutter contre Israël. Des dizaines d’obus de moyenne et de courte portée, appartenant au Parti de Dieu, récemment saisies par l’armée libanaise, ont toutefois semé le doute sur ses intentions, pour le moins aux yeux de ses adversaires politiques.

It also mentions Seymour Hersh’s recent article in which he alleges that US funding or arms are reaching Jihadi groups with the blessing of the Siniora government and the Hariri-controlled Internal Security Forces.

Hizbullah back to pre-war firepower?

Abu Muqawama has a question about recent Israeli reports that Hizbullah has recovered its pre-war firepower:

doesn’t this report shoot holes in all those claims made by the IDF in the aftermath of the summer’s war about how this wasn’t a Hizbollah victory on account of all the damage Israel did to Hizbollah’s infrastructure? If Hizbollah can build itself back up to pre-war capabilities after just six months, then really, what does that say about what the IDF did and didn’t accomplish in the summer’s war?

Lebanon in flames

Is another civil war about to start in Lebanon? The general strike called by Hezbullah and its allies yesterday turned into a day in which 3 people were killed, dozens injured, and gangs of Sunni and Shia youth threatened and insulted each other.

Novelist Elias Khoury and historian Fawwaz Traboulsi–two major Lebanese intellectuals–are in New York at the moment and spoke at NYU the night before last. I’m not in any way qualified to analyze the labyrinthine politics of Lebanon, but I’m going to summarize some of the main points made during this talk.

Khoury and Traboulsi said that it is not in Hezbullah’s interest to start a civil war, and that Hezbullah knows this; but the movement it started–which has been using the exact same methods as last year’s “cedar revolution” to topple the government–has now painted itself into a corner, and Hezbullah’s allies (Syria and the party of Christian General Michel Aoun) may be pushing for a war because they have virtually nothing to lose from it.
Khoury referred to “the tragedy of Hezbullah”–that it is “bigger than Lebanon” (a pan-Islamic movement) and “smaller than Lebanon (it only represents one sect within the country and therefore can never take full power). In his analysis, it has long been a Syrian calculation to entrust Lebanon’s military resistance to the Israeli occupation (Hezbullah ousted the Israeli after years of fighting in the south) to a group that could not, when victorious, represent the whole country and hope to come to power–Khoury points out that a more widespread, leftists, national resisance movement was decimated by assassinations in the 1980s. Thus in his view Hezbullah is as much a tool of Syrian as of Iran.

Which points to another facet of the situation in Lebanon: the way every group there has an outside backer. It is common-place to speak of Hezbullah as “backed by Iran,” but Traboulsi and Khoury were at pains to make clear that the way politics works in Lebanon is that every major player turns to powers outside the country to solidify its position–or is used by powers outside the country to promote their interests (the government is backed by the US, for example, the Sunni community by Saudi Arabia). The connection between Lebanese politics and regional politics is one reason that–seemingly overnight–the main sectarian conflict has become that between Sunni and Shias, not Muslims and Christians. This new divide is one of the many consequences of Iraq.

CIA, Saudis covertly plot support of Siniora

Rather obvious, of course:

The Central Intelligence Agency has been authorised to take covert action against Hizbollah as part of a secret plan by President George W. Bush to help the Lebanese government prevent the spread of Iranian influence. Senators and congressmen have been briefed on the classified “non-lethal presidential finding” that allows the CIA to provide financial and logistical support to the prime minister, Fouad Siniora.

The finding was signed by Mr Bush before Christmas after discussions between his aides and Saudi Arabian officials. Details of its existence, known only to a small circle of White House officials, intelligence officials and members of Congress, have been passed to The Daily Telegraph.

. . .

A former US government official said: “Siniora’s under siege there and we are always looking for ways to help allies. As Richard Armitage [a former deputy US secretary of state] said, Hizbollah is the A-team of terrorism and certainly Iran and Syria have not let up in their support of the group.”

Prince Bandar bin-Sultan, the former Saudi Arabian ambassador to Washington, is understood to have been closely involved in the decision to prop up Mr Siniora’s administration and the Israeli government, which views Iran as its chief enemy, has also been supportive.

“There’s a feeling both in Jerusalem and in Riyadh that the anti-Sunni tilt in the region has gone too far,” said an intelligence source. “By removing Saddam, we’ve shifted things in favour of the Shia and this is a counter-balancing exercise.

Why don’t they just redraw the maps while they’re at it?

Jumblatt and Nasrallah trade serious accusations

I missed this at the time, but this Le Monde article says that Hizbullah (via al-Manar) has accused close Walid Jumblatt collaborator Marwan Hamade of helping the US Ambassador in Lebanon to locate Hassan Nasrallah during the Summer 2006 war — so the info could be passed on to Israel. Walid Jumblatt has replied by, for the first time, directly accusing Hizbullah of having a hand “one way or the other, in some of the assassinations, if not all the assassinations.”