Tag: egypt

Not in our name!

Egypt’s Revolutionary Socialists — a small, influential and, in the Egyptian political scene today, remarkably coherent and clear-eyed group — has issued a statement that explains why giving General Al-Sisi a “mandate” to “fight terrorism” is a bad, and illogical, idea. Egypt’s April 6 movement — the activist group that began youth protests against Mubarak — has also come out against heeding Al-Sisi’s call for mass demonstrations today. 

Whatever crimes the Brotherhood has committed against the people and against the Copts in defence of its power in the name of religion, we do not give army chief Al-Sisi our authority. We will not go into the streets on Friday offering a blank cheque to commit massacres.

If Al-Sisi has the legal means to do what he wants, why is he calling people into the streets? What he wants is a popular referendum on assuming the role of Caesar and the law will not deter him.

 

A definition of excessive force

AP, reporting on yesterday’s killing of at least 50 Muslim Brotherhood supporters: 

The shootings Monday of Morsi supporters prompted questions about whether troops used excessive deadly force, an accusation the military dismissed as unfair.

“What excessive force? We were dealing with people shooting at us with live ammunition,” chief military spokesman Co. Ahmed Mohammed Ali told The Associated Press. “It would have been excessive if we killed 300.”

Confident in the army’s position, Ali asked those at a televised news conference to stand in silence to mourn the dead. Later he expressed regret for the loss of life, but did not accept blame for the killings.

And Justice for All? | Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights

Interesting post by EIPR’s Mohamed El-Shewy: 

Two noteworthy processes appear to be underway in Egypt, both of which have so far eluded the focus of most analyses and commentary on the country.  On the one hand, there has been discussion lately in the Shura Council (currently the country’s legislative body) of passing a “transitional justice law” that would supposedly result in the formation of a truth commission and “special courts,” to investigate government agencies, such as the Ministry of the Interior and the Central Bank. On the other hand, the government of Mohamed Morsi has been taking steps to “reconcile” with members of the Mubarak regime and businessmen associated with it—some of whom have fled the country or are serving sentences in prison. These two processes could potentially have a significant impact on the nature of Egypt’s political structure for some time to come.

The language used by the Shura Council on the “transitional justice law” has been one of necessity: to help Egypt “avoid many catastrophes and political instability”i. But it seems that lawmakers are repeating the chronic problem with transitional justice; the rush to pass such legislature based on the assumption that a transition has, already occurred. Since February 11, 2011 (the day Mubarak stepped down), this temptation has been there on the part of those interested in transitional justice, both internationally and domestically, to advocate for its application. As Egypt was now “in transition,” it followed that transitional justice was needed to safely guide the country to the stable, prosperous shores of democracy. Ezz el-din El-Koumi, one of the Shura Council members working on the law, stated in an interview that transitional justice would bring to an end the “reasons people have to protest.” This is an invariably short sighted way of approaching the issue.  

A major problem with transitional justice lies in the way it condenses long, complex histories of repression into a single moment of rupture, the transition. Thus, any violence or discontent that continues after the delineated time can be portrayed as disruptive to the democratization process. The recent and ongoing events in Egypt—particularly in the cities along the Suez Canal—and the continuing abuses committed by the security forces suggest that  “transition” (so neatly defined) is not a reality. It is erroneous to assume that mass political upheavals have fixed points in time; going from the large social movement of an “uprising” to the moment of political change of the  “revolution” to a period of “democratic transition”—which,  finally ends, in a democratic future.

 Read on for his suggestions.

Heavy Metal Umm Kulthoum

Via AvantCaire via Fustat.

Pretty impressive heavy metal rendition of the classic Umm Kulthoum song “Enta Omri” considering this is an amateur recording of a live gig. The studio version could be quite polished, and the song lends itself quite well to melodic metal. They would have to shorten considerable to the ultimate original version, which lasts about an hour (but it’s an hour extraordinarily well-spent.)

Umm Kulthoum’s Enta Omri [61.2MB]

Cairo KFC run by deaf

A Cairo KFC outlet entirely staffed by deaf people. This video is not new but I came across it and was struck. There are a lot of deaf people in Cairo and I remember, when I first arrived here, going to an qahwa (café) whose customers were mostly deaf. I made some interesting conversations there, thanks to the help of a very talented interpreter who could sign in several languages and translate between them, as well as speak several languages.

Egypt has a high proportion of deaf people because of poor public health policies and the prevalence of certain diseases such as meningitis and rubella, as well as the practice (traditionally preferred by some) of first-cousin marriages. Read more about it in this Egypt Today feature.

Now not only Hizbullah, but Iranian Revolutionary Guards?

I haven’t really had time to weigh in on the Hizbullah-in-Egypt scandal, but the story continues to develop with more allegations and charges made against the Hizbullah cell, including another Shorouk scoop this morning that four Iranian Revolutionary Guards were arrested by Egyptian authorities last December, apparently entering on the country using Shia Iraqi IDs and networking with Iraqi Shia refugees in Cairo. Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit said that the public prosecutor is preparing a “surprise” when more charges are formally filed, which some think will include charges against Hassan Nasrallah himself.

