Investor confidence and the succession issue in Egypt

One of the interesting things that has come out of the recent rumors that Mubarak was on death’s door is that, for the first time publicly at least, a link is being made between presidential succession in Egypt and investor confidence. Quite aside from ordinary Egyptians on Facebook or newspaper editors, this is now an open subject of discuss for the financial press and analysts. This Reuters story from earlier this month quotes a Standard & Poors ratings director as saying this has kept Egypt’s rating down:

But Egypt has not made clear what would happen to the reform process if Mubarak, 79, who has ruled for a quarter century, leaves office, Farouk Soussa said in an interview.

“The main constraint at the moment is the question of succession,” Soussa said. “Trying to determine what will happen on key policy issues is like gazing into a crystal ball, and it shouldn’t be that way.”

Standard & Poor’s rates Egypt BB+ for foreign currency and BBB- for local currency with a stable outlook.

Likewise, a Forbes story today predicts investor worry about the post-Mubarak period, considering that Egypt’s own Central Bank (foolishly?) has said that the recent rumors cost a loss of $350 million:

“Foreign investment really has to do with the stability of the country,” said Arsene Aka, analyst with Global Insight. Although he found the central bank’s readiness to put a figure on the cost of freedom of speech “a bit disturbing,” he admitted that from an economic standpoint, it did make sense.

According to Aka, the $350 million figure was probably a rough calculation of what a few days’ rumors could cost Egypt’s already impressive achievement of $9 billion in foreign direct investment so far this year. “If Mubarak dies, investment will halve,” he warned.

My own experience in talking to Egyptian businessmen is that they are relatively confident a transition will take place without any serious disturbance to the country’s economic policy. But, arguably, the way Egypt is currently run (with an increasingly obvious delegation of economic decisions from the presidency to Gamal Mubarak and the Nazif cabinet) is not exactly optimal, especially since getting a presidential go-ahead is sometimes necessary for major investment projects. Investors have complained of inexplicable delays in decision-making, and I’ve even heard of cases where an investor with cash in hand simply left because he was tired on waiting for clearance from the presidency.
The question is, at what point does it become necessary for the country’s economic stability that a clear succession plan (if not a specific successor) be outlined? Or will financial analysts and investors will continue to make educated guesses (but in the end still quite uninformed guesses since there is little solid information) about Gamal Mubarak or Omar Suleiman scenarios? Sure, Egypt’s not badly at all in terms of attracting investment despite the current uncertainty, with some long-term projects (e.g. petrochemicals, LNG, etc.) seeing the light of the day, but I’ve often wondered why the succession issue was not a major concern of investors, or rather why most were pretty confident succession would mostly provide continuity with current economic reform policies. Perhaps that is now changing.

Tribes, marriage and terrorists in Iraq

I can’t claim anything as to its veracity, but below is an interesting anthropological-military analysis of what might have motivated the recent switch of key Sunni tribes from fighting with foreign jihadist elements to fighting against them. Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt (SWJ Blog):

The uprising began last year, far out in western Anbar province, but is now affecting about 40% of the country. It has spread to Ninewa, Diyala, Babil, Salah-ad-Din, Baghdad and – intriguingly – is filtering into Shi’a communities in the South. The Iraqi government was in on it from the start; our Iraqi intelligence colleagues predicted, well before we realized it, that Anbar was going to “flip”, with tribal leaders turning toward the government and away from extremists.

Some tribal leaders told me that the split started over women. This is not as odd as it sounds. One of AQ’s standard techniques, which I have seen them apply in places as diverse as Somalia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Indonesia, is to marry leaders and key operatives to women from prominent tribal families. The strategy works by creating a bond with the community, exploiting kinship-based alliances, and so “embedding” the AQ network into the society. Over time, this makes AQ part of the social landscape, allows them to manipulate local people and makes it harder for outsiders to pry the network apart from the population. (Last year, while working in the tribal agencies along Pakistan’s North-West Frontier, a Khyber Rifles officer told me “we Punjabis are the foreigners here: al Qa’ida have been here 25 years and have married into the Pashtun hill-tribes to the point where it’s hard to tell the terrorists from everyone else.”) Well, indeed.

