The judges vs. the state: a primer

I have received the document below, which is essentially a backgrounder to the current situation between Egypt’s judges and the Mubarak regime. It was formulated by a group of Egyptians involved in activism, human and the media to get a better picture out there of what this crisis is really about: the castration of the judiciary as a branch of government. In other words, the crisis is bigger than the two judges — Mekki and Bastawissi — that have been at the center of the storm:

Current events in Egypt represent an escalation in the conflict between a government intent on domesticating the judiciary, in order to expand the executive’s dominance in political life, and the judiciary’s attempts to ensure their independence and ability to act as a check on executive power. In recent years, the judiciary has become an important actor in efforts to maintain the separation between government branches. In June 2000, Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court passed a landmark ruling that all elections must be supervised by judges. Then, in 2003, a decision by the Court of Cassation (the Highest Appeals court) null-and-voided parliamentary electoral results for a high-ranking executive official. In response, the government has pursued a number of strategies to isolate and intimidate proponents of judicial independence.

The Court of Cassation’s president, who simultaneously represents the executive as the head of the presidential-appointed Supreme Judicial Council (SJC), has sent threatening letters to outspoken judges. The presidency is also implicated through appointments of known pro-executive judges to high positions throughout Egypt’s court system as well as a presidential decree that increased the retirement age of bench judges from 66 to 68 (against the will of the Egyptian Judges Club). More recently, the executive drafted a new judiciary law that is scheduled to be passed by parliament before the current session ends in June. The bill, which was not subject to any consultations with judges, is rumored to ignore the demands of the Egyptian Judges Club for greater independence and to further accelerate the process of the executive’s appropriation of the judiciary.

The source of the current protests is the attempt to dismiss two judges (Hisham al-Bastawisi and Mahmoud Mekky) who have publicly argued for the autonomy of the judiciary from the executive branch. The SJC has begun “competency” investigations into the two individuals on charges that they reported cases of election rigging in the country’s three most recent elections last year, spoke to the media about political affairs, and ‘disparaged’ the executive-affiliated SJC. Such investigations are unprecedented in Egyptian history. At least five more judges have been formally named and could be investigated in future cases. The response of Egyptian society and the international community is crucial in determining the fate of Egypt’s independent judges.

The executive has feigned all responsibility and refused to interfere in this matter by declaring that it is solely an internal judicial matter. This could not be further from the truth. Rather, these measures represent a culmination of the executive’s recent attempts to control the judiciary. What is at stake is the future autonomy of an already embattled judiciary to assert itself as a check to executive power and will. At the core of this struggle is the state’s attempt to nationalize the judiciary as its central legitimacy tool.

The Egyptian Judges Club has sought negotiation and compromise measures, which have all been rebuffed by the executive and led to an unavoidable showdown for control, power, and the future. The regime is determined, at seemingly any cost, to eliminate the independent judges from state ranks so that future governance – and an impending transition of presidential power – is unobstructed and declared legitimate by the judicial branch. This, in effect, has turned the situation into a zero-sum game in which the regime must increase the use of its repressive apparatus through detention and beatings of peaceful demonstrators, who are standing in solidarity with the judge’s demand for autonomy.

The two judges currently under investigation are scheduled to appear in front of the SJC-appointed disciplinary board in Cairo on Thursday 18th of May. The judges say they will appear before no such body until the security forces are removed from the streets and nearly 400 activists – from all political trends – that have been detained since 24 April – are released. Demonstrations, which have previously been met by severe repression and violence by the security services, are scheduled across the country. Yesterday, the Interior Ministry issued a statement banning “unlawful” protests, which is being understood as a threat of further escalation against demonstrators.

The interest of ordinary citizens in the judges is at unprecedented levels as the executive pursues its unprecedented measures against them. The judges – particularly those under investigation – have been catapulted into legendary hero status. The current events in Egypt are no mere crackdown on political parties, extra-parliamentary protest movements, or Islamist-leaning organizations – it is about the very nature of future governance.

A general protest, led by the judges, is scheduled for the 25th of May to mark the ongoing struggle between the executive and judiciary as well as to remember the one-year anniversary of the flawed referendum that amended the Egyptian constitution. These are occasions for those that care about the future of Egypt and the democratic rights of all to get involved.

