This widening ideological divide between ruling elites and oppositions will make it more difficult to adopt political reform measures, which require at least some consensus and flexibility on both sides. More troubling is that the positions of putatively democratic Arab opposition movements on the war in Lebanon have exposed their totalitarian and populist tendencies. There is a great difference between adopting a rational discourse that rightly condemns the Israeli military for its crimes against civilians and criticizes unconditional American acceptance of the war, and cheering the death of Israeli civilians as a step toward the destruction of the “Zionist entity.” This goes beyond the tendency of Islamist and pan-Arab opposition movements to opportunistically capitalize on popular feelings to rally support. It shows that these movements lack a key characteristic of reformist political forces: a willingness to combat ideologies of hatred and extremism rather than using them for political advantage.
Furthermore, although they call for democratic reform in Arab countries, Islamist and pan-Arab movements have failed to acknowledge the fundamentally non-democratic nature of the actions of Lebanon’s Hizbullah. By unilaterally making a decision of war and peace on July 12, Hizbullah confiscated the right of Lebanon’s government, of which it is part, to determine the country’s fate. Israel’s response , by targeting infrastructure and the civilian population, was surely extreme, legitimizing resistance; however, Hizbullah acted like a state within a state, taking advantage of the weakness of Lebanon’s formal institutions and transgressing the principle of consensual decision-making.
The regional shadows of the war in Lebanon will persist for many years. They may well be a long and painful reminder that the hope for any near-term democratic transformation of the Arab world was perhaps the greatest loser in a war that produced tremendous damage on all sides.
Harsh words indeed. While I agree with him that Hizbullah acted irresponsibly on 12 July, it’s quite a stretch to say that it took a decision of war and peace. It was Israel that took the decision to escalate the conflict into a full-scale war. As for the opposition being opportunistic in capitalizing on the Hizbullah-Lebanon war for local advantage, I don’t really see that as a problem (they’re politicians, after all) as much as some of the delusions about this war. But there is a real concern in that the opposition does not realize that cheering for Hizbullah is a dead-end street: there is no real support in Egypt (and I suspect in all other Arab countries) for going to war against Israel. The need for a rational discourse about the region is indeed great, and it would have been nice to see less grandstanding from certain parts of the Nasserist left (which does indeed have totalitarian impulses). But it’s a bit of a chicken-and-egg argument: can you have a quality democratic debate in the absence of democracy and when the only avenue open to dissidents is populism? Rational debate lost out on all sides here: in both the Arab world and in Israel (actually, particularly in Israel), jingoism triumphed.
Good article. I wonder if a bit of homo foggybottomus is rubbing off on Hamzawy with those references to “totalitarian” tendencies in Arab opposition movements and accusations that they are not doing enough to combat “ideologies of hatred and extremism.” It’s a typical Washington argument to hold opposition movements to a far higher standard than good old boy dictators.
Did people in Egypt really cheer the deaths of Israeli civilians? Weren’t several Israeli Arabs killed or injured by HA rockets?
Your argument that populism as the only avenue open to dissidents in the absence of democracy is an interesting one. Populist anger and demonstrations against Israel are certainly cheaper for opposition activists than taking on the Mubarak regime, in that everyone knows it’s just letting off steam and no-one is in a position to actually back up rhetoric with action. I guess an Israel-Palestine escalation can get more people out on the streets and faster than all sorts of domestic repression and injustices in Egypt because the moral lines in that conflict are easier for Egyptians to draw than in their own domestic tussles. And who can blame Egyptian opposition activists for trying to piggyback on popular sentiment about Palestine, it helped them in 2002-2003, didn’t it?
It certainly did. I don’t think it’s a cheap shot to have concerns about the democratic credentials of parts of the Egyptian left — Nasserism was hardly liberal — but he may exagerate the point. I am not aware of people specifically cheering Israeli deaths, but you could say there was little focus on Israeli civilians in the conflict. That’s hardly surprising consideriing the “imbalance” in casualties.