The informed consensus among Egyptian commentators is that Hizbullah made a mistake in toying with Egypt’s sovereignty, but that Egypt should not exaggerate in its response either. Most center around the accusation, confirmed by Nasrallah, that Hizbullah was setting up a logistics support network for Hamas’ weapons supply line. It would be naive to assume that this is strictly all they were doing, some level of spying should also be assumed. Most commentators reject the accusation that Hizbullah was planning attacks against Israeli tourists in retaliation for the assassination of its military chief Emad Mughniyeh, although some recent information has surfaced that there may have been parallel networks operating: in addition to the ones helping Hamas, there might have also been one concentrating on the Iraqi Shia community and what one might call general purpose espionage, for instance on the Suez Canal (rather, as some newspapers have alleged, a plan to fire shoulder-launched missiles at passing ships.)

Although the brouhaha over this affair will probably have the intended effect of turning part of Egyptian public opinion against Hizbullah on nationalist grounds — and I would certainly agree that any country should be concerned about arms smuggling and espionage operations taking place — it is also highlighting Egypt’s strangehold on Hamas supply lines (financial and military) which the likes of columnists Fahmy Howeidy, the Muslim Brothers’ General Guide Mahdi Akef and others are condemning. Nasrallah, in his unusual confession that Hizbullah does have operatives in Egypt, also reiterated the helping-Hamas-as-a-duty line that has some resonance here, and not just among Islamists.

Perhaps more details on the accusations to date later…

Update: I wanted to ask readers who are more familiar with Hizbullah than I am the following: the Egyptian press reported in the last couple of days that the name of the Hizbullah handler for their Egypt operation is called Muhammad Qabalan, alleged to be the head of intelligence for Hizbullah. And that Emad Mughniyeh’s replacement as head of military operations is called Talal Hamiyeh. Anyone familiar with those names?

But what about Hosni, ya Jehan?

The Daily Show With Jon Stewart M – Th 11p / 10c
Jehan Sadat
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Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat’s widow, Jehan Sadat, was on the Daily Show the other night plugging her new book out on the occasion of 30 years of Egyptian-Israeli piece. It wasn’t quite as weird as her recent NYT interview (evidence #2312325345 it’s not a very good newspaper) but this has a great moment when Jon Stewart asks her whether there are any Arab leaders capable of pushing for peace at the moment and she says there are non. Check in at 3:00 of the video.

The Hizbullah in Egypt plot

I still don’t know what to think about yesterday’s revelation that Egyptian State Security believes, or is pretending to believe, that Hizbullah tried to set up an Egyptian cell:

CAIRO, April 8 (Reuters) – Egyptian authorities accused the Lebanese group Hezbollah on Wednesday of planning attacks inside Egypt, a development that could plunge Cairo’s relations with the Shi’ite group’s backer, Iran, to new lows.

The office of Egypt’s public prosecutor said it was investigating accusations that Hezbollah had recruited a 49-member cell with the aim of striking inside Egypt, a key U.S. ally in the Middle East.

Hezbollah angered Egypt earlier this year by accusing Cairo of complicity with Israel in its siege of the Gaza Strip.

“The public prosecutor received a note from state security about information confirmed by questioning about Hezbollah leaders sending some elements to the country to attract members to work with the organisation … with the aim of carrying out acts of aggression inside the country,” a statement by the public prosecutor said.

The statement said the group had been trying to monitor Egypt’s Suez Canal, its border with the Gaza Strip, and tourist installations in the Sinai Peninsula and sending information back to Hezbollah.

It also said the group had been establishing links with criminal elements to forge passports and setting up businesses to cover for spying activities.

It gave no details of any attacks being planned, but accused Hezbollah of trying to spread Shi’ite ideology in Egypt.

Culled from various sources, a list of what the “Hizbullah cell” was trying to achieve:

– Carry out terrorist attacks on the Shia holiday Ashura
– Rent housing near the Suez Canal to monitor the passage of ships
– Surveillance of tourist resorts in Sinai
– Procurement of explosives to manufacture bombs
– Renting housing in luxury areas to serve as safe houses
– Recruitment of Egyptians to their cause, with the aim of sending them abroad for paramilitary training
– Using businesses to fund and provide cover for their activities
– Spread Shiism in Egypt

All that seems like a tall order… While I won’t dismiss it entirely as many who have heard Egyptian security cry wolf too many times — after all there is a rich history of Arab states and non-state actors operating in each other’s turf, even if it died down in the post-Cold War world — the idea of Hizbullah suddenly deciding to implant itself in Egypt, where it has no natural constituency, is rather weird. Spying, information-gathering, destabilization — maybe. But this whole affair, like Morocco’s paranoia about Shia infiltration, reflects the deep apprehension many Western-allied Sunni regimes have about Iran, its allies like Hizbullah, and the challenge to the dominant regional order under US hegemony that has taken place since the invasion of Iraq. This, not Shiism, is what they are afraid of.