Please distribute this document as widely as you can, particularly to relevant personalities around the world who work on Middle Eastern issues in government, academia, NGOs, the media and so on. It’s important that the current situation is not just seen as being about the integrity of two judges, but rather the independence of an entire branch of government. In the coming years, whether Egypt moves away from an authoritarian political model or not, the judiciary will be a key to legitimacy. Considering that the succession of President Hosni Mubarak has been left unclear, and that his own son may be vying for the job, the current crisis might be seen as an effort by the regime to smooth out obstacles to certain succession scenarios that are potentially unpopular.

Update: A French version of the same document is after the jump. Version Francaise du document sur les juges Egyptiens ci-dessous.

Continue reading The judges vs. the state: a primer

Judge Bastawissi hospitalized

Hisham Bastawissi, one of two judges currently facing disciplinary action for having reported electoral fraud during last December’s parliamentary elections, is reported to have been hospitalized this morning after having a heart attack. No doubt the stress of the past few weeks had a role in that.

Bastawissi was due to return to court tomorrow for another disciplinary hearing.

More info later as it becomes available.

Update: There is coverage of Bastawissi’s condition at here (or here):

One of the judges at the center of a conflict between the Egyptian judiciary and the government had a heart attack on Wednesday, throwing into doubt the future of disciplinary proceedings against him.

In the Nile Delta town of Shibin el-Kom, police fired teargas to disperse protesters who gathered at the law courts in solidarity with the two judges and with a campaign for judicial independence from the executive, opposition leaders said.

Judges Club President Zakaria Abdel Aziz said judge Hesham Bastawisi was in serious condition in hospital after the heart attack at 3 a.m. Rights groups called on the authorities to postpone a disciplinary hearing set for Thursday.

“They gave him seven electric shocks … Of course he cannot go on trial tomorrow,” Abdel Aziz told Reuters.

Gamal Mubakak meets Bush, Cheney, Rice, Hadley

Gamal Mubarak met with Dick Cheney and other senior US officials the day after last week’s protests:

Gamal Mubarak, 42, a powerful political player and widely considered a possible heir to his father, Hosni Mubarak, told the U.S. officials that Egypt is committed to further democracy but said it would be a long-term process that will include setbacks. “There was no tension at all,” Egyptian Ambassador Nabil Fahmi said in an interview. “They listened to his explanation of what was happening.”

. . .

[Egyptian ambassador to the US Nabil] Fahmi said Mubarak was on a “private visit” and decided to see top administration officials Friday. A source familiar with the talks said Mubarak came to the United States to renew his pilot’s license. Neither side announced the meetings, which were first reported by al-Jazeera television and later confirmed by U.S. spokesmen.

Aside from Cheney, Mubarak had a separate White House meeting with national security adviser Stephen J. Hadley. President Bush stopped by for a few minutes to shake Mubarak’s hand and convey greetings to his father. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stayed for a portion of the discussion with Hadley. It is unusual for a private foreign citizen with no official portfolio to receive so much high-level attention.

Why does he have a pilot’s license in the US? Is he a US citizen? Would someone really make a trip all the way over there to renew a pilot’s license and, while at it, casually stroll by Dick Cheney’s office to see if he had time for a cup of coffee and a nice chat? And meet the president while hanging around the West Wing’s water cooler?

My bet is that this is related to the heat Egypt has been getting in Congress on the military aid issue. And that would suggest, contrary to common pundit wisdom in Egypt, that Gamal does indeed have a foreign affairs/security portfolio on top of his public domestic policy/economy agenda. But of course it could be about all kinds of other issues, not least succession scenarios and his father’s ailing health, which is rumored to be a growing concern in US circles.

University profs to protest for judges/detainees on Sunday

University professors — presumably the same ones that have been campaigning for State Security to move off-campus and greater academic freedom — will be holding a demo in front of the High Court in Downtown Cairo at noon on Sunday to call for the release of recent detainees.

Correction: Have received a message saying that the professors are actually heading a delegation to meet with the Prosecutor General. I suppose there is still a good chance they won’t be able to meet him and that it will turn into a demo.

Manif. pour les juges Egyptiens a Paris le 24 Mai

There will be a protest in support of Egyptian judges and detainees on 24 May in Paris:


Appel de solidarité avec les juges égyptiens
Pour la libération de tous les détenus

Les magistrats égyptiens sont en lutte depuis des années pour obtenir l’indépendance de la justice. Récemment, ils se sont massivement opposés à la fraude électorale, lors des élections présidentielles et législatives en 2005, et ont publié une liste noire des juges qui ont fermé les yeux sur la fraude. Le gouvernement a alors décidé de traduire deux magistrats-symboles du club des juges et de leur lutte, Mahmoud Mekki et Hicham Bastawisi, vice-présidents de la cour de cassation, devant une commission disciplinaire. Mais ni les deux juges, ni le club des juges ne s’est laissé faire. Ils occupent leur club et ont lancé un large appel de solidarité.