More after the jump.
Continue reading Tribes, marriage and terrorists in Iraq

IPS on role of clerics in Iraq

Clerics Begin to Take Over:

“Our country has turned from a secular into a purely religious country,” Munthir Sulayman, social reform activist in Baghdad told IPS. “We were dreaming of a huge development in social affairs to become more modern and free, where individuals can play their natural role in developing the country through participation in politics, economy and all aspects of life. What has happened is the opposite, and the country has become completely under control of clerics.”

Who will rid us of these turbulent priests? (No, not you General David “The Second Coming” Petraeus.)

The siege of Mecca

I want this book. (You can get it from Amazon.)

Update: Looking through the book’s site linked above, there are PDF versions of declassified Western intelligence documents on the siege. Some interesting examples are this US embassy in Cairo report of how Mubarak, vice-president at the time, ordered al-Ahram to downplay news of the siege that was going to be on the top banner headline or how Hassan II sent his most vital aide at the time, Moulay Hafid Alaoui, to Jeddah with commandos from the Gendarmerie Royale to be put at King Khalid’s disposal. H2 was ready send several hundred more commandos, in the grand tradition of Moroccan brawn working for Saudi Arabia.

Carnegie: “U.S. Democracy Promotion During and After Bush”

From the summary of a new Carnegie report, U.S. Democracy Promotion During and After Bush:

Despite sweeping rhetoric about the global spread of democracy, the Bush Administration has significantly damaged U.S. democracy promotion efforts and increased the number of close ties with “friendly tyrants,” concludes a new report from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Security interests, such as the war on terrorism, and U.S. energy needs have led the Bush Administration to maintain friendly, unchallenged relations with more than half of the forty-five “non-free” countries in the world.

Carnegie Vice President for Studies Thomas Carothers argues in his new report, U.S. Democracy Promotion During and After Bush, that the main U.S. presidential candidates have voiced support for democracy promotion, but not yet outlined plans to put it back on track. Carothers analyzes the Bush Administration’s record on democracy promotion and its effect on democracy worldwide, and then presents fresh ideas about the role democracy promotion can and should play in future U.S. policies.

Key recommendations after the jump — the report argues for new pressure on Egypt and Pakistan. Here’s the bit on Egypt in the report:

At the same time, the next administration should do more to push America’s many autocratic friends on democracy and human rights issues. Dramatic or decisive measures are almost never available in such situations, and finding a productive balance between the con- tending interests at stake is always difficult. The temptation to follow the path of least resistance—uncritically embracing the friendly tyrant—is inevitably strong. Yet, in some cases a better approach is possible, one that does not overlook democracy yet is still compatible with other interests.

Egypt is one example. The Bush administration has made a mistake in giving up its push for Egyptian political reform. The Mubarak government is indeed a useful regional security partner for the United States. But as some noted Egypt experts have pointed out, the United States maintained good security relations with Cairo even at the height of the short-lived U.S. push on democracy. Mubarak’s current political crackdown is stifling what was a genuine possibility for badly needed inclusive, pluralistic political change in his country. Washington has only limited influence on Egyptian politics, but it does have some. Focusing diplomatic attention on key issues—such as establishing an independent electoral commission, opening up the legalization process of political parties, and reducing human rights violations—would help increase the chance of a more open, democratic leadership succession in Egypt. Such a transition would be good for Egypt’s long-term political health, which in turn would be good for the U.S. government’s long-term security interests in the country.

There are no indications on how to pursue this, however. As a Bush administration official who worked on this subject once told me, there is no one to talk to in Egypt (within the regime) who is willing to go down the path of even limited genuine reform. It’s being blocked at the highest level, and the uncertainty over succession does not encourage bold steps.

