Islamism – Page 4

ICG on “Hizbollah and the Lebanese Crisis”

International Crisis Group – Hizbollah and the Lebanese Crisis:

Looking back over the past ten months, Lebanese can feel somewhat relieved. The massive demonstrations in December 2006, followed by a general strike and clashes between pro- and anti-government forces with strong sectarian overtones, as well as a series of assassinations and car bombs, brought the nation perilously close to breakdown. State institutions are virtually paralysed; the government barely governs; the economic crisis is deepening; mediation efforts have failed; political murders continue; and militias, anticipating possible renewed conflict, are rearming. Still, fearful of the consequences of their own actions, leaders of virtually every shade took a welcome step back.

An important explanation lies in Hizbollah’s realisation that its efforts to bring down the government carried dangerous consequences. Facing calls for its disarmament and denunciations of its (allegedly foreign-inspired) adventurism in triggering the July 2006 war, the movement concluded that the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and its backers were hostile actors intent on cutting it down to size and further aligning Lebanon with the West. As a result, it carried the fight squarely on the domestic scene, removing Shiite ministers, taking to the streets and pushing for the government’s ouster. This resort to street politics was risky and ultimately self-defeating. At almost every social level, Shiite support for Hizbollah has solidified, a result of both the movement’s longstanding efforts to consolidate its hold over the community and a highly polarised post-war environment. Former Shiite adversaries are, for the time being, silencing their differences, viewing the movement’s weapons as their best defence in an environment where Shiites feel besieged from both within and without.

But while the movement demonstrated its mobilisation capacity and enjoyed support from an important segment of the Christian community, its use of an essentially Shiite base to bring down a Sunni-dominated government reinforced sectarian loyalties. Sunnis and many Christians were alarmed at Hizbollah’s might and ability unilaterally to trigger a devastating confrontation; they increasingly saw it as a Shiite not national movement and as advancing an Iranian or Syrian not Lebanese agenda. In short, while the movement sought to highlight the conflict’s political stakes, the street battles quickly morphed into confessional ones, forcing Hizbollah into a sectarian straitjacket and threatening to distract it from its primary objectives.

Some interesting stuff about the Aoun-Hizbullah relationship coming to a head over the presidential elections towards the end.

Hodeiby: Your best friend hates you

Your best friend hates you: prolific Muslim Brother Ibrahim Houdeiby’s latest article, perhaps his best one yet, on Egypt’s promotion of anti-Americanism and how it relates to the “engage the MB” debate. He concludes with an interesting argument:

In the era of “neo-terrorism,” or micro-terrorist groups, this increasing hostility only means a threat to American national security. With the rapid boom in technology and communication, it takes no more than a connection to the Internet and a few dollars to develop a bomb and threaten the security and lives of innocents anywhere. Therefore, relying on the strong relations with Egypt’s dictator as a substitute for building bridges of understanding with the Egyptian people is a strategic mistake.

The current and next American administrations have one of two possible alternatives. The first is to continue supporting a regime that complies with all their demands yet spreads embedded anti-Americanism on the domestic level, and suffer the possible consequences of that, which will be devastating to everyone. The second alternative is to support real democracy in Egypt, and realize that the outcome would be a government that would not necessarily serve America’s short term interests in the region. The outcome will be a government that pursues Egypt’s interests, and manifests the people’s will, yet does not fuel widespread inherent hostility towards the United States.

On the other hand, the MB is not exactly known for its pro-US rhetoric either, is it? So the message is, if you encourage democracy in Egypt, even if it will inevitably strengthen the MB (at least initially), Egypt will continue to play more or less within the limits imposed by American regional hegemony. And presumably refrain from doing things like sending soldiers to defend Lebanon from Israel. Or am I reading it wrong?

WaPo on MB Crackdown

Cairo Moving More Aggressively To Cripple Muslim Brotherhood:

CAIRO — After imprisoning or prodding into exile Egypt’s leading secular opposition activists, the government is using detentions and legal changes to neutralize the country’s last surviving major political movement, the Muslim Brotherhood.

Brotherhood leaders and rights groups contend the government is clearing the stage of opponents in politics, civil society and the news media ahead of the end of the 26-year rule of President Hosni Mubarak, who is 79. Egyptians widely expect the transition to be tense and that Mubarak’s son Gamal will be a top contender.

“Tyranny has reached unprecedented limits from any previous regime,” said Mohammed Mahdi Akef, the supreme guide, or highest leader, of the Brotherhood, which the government has outlawed for decades but allowed to operate within narrow limits. “This is insane tyranny.”

Egyptian officials point to the group’s high level of organization and violent past, and insist it remains the most dangerous force in Egypt. “The Muslim Brotherhood represents the framework for future violence,” said Mohamed Abdel-Fattah Omar, a lawmaker from the ruling party and a former head of the state security apparatus.