Depuis, de jour en jour, la répression s’amplifie.

Le 24 avril, les forces de police ont attaqué les citoyens rassemblés devant le club des juges, arrêtant une douzaine de personnes. Quand le juge Mahmoud Hamza est sorti en déclarant que les citoyens étaient sous la protection des juges, il s’est fait rouer de coups et a du être transporté à l’hôpital.
Le 26 avril au soir, la police attaque une nouvelle fois le rassemblement et arrête 15 personnes.
Le 27 avril, jour où Bastawisi et Mekki comparaissent devant la commission disciplinaire, l’accès au tribunal est bloqué par des milliers de policiers, pour empêcher les manifestations de solidarité. Les manifestations ont eu lieu malgré tout mais près de 15 personnes sont à nouveau arrêtées.
Le 30 avril, le gouvernement égyptien reconduit l’Etat d’urgence pour deux ans
Le 7 mai, la police arrête 15 personnes, dont 3 femmes, en les insultant et en les rouant de coups, devant le tribunal où devaient comparaître les détenus.
Le 11 mai, jour où Bastawisi et Mekki devaient à nouveau comparaître devant la commission disciplinaire, des milliers de personnes manifestent pour l’indépendance de la justice et la fraude électorale, malgré le blocus policier, qui empêche manu militari les journalistes de filmer, roue de coups les cameramens d’al Jazeera, et arrête 273 personnes. Dans la matinée, une journaliste de l’opposition se fait kidnapper par les sbires de la sûreté, molester et déshabiller en pleine rue, rappelant les heures noires du 25 mai 2005.

Le 25 mai prochain, un an après la mascarade du référendum sur les élections, les juges appellent à une nouvelle journée de solidarité. A cette occasion de nombreux rassemblements auront lieu devant les Ambassades d’Egypte dans divers pays.

La lutte des juges s’inscrit dans un combat plus large pour la démocratie, mené par les forces vives de la société égyptienne. Ces forces mènent depuis des années une lutte acharnée et difficile contre une dictature qui ne puise sa force que du soutien de l’administration américaine et de ses alliés européens.
.
Leur victoire sera aussi la notre.

Pour soutenir le mouvement des juges et demander la libération de tous les détenus:

Envoyer des lettres de protestation au procureur général, Maher Abdel Wahid
Fax: + 202 577 4716

Rassemblement devant l’Ambassade d’Egypte, le 24 mai à 14h, 56, av. d’Iéna, 16ème, métro Iéna

Ahmed Fouad Negm in the NYT

A reader sends in this NYT profile of the great colloquial Egyptian poet Ahmed Fouad Negm:

Mr. Negm is a bit of a folk hero in Egypt, and has remained popular even while the street, his street, has turned away from his largely secular vision of modernity. The changes on the street have only fueled his contempt for the ruling elite. Their illegitimate government, he said, has made Egyptian identity less distinct and more defined by faith.

“The government has always been run by pharaohs, but in the past they were honorable,” Mr. Negm said, returning to one of his favorite topics. “Now, Egypt is ruled by a gang, led by Hosni Mubarak, and he is only there because America and Israel support him. He does not have the support of the street.”

It is that contempt for power, his giving voice to a desire for justice, that seems to keep him popular, keeps his books selling and recently led to a revival of a popular play called “The King Is the King,” which showcases his poetry.

HE had laughed and smoked his Merit Ultra Lights as he climbed the rickety wooden ladder through a narrow hatch onto the rooftop above his apartment in a public housing block. He loves to smoke. He loves to curse. He loves to boast with a wink and a smile that he was married six times, that his current wife is 30 and that his youngest daughter, Zeinab, who is 11, is not forced to adhere to the strict religious practices that have spread throughout his country in recent years.

“I am free,” Mr. Negm said, as he scratched his head with long, carefully cut fingernails. “I am not afraid of anybody because I do not want anything from anyone.”

And then, looking down from his rooftop perch upon a pile of rotting trash, where children, dogs and donkeys competed for scraps, he lamented what has become of Egypt.

“This is not Egypt,” he said. “I weep for Egypt.”

I received this Negm poem earlier this week:

Ahmadnegm1

GAO report on military aid to Egypt

The slow crusade in the US Congress to cut down on military aid to Egypt went a step further yesterday with the publication of a report, requested by leading anti-Egypt congressman Tom Lantos, on the effectiveness of the aid program. Haaretz reports:

The study was requested by Rep. Tom Lantos, senior member of the opposition Democrats on the House of Representatives International Relations Committee.