Update: Here is a WaPo op-ed by the author of the report, Thomas Carothers.

Continue reading Carnegie: “U.S. Democracy Promotion During and After Bush”

Egyptian torture NGO under threat

Speaking of crackdowns in Egypt, it seems that NGOs working on torture are also being targeted:

CAIRO, Sept 13 (Reuters) – Egypt has told a rights group that aids torture victims it will be shut down for financial misdeeds, the group said on Thursday, in what activists called a government effort to quash criticism.

The Association for Human Rights Legal Aid (AHRLA) said it had received notice it was being dissolved and its assets seized over accusations it had accepted foreign funding without government approval. AHRLA denied any wrongdoing.

Egyptian and international human rights groups dismissed the accusations as political cover for an attempt to silence a group that has raised embarrassing torture cases in court. Government officials had no immediate comment.

More info in Arabic after the jump on planned demo in support on AHRLA.
Continue reading Egyptian torture NGO under threat

Egypt: A war on the press?

Update: This post has been edited for clarity, since two separate trials are mentioned.

The surprise verdict that came down this morning against the editors of four independent political tabloids is the herald of more repression to come — at least when it comes to dealing with President Hosni Mubarak, his son Gamal and other regime bigwigs. It also appears to mark the end of that the three-year window of openness to the press, which saw a multitude of new titles (including all of the ones whose editors were condemned) appear and freedom of expression widen significantly.

Let’s first focus on what happened today: Ibrahim Eissa, editor of al-Destour, Adel Hammouda, editor of al-Fagr, Wael al-Ibrashi, editor of Sawt al-Umma, and Abdel Halim Qandil, editor of al-Karama also face fines of LE20,000. Their bail to stay out of jail pending appeal was set at LE10,000. The prime target in this bunch was Eissa, who has been a thorn in the neck of the regime for over a decade (the previous incarnation of al-Destour was banned in 1997 and Eissa was blackballed from public and private newspapers and television by security interference) — and he will still face separate charges when another trial opens on October 1 for what he published on the rumors. Hammouda, who has run a series of nationalist-populist scandal rags, is a surprise target but even his al-Fagr needed to keep up with the sheer aggressivity of its competitors. al-Ibrashi was long Eissa’s second-in-command and has very much “Destourized” (the phrase is now commonly used among Egyptian journalists to mean making an article more provocative) Sawt al-Umma after he took it over from Hammouda. Finally, Qandil is a seasoned Nasserist activist who, in Fall 2004, was kidnapped by goons and told “not to write about the big people” (al-kubar) — he was one of Egypt’s first journalists to recently take on the institution of the presidency and the president himself.

Together, this group represents the core of Egypt’s political tabloids. It’s true that these newspapers don’t exactly have great journalistic standards, but they serve as (frequently impassioned and funny) pamphlets to vent political frustration. al-Destour, perhaps more than any other newspaper, appeared to specialize in not-so-subtle attacks on Mubarak, particularly in Eissa’s long front-page article that was frequently illustrated with a little cartoon of a king (who the king represented is pretty easy to figure out.) Eissa and a Destour journalist both given suspended sentences in 2006 (upon appeal) for printing an article on a lawyer’s plan to take Mubarak and his family to court for swindling foreign aid. Of course, he did not heed that warning shot. It should also be noted that in addition to the court case, the crony-run Higher Council for the Press is now urging the Journalists’ Syndicate to condemn alleged rumor-mongers, which include all the newspapers listed above.

Judging from reports that the judge praised Mubarak and his son Gamal as he read out the verdict, this crackdown appears very much related to the regime’s that any upcoming political transition, whether to Gamal or someone else, takes place in a controlled atmosphere.