The article continues to link the crackdown on the MB with a general wave of repression (the press, civil society, etc.) linked to succession. This theory, frequently aired in the local press, is that the regime is moving to ensure that all vehicles of dissent are unable to organize when the time for succession comes, presumably in the next 24 months. But that would mean that there is a plan in motion for succession, and nothing could be less certain (even if some candidates may be maneuvering). Maybe it’s not that the crackdown is in preparation for succession, but rather that the uncertainty over succession has become such an existential problem (in the philosophical sense, not life-or-death sense) that it pushing various political actors (opposition parties, the MB, the press, civil society, etc.) to assert themselves and make a push on long-held beliefs and positions.

Or maybe things are so opaque it’s hard to make heads of tails of regime strategy, if strategy there is.

al-Hodaiby answers Tahawy

Muslim Brother Ibrahim al-Houdaiby has responded to Mona al-Tahawy’s critical column in the Forward on the group. In this pieces he distances himself from Supreme Guide Mahdi Akef’s remark that she appeared “naked” because she was unveiled — not the first time I hear Ibrahim condemn al-Houdaiby in favor of the person many see as the MB’s real strongman, Khairat al-Shater. He also makes the argument that while the MB has not been successful at convincing the world (more importantly, I wold add many Egyptians) of its commitment to democracy, it is serious about establishing a dialogue with other political currents.

The Muslim Brotherhood Will Stand Up for All Egyptians:

Reading Mona Eltahawy’s September 21 opinion article, I felt more than ever that all Egyptians — regardless of their ideological orientation, gender or age — have a lot in common (“I Will Stand Up for the Muslim Brotherhood”). Eltahawy and I differ on much, yet we share a common objective and we struggle for the same cause of bringing real democracy, justice and freedom to Egypt.

Eltahawy is critical of the Muslim Brotherhood’s political orientation and stances on a number of issues, yet she stands with us in solidarity against the Egyptian government’s crackdowns. It is important that Egyptians of different political views defend each others’ political rights, as Eltahawy has done — and as several Muslim Brotherhood members, myself included, have previously done on behalf of opposition leaders Ayman Nour and Talaat El Sadaat and bloggers Kareem Amer and Sandmonkey.

Nor is that the only point on which we agree.

In her opinion article, Eltahawy criticizes the Muslim Brotherhood’s leader, Mohammed Mahdi Akef, for calling her “naked” because she was wearing a short-sleeved T-shirt and pants. I could not agree more with her.

Not wearing the hijab, or headscarf, makes a woman unveiled, not naked. I realize how offensive it is to call someone “naked” for not wearing a headscarf, and I find Akef’s comment unjustifiable.

[…]

I agree with Eltahawy when she writes that the Muslim Brotherhood is “the last man standing in Egypt.” I sincerely believe this puts an additional responsibility on the group, as it must shoulder the burden of helping others to stand.

As declared several times by leaders including Deputy Chairman Khayrat El Shatir (who is currently being tried by a military tribunal), the Muslim Brotherhood realizes that no single party or group will be able to solve Egypt’s economic, political and social problems. It is for this specific reason that Muslim Brotherhood members need to hear constructive criticism and advice from their political rivals, so we can all help each other move forward in pushing for genuine reform in Egypt.

Frankly, I find that neither Tahawy nor al-Hudaiby make a particular convincing case, and I find it odd that they are having this argument in America’s premier Yiddish community magazine.

Tahawy in Forward on MB

Mona al-Tahawy has a personal story of dealing with the Muslim Brotherhood and explains why she backs their political rights even as she (rightly) finds their views distasteful: I Will Stand Up for the Muslim Brotherhood.

I think, even more than the arrests, the sign that there is really a fierce campaign taking place against the MB is that last week they were prevented from hosting their annual Ramadan iftar, which only two years ago was being attended by NDP figures. Symbolically, it is saying that they are considered beyond the pale, which was not the case not so long ago.

MB’s Essam al-Erian arrested

I have just received the following email from a friend in the Muslim Brotherhood:

I just received the news of the arrest (or re-arrest) of Essam El Erian, Chief of the Muslim Brotherhood’s political bureau, who was banned from travelling to Turkey this morning. A number of leaders were also arrested, including Mahmoud Hussien, a member of the Executive Council.

El Erian spent most of his lifetime in prison, being arrested one time after the other. I fail to comprehend the logic of his arrest, especially that he is a well -known leader who appears on media outlets all the time, and is well known for his moderate stances, and tolerance. He enjoys the love and support of all political activists in the country, including his political opponents. In fact, some observers make distinctions between his discourse and that of other Brotherhood leaders, and claim that El Erian presents a moderate façade for a group which is not that moderate.

El Erian was elected to parliament in 1987, and was arrested several times. I could not count them now of course, but he was arrested in 1978, 1981, 1995 ( and was sentenced to five years in prison by a military tribunal), 2002, 2005, 2006, and was last released in December 2006, only 4 days before the arrest of Khayrat el Shater, the Muslim Brotherhood’s deputy chairman.

The arrest of El Erian is a clear attempt by the regime to crackdown on the moderate leaders of the Brotherhood who could push the group towards more moderate stances. With El Shater and El Erian being behind bars, the Brotherhood’s political leadership is being deprived of two of its most influential and moderate faces. The question remains: who does that serve?

It’s a good question.