Lantos said in statement the study proves his long-held belief that the “Egypt program is meant more as a political entitlement program, with no real performance standards.”

“For all of the $34 billion that U.S. taxpayers have spent on this program over two decades, it is clearly not a serious effort to enhance the military capabilities of an ally to better participate with U.S. forces in joint actions,” he said.

“This is a massive military entitlement program on autopilot.”

The study, which can be downloaded in PDF here, concludes:

For the past 27 years, the United States has provided Egypt with more than $34 billion in FMF assistance to support U.S. strategic goals in the Middle East. Most of the FMF assistance has been in the form of cash grants that Egypt has used to purchase U.S. military goods and services. Like Israel, and unlike all other recipients of U.S. FMF assistance, Egypt can use the prospects of future congressional appropriations to contract for defense goods and services that it wants to procure in a given year through the FMF program. Until 1998, DSCA limited the number of new commitments to less than the annual appropriation thereby allowing more than $2 billion in undisbursed funds to accumulate. If the plan to eliminate the undisbursed funds for the Egypt FMF program is realized, these funds will be depleted by the end of fiscal year 2007. As Congress debates the appropriate mix between military and economic assistance to Egypt, the inherent risks of such flexible financing warrant careful attention and assessment by State and DOD.

Similarly, both State and DOD could do a better job assessing and documenting the achievement of goals as a result of the $34 billion in past U.S. FMF assistance and the $1.3 billion in annual appropriations planned to be requested. Periodic program assessments that are documented and based on established benchmarks and targets for goals would help Congress and key decision makers make informed decisions. We agree that expedited transit in the Suez Canal; support for humanitarian efforts in Darfur, Sudan, and elsewhere; and continuing offers to train Iraqi security forces are important benefits that the United States derives from its strategic relationship with Egypt. However, without a common definition of interoperability for systems, units, or forces, it is difficult to measure the extent of current and desired levels of interoperability, nor is it clear how the Egyptian military has been or could be transformed into the modern, interoperable force articulated in the U.S. goals for the Egypt FMF program.

The report also cites some forms of Egyptian payback for the aid:

Egyptian and U.S. officials cited several examples of Egypt’s support for U.S. goals. For example, Egypt:

• deployed about 800 military personnel to the Darfur region of the Sudan in 2004;
• trained 250 Iraqi police and 25 Iraqi diplomats in 2004;
• deployed a military hospital and medical staff to Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005, where nearly 100,000 patients received treatment;
• provided over-flight permission to 36,553 U.S. military aircraft through Egyptian airspace from 2001 to 2005; and
• granted expedited transit of 861 U.S. naval ships through the Suez Canal during the same period and provided all security support for those ship transits.

36,553 flight sorties between 2001 and 2005? That sure seems like a lot for a country that officially is not providing logistical aid to US forces in Iraq.

A few Gamal quotes from Al Misry Al Yom

Today’s Al Misry Al Yom reports that at a press conference yesterday following a meeting of the policies secretariat Gamal Mubarak denied that he spoke on behalf of Egypt during his travels abroad, and insisted he only spoke on behalf of the National Democratic Party.

A quick thought: It seems worth noting the existance of the debate around the acceptable parameters of Gamal Mubarak’s portfolio. It seems that it is not acceptable for him to speak on behalf of Egypt, although, as head of the Policies Secretariat, he can speak on behalf of the NDP. In practice, is there really a difference between the NDP and the government? Mr. Stacher has an interesting theory about the importance of the foreign policy portfolio to Gamal and gang. Perhaps he’ll share it with us.

When asked about Monday’s demonstration against the President, Gamal is quoted as saying: “Every faction of society has the right to express their opinion, whether in Parliament, or in the street, in accordance with the law, and this is a matter we want to stress to the Egyptian people, whether their opinion agrees with the government and the party, or not.”

Smooth talking and saying the right things.

Gamal also added that there would be a dialog with the opposition before the political reform law is submitted to Parliament and that the party has no intention of opposing any constructive ammendments.

So there’s definitely going to be a political reform law? As for the dialog with the opposition bit, it seems pretty hackneyed by this point.

On Israeli-Egyptian relations he had this to say: “We have a vision about our relationships in the Arab world and the neighboring countries, like Israel and Turkey, which indicates that Egypt is committed to a peace agreement, and it has an active role in the region, that it uses to advance its interests and Arab issues.”