These sentences are about the attacks on the NDP and the presidency that have taken place for well over a year, as if the newspapers were competing with one another in making the regime look bad. The recent furore over when Mubarak is dead, seriously ill or whatever — rumors that the newspapers stand accused of “maliciously spreading” are after all, even if they were not true this time around, plausible: Mubarak is 79 years old and sooner or later the inevitable will happen. Prosecutors are said to be arguing that the editors (more specifically, at least for now, Eissa) were responsible, because they published the rumors, of some $350 million capital flight from foreign investors worried about a chaotic transition. (I’m no Egyptian stock market expert, but surely there are all kinds of possible reasons for capital flight these days, considering high oil, high euro and the lingering malaise over the subprime mortgage business).

Yet, if there is little to no visibility on how presidential transition will take place, whose fault is that? Newspaper editors who are tempted to reprint (and add to) whatever rumor they hear because, let’s face it, the future of the country is a topic that sells? Or that of a president who has not designated a successor and refused to appoint a vice-president?

The entire past three weeks of rumors on Mubarak’s health (which we still have no idea whether they were even partly accurate) have been like an experiment in surrealism. The rumors appeared originally (in al-Badil, I believe) with a report that US Ambassador Francis Ricciardone had said Mubarak looked ill, as well as some speculation as to why Mubarak had not been in the public eye recently. Fast-forward a few weeks and you have the “nationalist” MP Mustafa Bakri calling for Ricciardone’s expulsion on grounds that he deliberately tried to destabilize the country, Ambassador Ricciardone having to categorically deny anything about the rumors a few days ago at a meeting at the American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt, Suzanne Mubarak appearing on TV to say her hubby is fine but that “as a private citizen, not the president’s wife” she feels the journalists who spread the rumors should be punished, those same journalists sentenced in a lightning trial and Gamal (who let’s remember holds no official position outside of the one in the ruling party) suddenly replacing the president in his public functions such as the annual “meeting with the students.”

In a country run like that, if I were a foreign investor I might want to divest too.

In the meantime, if 2006 (or even late 2005) saw the beginning of the crackdown on all opposition figures (jailing of Ayman Nour, campaign against the MB), 2007 appears to be dedicated to silencing the press when it comes to the president. Try as they may, that’s going to be a much tougher job.

Assorted links

In the tradition of Arab summits, let us discuss issues of mutual interest and reaffirm brotherly ties:

Shaaban Abdel Rahim has a new song on the Mubarak health rumors.

The Guardian profiles Alaa al-Aswany as the UK debut of the Yacoubian Building comes out.

Amr Khaled is a hit in America.

Stop the presses — Middle East crap at democracy, says EIU!

More coverage of Nadia Abu al-Haj, the latest academic to be on the Zionist hit-list.

Potential US presidential candidate John Edwards, in a speech on his policy towards terrorism, calls for the establishment of a king of counter-terrorism and intelligence NATO. He calls it CITO. It’s a cure acronym and a pretty good speech.

Jihad for Love — a documentary on gay Muslims. I know its maker and like to think I had a role in persuading him not to foolishly go film on this subject in Saudi Arabia, otherwise he might not have survived to make the documentary. I haven’t seen it, think the title is a bit cheesy (I declare jihad against using the word jihad), but wish him luck.

Israeli officials believe North Korea is selling nuclear materials to Syria. In other news, Israeli officials have proof that Bashar al-Assad and Hassan Nasrallah recently are small, cute puppies for lunch.

Russia unveils “the father of all bombs.” Vladimir Putin entertains me to no end. Do read the wonderful special on the KGB networks the Economist did a couple of weeks ago. I wonder if the Russians are going to start selling this kind of technology in the Middle East. And by the way, if you’re a resident of Ulyanovsk, conceive!

Naomi Klein on the privatization of Iraq, looting in Baghdad, private security firms and the exploitation of natural disasters. See also her Harpers article on “disaster capitalism,” from her new book, the the short film she made to promote it (which no matter what you think of her has cool graphics.) I like some of what Klein writes, but sometimes feel she does not completely master her topics and borrows from academic and other thinkers without attribution. But she’s an excellent vulgarizer, in the best sense of the word.

Also a good occasion to re-read this MERIP piece on the war economy of Iraq.