As for populism, it certainly works for the Muslim Brotherhood, and worked partially for Ayman Nour’s presidential campaign (during which he appealed to both leftist and Islamist subtexts). It has also worked very well for the Mubarak regime over the years.
As Hossam likes to say, the Egyptian opposition left has embraced the idea that “the road to Jerusalem goes through Cairo” — i.e. change in the Arab-Israeli dynamic must start with change in the internal Arab dynamic — so it’s no surprise that these regional issues are important to the opposition. It’s also a great opportunity to highlight the moral bankrupcy of the regime. I can’t blame them for using this war for domestic purposes, but I do share some of Hamzawy’s concerns about on what terms the leftists and liberals give their support to Islamists. An alliance between these forces is probably the only way to achieve real change, but the former have to tread very, very carefully and avoid getting caught in the rhetorical trap of Islamist discourse.
hmmm … the road to Jeruslam goes through Cairo … sounds remarkably similar to the “near enemy” argument, no? I suppose the means are different, though, and that’s the most important thing.
Perhaps as important as Nasserist beliefs about the morality of violence against Israeli civilians are their beliefs about violence toward internal enemies. What does the radical Egyptian left say about imprisoning Brothers, for instance? Kifaya has brought them together in some instances, but I think many Nasserists probably have mixed feelings, no?
The Nasserist party leaders are still not fond of the Brotherhood. But among young activists like Alaa (see comments passim on this blog and on his) it seems that the Judges Crisis was a turning point. The MB came out to support the judges, presented the judicial reform bill they wanted, got arrested en masse for it. I think many feel they deserve to be more integrated with the left and be given the benefit of the doubt. While I don’t think this has feeling has reached beyond activist circles, it does mark a turning point.
Judges Crisis + being thrown in jail with some Brothers for company, too…but the Revolutionary Socialists who (correct me if I’m wrong) are well represented among the young Kefaya-ites, have been pretty supportive of working with the Brothers for a while.
A month or so ago I would have agreed with you Issandr that the new generation of secular activists seem ready to work stategically with the Brothers. But Amr Hamzawy is probably right to say that this recent war has set back any domestic push for democracy. The street demonstrations I attended in early August were discouraging — far too much celebration of violence and calls for the Egyptian military to jump in. And while a lot of the chanting was being led by the old guard, there were plenty of young enthusiasts too.
Where is the space for reasoned public debate that could inform a fresher populist vision?
“They may well be a long and painful reminder that the hope for any near-term democratic transformation of the Arab world was perhaps the greatest loser in a war that produced tremendous damage on all sides.”
If that is so, then Hezb’allah (and Iran) has won, at least for the time being. But I think in the end even the Arabs will get bored with their charismatic Great Leaders and realise they are simply sociopaths.
will you stop spreading this misinformation, the judges crisis was not a turning point, the people speaking for cooperation with the brotherhood have been doing it for a while already (including me, I did join the bloody ta7alof).
I’d say you’re missing some interesting discussions Issandr.
since there where alot of people speaking against HizbAllah from the opposition, some of us managed to bypass the whole you’re a traitor you’re a terrorist flamewar and do some real discussing and all.
also the pro resistance folks are discussing what does resistance mean and what are the options available to us (on concrete suggestion was to stop supplying Israel with energy for instance).
but I must admit, the nasserists are not that interested in these discussions.
I can’t see why you consider the past war a step back for efforts to push democracy?
I can see an argument about Lebanon (I don’t buy it, but I can see what you’d mean). but how did the war affect efforts to bring democracy in Egypt?
is there some inherit incompatibility between being anti zionist and democracy? can’t one democratically decide to go to war with Israel?
is this something about HizbAllah being undemocratic? so? don’t other democracies form alliances with non democratic entities (as in the US and arab regimes for instance?) why can’t pro democracy activists show solidarity to groups that serve their greater cause regardless of how democratic these groups are?
this is all assuming the assessment of HizbAllah being undemocratic (as opposed to the Lebanese government of all things) is correct.