Links for December 4th

Automatically posted links for December 4th:

Podhoretz on the NIE

Prepare to have your head explode:

Dark Suspicions about the NIE NORMAN PODHORETZ – 12.03.2007 – 17:50

It is worth remembering that in 2002, one of the conclusions offered by the NIE, also with “high confidence,� was that “Iraq is continuing, and in some areas expanding its chemical, biological, nuclear, and missile programs contrary to UN resolutions.� And another conclusion, offered with high confidence too, was that “Iraq could make a nuclear weapon in months to a year once it acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material.�

I must confess to suspecting that the intelligence community, having been excoriated for supporting the then universal belief that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction, is now bending over backward to counter what has up to now been a similarly universal view (including as is evident from the 2005 NIE, within the intelligence community itself) that Iran is hell-bent on developing nuclear weapons. I also suspect that, having been excoriated as well for minimizing the time it would take Saddam to add nuclear weapons to his arsenal, the intelligence community is now bending over backward to maximize the time it will take Iran to reach the same goal.

[From Commentary » Blog Archive » Dark Suspicions about the NIE]

Norman Podhoretz, of course, is a leading advocate of immediately attacking Iran. He was also in favor of invading Iraq. But since the intelligence on Iraq’s WMDs was wrong, then the latest intelligence on Iran’s WMDs must also be wrong. Geddit!?!

Qursaya Island

I’d mentioned before this story about the Egyptian military’s attempts to takeover an island south of Cairo in order to build a new development, which means kicking out the farmers and other inhabitants that live there. There has been anecdotal evidence that the military is getting increasingly greedy about encroaching on the civilian sphere, particularly when it comes to prime land and business. Some, perhaps many, would say that has always been the case. But it’s worth reading the AFP dispatch (one of the only English-language stories on the issue to my knowledge, although the independent and opposition Arabic press has given it plenty of coverage) in light of the movies Hossam posted today, which show the islanders’ fight against soldiers and include a documentary on the island.

The spies who loved NIE

This is just plain bizarre. Where has this report been for the last two years?

WASHINGTON, Dec. 3 — Rarely, if ever, has a single intelligence report so completely, so suddenly, and so surprisingly altered a foreign policy debate here.
An administration that had cited Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons as the rationale for an aggressive foreign policy — as an attempt to head off World War III, as President Bush himself put it only weeks ago — now has in its hands a classified document that undercuts much of the foundation for that approach.
The impact of the National Intelligence Estimate’s conclusion — that Iran had halted a military program in 2003, though it continues to enrich uranium, ostensibly for peaceful uses — will be felt in endless ways at home and abroad.
It will certainly weaken international support for tougher sanctions against Iran, as a senior administration official grudgingly acknowledged. And it will raise questions, again, about the integrity of America’s beleaguered intelligence agencies, including whether what are now acknowledged to have been overstatements about Iran’s intentions in a 2005 assessment reflected poor tradecraft or political pressure.

[From An Assessment Jars a Foreign Policy Debate About Iran – New York Times]

Scott Horton has links to a summary of the full report, which essentially says:

• We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program; we also assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. We judge with high confidence that the halt, and Tehran’s announcement of its decision to suspend its declared uranium enrichment program and sign an Additional Protocol to its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement, was directed primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran’s previously undeclared nuclear work.

• We continue to assess with low confidence that Iran probably has imported at least some weapons-usable fissile material, but still judge with moderate-to-high confidence it has not obtained enough for a nuclear weapon. We cannot rule out that Iran has acquired from abroad—or will acquire in the future—a nuclear weapon or enough fissile material for a weapon. Barring such acquisitions, if Iran wants to have nuclear weapons it would need to produce sufficient amounts of fissile material indigenously—which we judge with high confidence it has not yet done.

Of course that won’t stop the people at Warmongers Inc. (i.e. WINEP, that research center of the Israeli Ministry of Defense, just look at who wrote that report) to continue talking about how exactly they should be bombing Iran.

But it does raise some pretty big issues about why the Bush administration has exaggerated the threat that Iran’s nuclear program, why this year’s NIE contradicts previous ones, and how much this change of mind is politics rather than pure tradecraft and new information. The most likely source of new information for the American intelligence agencies would be the alleged Iranian defector believed to have been either selling intelligence to Western agencies for several years or to have more recently been turned. Remember this story from this Spring? It was hard to trust at the time, since it came out in the Sunday Times (that favorite clearinghouse for Mossad disinformation) and various Israeli newspapers.

Either way some might take it as a sign that the US intelligence community was either (1) scared into being extremely cautious after the Bush administration tried to blame it for missing the boat on Iraq, (2) going on the offensive against the Bush administration’s clear desire to sanction or bomb Iran as a form of revenge against being bullied about for the last seven year because they now face a discredited lame-duck president, or (3) both. Although now may now be a time to commend them for agreeing with the assessment of other intelligence agencies and of the IAEA (by the way: how about an apology to Mohamed Baradei?), in the end no matter which way you look at it they (the spy community) come out looking pretty bad. It’s going to take them a while to recover from the lack of trustworthiness demonstrated in the whole Iraq WMD fiasco.

I am now looking forward to seeing some of the wingnut commentary about how the people who wrote NIE are a bunch of appeasers, traitors and anti-semites. And, just maybe, a new policy towards Iran not designed to bring the Persian Gulf to the brink of apocalypse and that gives ordinary Iranians more, not less, access to the outside world. That’s the lesson to be learned from over a decade of sanctions against Iraq that destroyed that country’s civic fabric and, with the occupation, led to the present sorry state of affairs.

Links for December 3rd

Automatically posted links for December 3rd:

Links for 2 December

Automatically posted links for November 30th through December 2nd:

US withdraws resolution under Israeli pressure

US withdraws Mideast resolution:

UNITED NATIONS – Because of Israeli objections, the United States suddenly withdrew a U.N. resolution endorsing this week’s agreement by Israeli and Palestinian leaders to try to reach a Mideast peace settlement — even though the measure had overwhelming Security Council support.

The U.S. about-face in less than 24 hours on Friday surprised many U.N. diplomats and highlighted Israel’s difficult relations with the United Nations, which it contends is anti-Israeli and pro-Palestinian. But what surprised U.N. diplomats most was that the U.S. didn’t consult Israel, one of its closest allies, before introducing the draft resolution on Thursday afternoon.

With virtually every other Mideast resolution, the U.S. has consulted Israel in advance, but on Thursday, U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad first presented it at a closed council meeting.

As he left, he welcomed the “very positive” response from council members but told reporters he needed to consult with the Israelis and Palestinians on the text to ensure that the resolution was what they wanted.

It clearly was not what Israel wanted as a first step to support the agreement that emerged at the U.S.-sponsored Mideast conference in Annapolis, Md. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert agreed to try to reach a peace settlement by the end of 2008.

Well-informed diplomats said Israel didn’t want a resolution because it would bring the Security Council, which it distrusts, into the fledgling negotiations with the Palestinians.

The diplomats, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue, said Khalilzad introduced the draft resolution not only without consulting the Israelis and Palestinians but without getting broad support from President Bush’s administration.

“It’s not the proper venue,” Israel’s deputy ambassador Daniel Carmon told reporters after Friday’s council meeting. “We feel that the appreciation of Annapolis has other means of being expressed than in a resolution.”

Why don’t the Israelis want a UN resolution on Annapolis? Because they want to stay as far as possible from the solutions to the conflict that are most legitimate in international law, namely the ones contained in UN Resolution 242. As always, Israel gets its special treatment and dictates the US position in the United Nations. So while there is broad international consensus on the conflict, Israel seeks to escape it, because it can.