Joel Beinin writes a letter from al-Tuwani, near Hebron.

I still can’t quite get over the fact that people say things like “Arabic-language instruction is inevitably laden with pan-Arabist and Islamist baggage” and get away with it. Let’s not forget about the racist campaign against the Khalil Gibran International Academy in New York.

Ian Buruma on Norman Podhoretz, that sick fuck.

I am not sure whom has the most forked tongue: Christopher Hitchens or Tariq Ramadan. Ramadan, as Hitchens says, skirts too many issues in trying to make Islamism an acceptable idea (he has at least the merit of dragging it away from the populist muck.) But Hitchens, with his own jihad on Islamism (or should I say Islamo-fascism), wallows in double-entredres, as his own colleagues admit.

POMED has an interview with Sihem Bensedrine, arguably Tunisia’s most important human rights activists. It’s worth reading in contrast to this piece by Jill Caroll about attempts by MEPI to develop independent journalism in Tunisia, which has been put on hold. I wish Jill had talked a little bit more about the journalistic context in Tunisia, one of the most repressive countries in the region in terms of press (and internet) freedom.

Palestinian micro-breweries. It almost brings tears to my eyes as we enter the dry season (in Morocco, the relatively new Casablanca beer is great!). Ramadan Karim, all. And a happy new year to our dear cousins.

The Moroccan 2007 parliamentary elections did not take place

(With apologies to Jean Baudrillard)

Little by little on Saturday the results of Morocco’s parliamentary elections leaked out. First, in the morning, we heard that the PJD still felt it would come first of 33 parties but would still get less than the 60-70 it expected, compared to the 43 it had in the exiting parliament. Then, in the early afternoon, rumors started spreading that the traditionalist Istiqlal party — the grandfather of Moroccan political parties — had in fact come first, and that the PJD might only get 50. Finally, at the end of the day, we learned that the PJD had only gotten 47 seats, compared to the Istiqlal’s 52. The other surprise being that the leftist USFP only got 36 seats, slipping from second to fifth in popularity, while the mostly rural-centered “notable parties” MP and RNI made a serious advance and came in third and fourth respectively.

It had been widely assumed by the press and most political analysts that the PJD would see a major breakthrough, notably because of IRI polls in 2006 that gave it a ridiculous 45%. Although it’s hard to compare because of electoral redistricting and a complex new electoral law, in 2002 the PJD had only run in about half the country’s constituencies and had performed well. This time around, the PJD ran in all but one constituencies but barely got a few extra seats.

That result is probably in part due to the Machiavellian new electoral system, in which voters get to pick local and nationalist party lists, including for the 30 seats reserved to women. This electoral system, largely manufactured by former royal advisor Fouad Ali al-Himma (who since controversially left his post to run in the elections — he won, as expected), basically made it impossible for any party to win a clear cut majority. It made winning all the seats in a district (typically there were three in each of 95 districts) impossible, because to do so a party had to win almost all the votes in that district. This, in turn, ensured that even small parties with a local following (local notables, for instance) could win at least one seat.

The other product of this electoral system, especially compared to the normal first-past-the-post system used in the 1990s when Morocco’s elections were routinely rigged, is that there is an almost total absence of the concept of leadership in politics. Lists are local, and of course MPs have to campaign locally and get their constituents to like them, but there is no real nationwide sense of who a political party’s leaders are except among the educated and politically curious. In Israel, another country that uses a proportional representation system, party leadership is important and can often determine a party’s popularity over the identity of the local MK — hence the political superstars of Ariel Sharon or Benjamin Netanyahu.

Combine this absence of clear leadership-driven politics with the narrow consensus the regime has more or less forced the political parties to operate — for instance no large parties makes much of what democracy activists, serious journalists and political scientists consider to be Morocco’s priority, constitutional reform — and you have a very boring elections were the difference between party programs is hard to see and everyone campaigns on vague promises of fighting corruption and creating more jobs. No wonder the election campaign was so subdued and, well, boring.

