In recent weeks, Ain Shams University campus has been the scene of bloody clashes between the Free Student Union activists and the security-appointed official Student Union members. The latter brought into campus thugs armed with knives, swords, daggers, molotov cocktails in a terror campign to disrupt the FSU elections and intimidate the activists.
Tag: egypt
Are Egyptians being swindled of their gas?
There are EGPC supply contracts to Union Fenosa and Jordan. The prices are not published. It is said that the price to Union Fenosa is low. The highest number mentioned by observers of the Egyptian gas scene is $0.90 MBtu. Lower numbers, such as $0.65 MBtu are sometimes quoted. This is the price at the point of entry to the LNG plant. If these numbers are gross underestimates EGPC/EGAS would be wise to publish the true figures in order to set the record straight. It is true that in compensation for the low selling price EGPC/EGAS has provided some advantages such as delayed paying of their equity share in the LNG plant and the right to use up to 50 percent of the facility for their own exports under a tolling agreement. But what is the value of these advantages compared to the assumed loss on every Btu sold?
The sale price to Jordan is said to be set at $1.50 MBtu which is a more reasonable number. Yet one needs to keep in mind that Egypt purchases gas at the margin from foreign investors at $2.50/2.65 MBtu. To say that it gets 60-70 percent profit oil at zero price and that the average cost of acquisition is therefore much lower than $2.65 is the wrong argument. As discussed previously, in the case of oil the equity oil is a rent for the state not necessarily a fund to subsidize domestic consumption or exports. It is interesting to note a peculiarity in the agreement with BG for the development of gas fields dedicated to exports. There is a clause stating that if the netback revenue falls below the price at which the gas would be sold to EGPC for domestic use, EGPC would compensate the investor for the difference. Given that the investor was keen on the export option, the notion that he should be compensated whenever the domestic market becomes more attractive simply means that, as the English saying puts it, ‘he wants to have his cake and eat it too.’
. . .We also have to allow for the factors that may have influenced the negotiations of the initial contracts—a multiplicity of objectives which were to be achieved all at the same time. Hence, perhaps, certain concessions on prices were made which may not have been the case given other circumstances.
Circumstances have changed. The information available suggests that all the contracts relating to the export of gas should be now re-opened and re-negotiated. This is possible whatever the precise re-opening clauses state. The fact that Egypt sells at a much lower price than that at which it purchases gas is sufficiently explosive to justify re-negotiation. The foreign companies involved in the contracts would be unwise to oppose a re-opening. Contracts are a formal framework for a relationship. It is the relationship that matters, and it will only work to the benefit of both parties if it is continually perceived as fair by both of them.
Baheyya on Ismail Sabri Abdallah
I wish Baheyya would write more these days, but then again things are so much more depressing than they were last year. I can’t blame her for hibernating.
Update: Al Ahram Weekly also has pieces on Abdullah here and here.
Farouk Hosni, the accidental martyr
The turkey was delicious.
(Background on the Farouk Hosni affair here.)
Bastawissi at AUC
The man was brilliant, first-class public speaker. Eloquent and utterly scathing in a gentlemanly-legalistic sort of way. He was supposed to speak on Articles 76 and 77 but really focused more on issues of basic human rights and freedoms, and the kafkaesque structures of governance in Egypt. Started off with a fairly stirring defence of why judges must engage issues of concern to the people and had to defend basic freedoms because the judiciary was essentially the only independent institution left in a position to do so, and while judges could not in their capacity as judges comment on political issues, no one can take away their freedom as individuals to think and express themselves, and the taboos preventing judges from connecting with the people were finally broken in the past year and that was a good thing. He spoke about different articles in the constitution and international legal conventions that supported the independence of judges, why the Judges Club has the freedom of a syndicate and does not come under the law on societies/associations, and listed the ways in which regime efforts to deny judges the right to free association ran counter to all these norms. He didn’t spare his fellow judges who had agreed to cooperate with the regime in the “supervision” of elections and be willing accomplices to large-scale fraud, and noted ironically that this was not considered a violation of judicial neutrality while speaking out on human rights and free expression issues was.
On the topic of elections, he spoke at length on the importance of real, independent judicial supervision, and tore apart the regime’s argument that external or foreign observers would undermine the autonomy of the Egyptian judiciary, saying in fact that he welcomed such supervision and the judges themselves agreed to it. He remarked that the parts of the electoral process that should be secret – i.e. the secret ballot – were the most open to public knowledge and interference in Egypt, and in a bizarre reversal, the process became more secretive instead of more transparent as it went up the chain of authority, with vote-counting in secret and the declaration of results in secret, and noted ironically the Minister of Justice (if I heard correctly) was the only human being who really knew the actual vote count.