At the zoo

Charles Levinson unearths this disturbing-but-funny-but-disturbing MEMRI clip from Hamas TV about getting children to behave better with animals. It is truly bizarre, but I wouldn’t draw any wider conclusions from it aside from wondering whether there can be a worse place for animals than Gaza zoo (look at how small the lion’s cage is), which is not surprising considering Gaza itself has been turned into an open-air prison for humans.

Update: PETA is shocked, shocked at how animals are treated in a place where humans receive worse treatment.

Hamas bans protests in Gaza without its okay

Two questions about the story below: 1) While remembering that many governments, even in democratic countries, require demonstrations to be registered for public safety reasons, is this merely an attempt to control the situation in a chaotic area (and where certain clans may be still be bitter about Fatah’s defeat) or is Hamas taking the Mubarak approach to public protests? And 2) is it Hamas who is in charge of Gaza, or Executive Force?

Hamas bans protests in Gaza without its okay:

GAZA CITY (AFP) – Hamas announced on Monday it was banning demonstrations in the Gaza Strip without authorisation from the Islamist movement which has ruled the territory for nearly two months.

“In the interest of the general public, to preserve security and with an eye to the law, all demonstrations are categorically forbidden without the offical authorisation of the Executive Force,” spokesman Saber al-Khalifa told AFP.

He was referring to the paramilitary that has acted as police since Hamas overran forces loyal to Palestinian president Mahmud Abbas in Gaza in mid-June.

“This measure aims to preserve security and will guarantee that gunshots will not be fired. Above all, it will permit us to protect these demonstrations with our patrols,” Khalifa said.

The move marked the latest clampdown on dissent by the Islamists since they seized power in the impoverished territory on June 15 after days of bloody gunbattles with the rival Fatah party.

Hamas has closed the pro-Fatah public television, radio station and news agency and today controls all electronic media in Gaza, except for one radio station linked to the small Islamic Jihad group

Shehata & Stacher: Boxing in the Brothers

Our friends Samer Shehata and Joshua Stacher have a new piece on the Muslim Brotherhood’s relationship with the Egyptian regime at MERIP. It’s a thorough overview of the last two years of mounting repression against the MB, tracking down the post-parliamentary election crackdown, the Fall 2006 labor and student election crackdown, the “Ikhwan Militia” scandal, the arrest of senior leaders such as Khairat al-Shatir, the constitutional changes, and more. A kind of Chatham House version for Islamist politics in 2006-2007, if you will. Their conclusion of where this is heading:

The Mubarak regime is intent upon remaking the rules governing the Brotherhood’s participation in formal politics. Just as the 2005 parliamentary elections placed the Brotherhood on the national stage, the regime’s current moves aim to put the Brothers back in their box. If the reinstatement of military trials and seizure of assets were warnings of worse to come, the Brothers appear to have gotten the message. As Muhammad al-Baltagi notes, “They are saying, ‘If you back down from your strong political participation, then it’s over. If you persist, then this will persist.’” In this sense, the Brotherhood is a victim of its own success — the unexpected breakthrough in the 2005 parliamentary elections and subsequent prominence in Egyptian public life has led the regime to step up its harassment.

. . .

Intensified repression notwithstanding, the Muslim Brotherhood is unlikely to exit Egyptian political life. Indeed, the very fact that the group fielded 19 candidates in the June elections for the upper house of Parliament indicates that the organization will continue its participation in formal politics. The group is adjusting to a new reality, however. As Habib stated in April, “We will continue to work according to our agenda but the tactics will be different…. The repression is as strong and as annoying as in the 1960s and the 1990s but now they [the regime] are much smarter and plan better. They know better where to hit us.”

Among these smarter regime sanctions are the severe financial measures aimed at the organization’s ability to provide social services, which many believe to be the backbone of the Brotherhood’s popular support. Seizing the assets of major financiers such as Khayrat al-Shatir might discourage others from funding the organization. The measures could also have been intended to drain the Brotherhood’s campaign coffers before the June elections (in addition to blackening the group’s image). Yet the impoundment of individual members’ accounts and the effort to normalize the use of military courts bespeak a more enduring strategy of containment.

Hamas’ mass weddings

This is an excellent of why Hamas, and many Islamist groups, get much support despite not really having mainstream ideas (at least at the beginning):

Hamas sponsors mass wedding in Palestinian camp in Syria

By The Associated Press

Some 60 Palestinian couples were married in a mass wedding ceremony at their refugee camp in Syria in the first event of its kind to be sponsored by the Islamist Hamas movement.

The pro-Hamas marriage ceremony late Friday night was attended by 5,000 people. It aimed to help young people deal with the prohibitive costs of marriage, according to Hamas officials at the event.

“Hamas helped me make my dreams come true. I want to thank Hamas simply because it made me happy,” said 27-year-old groom Abdel Rahman Taha.

In addition to organizing the event, Hamas provided each couple with $1,500 in a mixture of cash and household appliances, the couples said.

They just get it – “it” being core social and economic problems that affect young people, which happen to be the biggest demographic force in the Arab world at the moment. Governments should emulate this type of thing.