This apathy is so pervasive that despite this being the election in which the Moroccan regime has made the most efforts to get people to register, with a huge registration campaign taking place for the past six months, only an estimated 42% of Moroccans bothered to go to vote yesterday (update: Sunday it appeared the turnout was closer to 38%). This is a historic low, much lower than the 52% participation rate of 2002. This might almost amount to a slap in the face of the political system, if not King Muhammad VI who only six weeks ago had condemned “nihilists” who thought the elections were pointless and urged his subjects to vote. In certain respects, this election was cast as a confirmation of Muhammad VI’s legitimacy, since it is only the second since he ascended to the throne in 1999. I’m not sure whether these results reduce his prestige, but they certainly raise important question about the castrated political system his advisors have carefully crafted over the last few years. As do indications that a large proportion that the votes that were cast were blank or deliberately spoiled as a form of protest.

One amusing thing is that the PJD is now complaining about vote-buying and other irregularities. I have no doubt they happened in places. But everyone I spoke to among the political class agreed that these elections would be the cleanest ever at least when it came to government action — in terms of security forces especially not intervening in favor of candidates and acting swiftly to correct fraud. This is what Lahcen Douadi, the PJD’s #2, told me a few days ago. He is now crying foul. It may be that serious fraud, with the help of the regime, took place — election observers will let us know about that, even though thus far it seems they are happy. But one has to wonder, as their Islamists opponents from the banned Adl wal Ihsan movement (with a base estimated at about four times the PJD) like to say, whether potential PJD voters were disappointed that it looked like a lot of the other parties and soft-pedaled the Islamist component of its platform. One would have thought that a low turnout would have favored the PJD and its strong grassroots presence, at least in urban areas. Lesson to Islamist parties: just because the AKP and Hamas are doing well, it doesn’t mean that you’re automatically going to perform well in your own country if you don’t have anything new to offer.

One may puzzle at the PJD’s strong performance considering the low turnout. Conventional wisdom has it that, in countries where political apathy is high, Islamist parties’ strong grassroots may actually over-represent them in election with low turnouts. From what I could see during the campaigning, the PJD’s members who were doing the campaigning were certainly dedicated believers. But they were small in numbers, and it’s not clear that they always got across the poor voters they were targeting. One lesson from this election is that, because of the regional context and a pervasive “the Islamists are coming” discourse, many may have overestimated the PJD’s actual appeal, even if only as a protest vote.

Once again, I am not entirely convinced by the PJD’s accusations that there was massive fraud in the campaign — as I said, Lahcen Daoudi only a few days ago was praising the ministry of interior for taking action swiftly against fraud for the first time in Moroccan electoral history. It’s hardly surprising that, as observers noted, there was some foul-play — the important thing in my eye is that the authorities were not involved in it, as in Egypt in 2005 or previous Moroccan elections. There were even reports that relatives of candidates who were serving in the police were called back to Rabat during the elections to avoid any potential conflict of interest! The one exception to this, of course, is politics in the Western Sahara, where of course police brutality is unfortunately routine and there is a long history of building up the pro-Morocco Rguibat tribe in local politics against pro-Polisario Sahrawis. I am not sure how the election took place there, but I doubt it had the same level of cleanliness as, s
ay, Rabat. (I am surprised to learn, however, that Dakhla was the city with the highest turnout.)

Like many secular, middle class Moroccans I am rather happy that the PJD did not come first. I don’t find their cheap rhetoric about Islamic values being a kind of ISO2000 certification (as one PJDiste explained to me) appealing, and have to wonder about whether their slogan “We Are The Muslims” means that they think everyone else is a kafr. It’s a rather loaded slogan these days. On Sunday night, on a busy street in the upmarket district of Agdal in Rabat, there was a procession of cars driven by the PJD, full of people celebrating their victory. I noticed the cars were full of families, included eight year old girls wearing the hijab, which I definitely have a problem with, chanting Islamist slogans. Apparently, they were given instructions to celebrate a minor advance as a victory.