He insisted that Article 41 must be defended above all, and that amendments to Article 76 wouldn’t have much meaning if basic individual rights continued to be violated as they have been. He listed random arrests, limits on freedom of expression and the press, and the emergency law, and sarcastically observed that the government had got so attached to its freedom to pick people up and arrest them at random that it wanted to pass laws on terrorism under which only they could decide who was a terrorist, to replace the emergency law they had promised to repeal. He spoke strongly against the use of military courts for purposes that were not strictly military, even for the trials of military personnel accused of common crime. Mentioned that the government wished to copy the Patriot Act from the US, and noted that it only worked in the US to the extent that it worked because there were other institutions to protect freedoms and a working democratic process; he ribbed the government for taking what was worst from each foreign constitution or country, including (I think – I didn’t catch this entire section very well) the presidential system of government and constitutional court from France, and something else from Russia – rather than what was good, like democratic institutions.
He also skewered the regime’s claim to put economic reform before political reform and the common claim that it was ensuring transparency and a favourable environment for business, by noting that surely business and investors would want greater judicial independence and transparency so that their interests could be guaranteed, and would rather not be subjected to the changing whims of the regime. He also lashed out at corruption and authoritarianism (and used the word “diktatura” a fair bit, which had the scribes furiously taking notes) as barriers to progress, and asked to what extent the government was actually able to look out for the people, given widespread corruption and pollution and even the chickens were diseased, etc etc.
He made a couple of interesting rhetorical moves towards the end. One was to trace the development of the Egyptian judiciary and judicial independence as part of the march of national independence and dignity, noting that the colonialist argument that Egyptians could not rule themselves was disproved and while early on (in the 1940s?) there were both foreign and Egyptian judges working in Egypt, the judiciary was soon Egyptianised and there was no excuse any more for denying it. Then he argued that the Judges Club derived its legitimacy from the fact that the people supported it, and from recognition by international institutions and agreements to which Egypt was a signatory (including the EU for institutions and some Milan convention for judicial independence), essentially telling the regime that they were not the ones who gave the judges their authority. He also remarked that even God, when he sent down his Word, accepted that people had the right to interpret it for themselves, but this regime did not want to grant people the most basic intellectual independence to interpret laws (I think he referred to a specific set of legislations, I forget which) differently from the party line. He then accused the government of acting as though they were the only ones capable of thinking, and the only ones who could be trusted with reason, and everybody else was only capable of obeying, and behaving as though only they could grant freedoms to the Egyptian people, even though freedoms came with being a human being.
There was some other stuff about working with civil society, and defending the freedom of the press, and journalists getting locked up, too, I just don’t remember the details. It was a long speech, over an hour. He got a good reception, lots of knowing laughter and nodding along with many of his points, and lots of applause for a few minutes at the end. I didn’t stay for the Q&A because the first few questions were sort of silly, though someone did challenge him for risking losing his neutrality. I can see why the civil society folks and democratization people and activists love this man, it would be difficult to find a more eloquent champion for their cause.
Farouk Hosni won’t step out of his house
Farouk Hosni has been culture minister since 1986. He is known for being close to First Lady Suzanne Mubarak, and was protected by Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif (read: someone higher up) last year after calls for his resignation over the Beni Suef theater fire scandal. There must be some interesting conversations taking place around the presidential dinner table these days…
One thing that strikes me about all this is that religious politics have been coming back with a vengeance for the last third of this year. For the first six months, all the MB could talk about was political reform. Now they grab every opportunity to score points on the religious issues. And why is the NDP tagging along? Who in the regime wants to get rid of Hosni? To make room for another Gamal Mubarak acolyte maybe?
Pipes: Egypt-Israel peace a “failure”
Alif no. 1
robust response

Today’s protest outside the Arab League was not particularly well attended, except by the police. The beltagui were lined up and large men in cheap suits were brought in to push the women around.
Look for a more substantial posting from Hossam soon on 3arabawy.
Jahaliya in Tanta
Al Azhar and the Brotherhood don’t like it, though:
They lean their foreheads against the metal cage that surrounds the tomb, and murmur prayers for health, better financial fortune, or a child’s success in school. The practice – similar to Catholic prayers to the Virgin Mary seeking intercession with God or Shiite prayers to Imam Ali – is strictly at odds with Sunni Islam, which is generally thought to prevail here.
Indeed, the leaders of Al Azhar University, the arbiters of Sunni orthodoxy in Egypt, have long assailed this and other popular moulids, or saint’s festivals, like the ones to mark the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday or the death of Zeinab, his granddaughter, whom the faithful believe is buried in Cairo. To these leading Sunni imams, praying to saints or even celebrating Muhammad’s birthday is akin to idolatry.
But their long-standing efforts and those of groups like the Muslim Brotherhood to discourage expressions of popular Egyptian Islam have gained very little traction. A senior Brotherhood official rolls his eyes when asked about the moulids. “We’re against it, it’s a relic of jahaliya,” he says, using the Arabic term for the age of ignorance before Muhammad’s time. “We would really like this to stop.”
And people say the Brothers are more in touch with the people.