Aside from the political operators, who can be very charming, I see the movement behind the PJD (Harakat at-Tawhid wal-Islah — Monotheism and Reform — better known by its French acronym MUR) as rather a typical carrier of “globalized Salafism” — not necessarily the extreme thoughts of current mainstream Salafism (not the original Egyptian one), but a diluted and more vague version of them. Their trashy newspaper, at-Tajdid, is forever charging against windmills of sleaze and civilizational decline (more often than not represented by the ample curves of Lebanese pop tarts). It’s not Islamism as a thinking political philosophy (of the kind a few genuinely interesting Islamist thinkers entertain) but as a populist, slightly xenophobic, us-VS-them philosophy, with a good dash of moronic Gulfie values thrown in for good measures.

That being said, despite that the Fassi party won (the Fassis are Morocco’s domineering bourgeois elite that founded the Istiqlal, my family name is typically Fassi), the Istiqlal isn’t exactly exciting. First of all, it shares some of the conservative values of the PJD, which I do not. Secondly, it is an “administrative party” by excellence, looking to the palace for instructions. It may have competent individuals, but its success hardly represents a broadening of the political elite that many would like to see. Most importantly, it is cowardly and submissive (in all fairness, like most parties) on the crucial issue of constitutional reform. Whatever constitutional reform takes place over the next few years will be consensus driven — even the PJD, or at least the wing of it led by Saad Eddin Othmani, had conceded to that. This means minimal concessions from the king unless those MPs and political leaders who want these concessions (real independence of the judiciary, and end to royal ministries, parliamentary oversight of the ministry of interior) really push for them. These people are present among the intellectual elite as well as in politics (notably the USFP offshoot PSU, the hardline wing of the PJD, the far left and the banned Adl wal Ihsan Islamist movement). Whether they chose to fight for it will remain to be seen — the co-optive power of the Makhzen, that security-economic complex that has ruled Morocco for decades, is formidable.

Long story short: the 2007 Moroccan parliamentary elections did not take place. The low turnout suggests few cared about them, and their result means little will change for the next five years. These were virtual elections, taking place among largely interchangeable political parties and within the confines of an electoral system brilliantly designed to generate maximum inertia (Fouad Ali al-Himma, bravo!) The elections, apparently so squeaky clean, served their purpose of advancing a discourse of steadily improving governance in Morocco — one important for Western powers that like to see Morocco, which let’s not forget is still an absolute monarchy, as a rare ally to boast about in the region. It is yet another good case study for why, when looking at democratization, elections really matter little: they are a spectacle for public and international consumption with minimal impact on political reality.

Perhaps we knew that already. But Muhammad VI cannot benefit from the novelty that he is not Hassan II forever. No one can contest many things have improved markedly since he became king. But you have to wonder, beyond new highways, ports and tourism projects that Sidna is forever inaugurating, where this country is heading. Banking on economic growth and technocratic savvy may work for a while, but it does not a democracy make.

Some good links:

  • Your Majesty, one is free to comment – RSF slams king in open letter for repression of the press
  • Ibn Kafka – Great French-language blog (I had the pleasure of dining with its author) with tons of election coverage, lately also in English on Aqoul.
  • What the nihilists think – An English-language Moroccan bloggers answers Muhammad VI’s accusations that those who doubt the usefulness of these elections in such a tightly controlled system are “nihilists.” It includes some good discussion of the constitutional reform issue.
  • Brian Ulrich links to a profile of Maguy Kakan, a Jewish candidate on the national lists for women.
  • Gloom grips Morocco slum as election approaches – good Reuters story on Sidi Moumen, the slum where 16 May 2003 terrorists came from.
  • The king still runs the show – The Economist
  • Al Miraat, another good Moroccan blog that has this great recording of a BBC “World Have Your Say” discussion with none other than the Red Prince himself, Moulay Hisham.